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Recent studies on international mediation have mainly focused on the impact of mediation on 
armed intra-state conflicts, emphasizing successfully completed ceasefires and peace 
agreements. Scholars have largely neglected the important part which mediation has played in 
implementing peace agreements. Accordingly, this dissertation aims at closing the research gap, 
analysing the impact of “pure” and “power” mediation on the successful implementation of 
peace agreements. To explain why some agreements have been successfully implemented, 
whereas others have experienced less progress, one should duly acknowledge the third-party 
mediators’ performance involving various qualities such as leverage power, facilitation, 
communication, monitoring, dispute resolution, confidence-building, providing security and 
spoiler prevention, planning timetable and arranging financial support for the implementation 
process. This study demonstrates that multiple power mediators (the UK and the Republic of 
Ireland in Ulster) and multiple pure mediators (the UN and COPAZ in El Salvador) are mutually 
supportive in the successful implementation of peace agreements. They are by far more 
successful than a singly acting pure mediator (Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 
Mindanao) or a single power mediator (Syrian Arab Republic in Lebanon). My thesis conducts 
a case analysis and likewise a comparative case analysis of four comprehensive peace 
agreements, revealing the two highest and the two lowest degrees of implementation. It takes 
extensive account of the difficult conditions under which governments and rebels have 
implemented peace agreements supported by international mediators. It thus reinforces the 
theories and practice of international mediation, of implementing peace agreements and of 
sustainable peace. Failed implementation leads to humanitarian disasters such as in Angola, 
Rwanda, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
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ACT   Action for Conflict Transformation  
AFP   Armed Forces of the Philippines  
ARENA  Alianza Republicana Nacionalista   
ARMM  Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao  
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ASG   Abu Sayyaf Group  
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GRP   Government of the Republic Philippines 
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MILF   Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
MINUSAL  United Nations Mission in El Salvador 
MNLF  Moro National Liberation Front  
MSDO  Most Similar Different Outcome 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 








ODECA  Organización de Estados Centroamericanos 
OIC   Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
OMSAR  Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform 
ONUSAL  United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador 
ONUV  United Nations Office of Verification in El Salvador 
ORDEN  Organización Democrática Nacionalista  
PAM   Peace Accords Matrix  
PIRA   Provisional Irish Republican Army  
PNC   Policia Nacional Civil 
PSNI   Policing in Northern Ireland 
PTSD   Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
RUC   Royal Ulster Constabulary  
SDLP   Social Democratic and Labour Party 
SPCPD  Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development  
SZOPAD  Special Zone of Peace and Development  
TJPA   Transitional Justice Peace Agreements  
TRC   Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
UDA   Ulster Defense Association  
UN   United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
UNIFIL  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
UNMDP  United Nations Multinational Donor Program 
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force 
UK   United Kingdom 
USA   United States of America 
USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 







Civil wars cause lots of humanitarian crises. Tens of thousands of people lose their lives or 
suffer severe physical injury. Civil-war victims suffer famine and malnutrition, as their 
country’s economy and infrastructure has been utterly devastated. The deterioration of health 
services leads to the emergence of epidemic diseases. Many of those who witnessed civil war 
violence have been psychologically traumatized. Victims are internally displaced and leave 
their homes to seek political asylum in foreign countries. Many of them lose their lives on 
migration routes. Countries hosting large numbers of refugees are now facing clashes between 
refugees and their local population. Refugees are confronted with economic crises, racism and 
increasingly powerful right-wing political parties. The power vacuum in civil war-torn 
countries has given rise to terrorist organizations violently oppressing the civilian population. 
New power struggles and proxy wars occur between regional or international powers. Problems 
caused by civil wars pose a major challenge for the UN and regional organizations in terms of 
conflict resolution and humanitarian aid. As to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the number 
of civil wars between 1946 and 2017 largely increased (UCDP 2018) and has still been on the 
increase since then (e.g., Syria, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq).  
 
Resolving civil wars is a challenging research task for scholars and policymakers aiming at 
peacebuilding. It requires a specific theoretical background, practical skills and a profound 
understanding of different cultures and history. Scholars engaged in peace and conflict studies 
have tried to identify possible causes of civil wars, maintaining that civil wars are generally due 
to governmental, territorial or economic power-sharing issues. Reaching a peaceful consensus 
in terms of governmental and territorial power-sharing between conflicting parties poses a great 
challenge. Trying to overcome such challenges, numerous political scientists in international 
mediation have developed various approaches to successfully mediate internal conflicts. 
However, mediation success is a relative concept. The question is what constitutes success 
(components of success) and how can it be adequately measured (Kleibor 1996; Bercovitch 
2005, 289). It has been generally acknowledged that whenever a conflict termination has been 
achieved, the mediation has been assessed as successful. The Peace Accord Matrix of the Kroc 





of them were achieved employing external mediation (Joshi et al. 2015; Högbladh 2011; 
DeRouen et al. 2011).   
 
As to resolving civil wars, the UN has repeatedly engaged itself in various peace initiatives at 
the international level because of its commitment for peacebuilding (Wallensteen 2015, 14). 
The same applies to the peacebuilding activities of regional organizations. After and during the 
Cold War, regional organizations (e.g., the EU, the African Union, the ECOWAS, the OIC, 
ASEAN), NGOs, and single states (Scandinavian countries, the US and Switzerland) also 
undertook peace initiatives in that respect. Civil wars are resolved via diplomatic channels (e.g., 
mediation, negotiations), economic or political sanctions, military intervention or one-sided 
victory. Some internal conflicts are “frozen” (e.g., Cyprus, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh), which 
means, although peace is being kept, the conflict has not been completely resolved (Perry 2009, 
40). Some civil wars seemed to end on a hopeful note, but a substantial peace agreement 
eventually failed. According to DeRouen et al. (2010, 333), studies have demonstrated that 
execution of civil war peace settlements is complex and likely to fail. Walter (2002, 5) likewise 
maintains that peace agreements in their implementation period are on the verge of failing, as 
former conflicting parties “have the greatest difficulty implementing the resulting terms.” 
Implementation requires strict time-planning and urges rival parties to constant commitment. 
Third parties acting as mediators are empowered to provide security and perform monitoring 
implementation activities. If their implementation capacity were to fail, renewed internal 
conflicts would emerge and mistrust between the opposing parties would be spread. Another 
problem could be that conflicting parties were to vehemently oppose a third party’s involvement 
in the implementation process. The third party’s presence would then be erroneously 
understood as interference in internal affairs.  
 
Recent studies have been focusing on the impact of mediation on intrastate armed conflicts, 
highlighting ceasefire and peace accords. However, they have given scant attention to peace 
agreements after the termination of internal conflicts, after a long time. I, therefore, wish to find 
out what happened ten years later, after the agreement had entered into force and to what extent 
the rules and obligations set out in the peace agreement were still obeyed by the respective 
parties. Those rules were implemented by signatories under new legal guarantees. There have 





post-agreement implementation periods. This field of research has not been thoroughly 
examined yet (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013, 8-9). Accordingly, this dissertation is closing a 
gap in the field of international mediation and implementation research by exploring the 
following research question: Under what conditions can external (pure and power) mediators 
enhance the implementation of mediated intrastate peace agreements? In this thesis, single case 
analysis and a comparative analysis of four post-agreement countries have been conducted. 
Four countries out of 26 mediated peace agreements dating from 1989 to 2012 were 
systematically selected (Joshi et al. 2015). Pure mediators, such as international organizations 
(the UN, the Comisión de Consolidación de la Paz (COPAZ), the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) and power mediators (the UK, the Irish Republic, Syria) were all involved 
in the implementation processes over ten years.  
 
I argue that multiple “power” or “pure” type third-party mediation1 is crucial to enhance a 
successful implementation process. By contrast, single pure or single power mediators are less 
likely to enhance successful implementation, as shown in the comparative and single-case 
analyses of El Salvador, Northern Ireland (UK), Lebanon and Mindanao (the Philippines). As 
peace agreements include challenging provisions in terms of governmental and territorial 
power-sharing, disarmament and ceasefire, it requires multiple third-party monitoring, 
leverage, assistance, security, specific knowledge, coordination, facilitation, guarantee and 
financial support. Peace spoilers are likely to violate peace processes since they do not comply 
with any peace agreements. Third-party mediators providing security guarantee are necessary 
to prevent the violation of agreements and any kind of conflict recurrence. When the provision 
of disarming a rebel group has been implemented, an experienced third-party mediator should 
coordinate the specific decommissioning processes. Multiple mediators can likewise ensure 
secure elections and carefully monitor them. In case an implementation process should prove 
unsuccessful, third-party mediators could still persuade parties to keep the implementation 
process running by arranging financial and technical assistance. As long as multiple third 
                                               
1 “Power mediators are defined as mediation efforts by great powers, colonial powers, and neighbouring states, 
whereas mediators who are representatives of international, regional, or non-governmental organizations, 
individuals, and small and distant states, are classified as pure mediators” (Svensson, 2007, 230). “Power - the 
ability to move a party in an intended direction – is often referred to in mediation as “leverage”. The “powerless” 
or “pure” mediator, however, is to persuade parties lacking leverage to communicate more easily with each other 





parties work together and mutually share specific responsibilities, successful peace 
implementation will be more likely. A singly acting third-party mediator is less likely to be 
successful (e.g., Lebanon and Mindanao, the Philippines). The lack of political will, financial 
support, experience or personal skill hampers implementation processes. Sometimes a single 
mediator takes sides with one of the rival parties out of political, economic or military interest 
in the country concerned. In that case, specific provisions can only be partially implemented by 
a single mediator.  
 
We remember the mediation work of certain implementation facilitators such as Martti 
Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, who personally committed himself to the 
implementation process of the Aceh Peace Agreement in Indonesia. Carl Bildt, former Swedish 
Prime Minister, served as a mediator in the implementation process of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (1996-97). He was largely responsible for building up a democratic framework in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nelson Mandela, former president of South Africa, arranged financial 
support for Burundi in the implementation process of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement (2000).  Successful mediators should share their valuable experience, assisting other 
mediators in future implementation processes, as they have become fully knowledgeable of 
core incompatibilities and have learnt to find proper solutions.   
 
1.1 Rationale and Contributions 
 
The dissertation takes extensive account of the difficult conditions under which governments 
and rebels have implemented peace agreements supported by third parties. Why is the impact 
of third-party mediation on implementation processes of intrastate peace agreements important? 
One main rationale justifies the necessity for this study. Dissatisfaction among post-agreement 
parties with missing implementation and power-sharing content are likely to engender a breach 
of agreements and nothing is done by state officials and third parties to provide lasting peace. 
DeRouen et al. (2010, 334) argue that international third parties are likely to contribute to 
conflict termination; however, they are not involved in implementation processes. In that sense, 





until the full implementation of a peace agreement has been achieved. They should act on behalf 
of a weak state capacity and provide assistance and security in post-conflict periods. To 
implement the Dayton Peace Agreement “more than 20 billion dollars” were needed; “35 billion 
dollars” were spent on the Arusha Peace Agreement (Stedman 2002, 661). The Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (2007, 13) maintains that a general lack of support for peace 
agreements might lead to failure. It states that “43% of wars in the 1990s restarted within five 
years of an initial negotiated” arrangement. Failed peace agreements in Angola (1993) and 
Rwanda (1994) resulted in large numbers of casualties (Stedman 2001, 20). As any violation 
of peace agreements should be strictly avoided, external third parties should carefully monitor 
the implementation process. They should forecast spoiling problems soon, provide security, 
replace missing state capacity, provide confidence-building between hostile parties and create 
dialogue networks at local levels. In that regard, the role of third-party mediation remains 
underrated in the research field of international mediation. This dissertation aims to closely 
examine the long-term role of third-party mediation.  
 
Power and pure mediators are from different international or regional organizations. They 
belong to different third countries and NGOs. Their impact on reaching a successful 
implementation is therefore highly diversified due to their different skills, capacity and support 
services. The implementation of single provisions (e.g., ceasefire arrangements, institutional 
reforms, security reforms or financial supports) presents a tremendous challenge to mediators, 
especially as certain provisions which are related to the outbreak of the conflict are more 
difficult to implement. A failure to implement those provisions might trigger an eruption of 
violence. Joshi and Darby (2013, 270) argue that conflict recurrence would increase in case of 
failed implementation of peace arrangements.  
 
The single case analyses and comparative case analyses in this dissertation contribute the 
importance of different third parties in implementation processes: cooperation of the UN with 
COPAZ in El Salvador, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Mindanao (the 
Philippines), the United Kingdom together with the Republic of Ireland in Ulster and Syria as 
the only third party in Lebanon. They provide new insights into the theory and practice of 
international mediation in terms of territorial, economic, security and governmental power-





theory of international mediation and the implementation of power-sharing peace agreements. 
It emphasizes post-conflict peacebuilding, the prevention of conflict recurrence and sustainable 
peace. It bridges the gap between present theory and the practice of international mediation.  
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis  
 
The dissertation comprises various sections: introduction to the subject matter, rationales and 
contributions. The individual chapters address the following topics: Chapter II: Literature 
Review and Research Gaps and layout. Chapter III: Theoretical Framework, Chapter IV: 
Methodology and Research Design, Chapter V: Single Case and Comparative Case Analyses 
of El Salvador, Lebanon, Northern Ireland (UK) and the Philippines, Chapter VI: Main 
Conclusion - Academic and Practical Implications. 
 
Firstly, Chapter III summarizes essential elements of the theoretical framework of discussions 
found in literature about intra-state peace agreements, territorial and governmental power-
sharing arrangements, transitional justice in post-conflict societies, international mediation, 
power mediation versus pure mediators, strategic coordination between multiple mediators 
versus single mediator which is to increase or diminish implementation success. Finally, the 
special tasks of external mediators in terms of peace agreement implementation processes are 
introduced. They are crucial functions for implementation: monitoring and verification, 
sponsoring and donor support, dispute resolution services, confidence-building mechanisms, 
third-party security guarantees, combating peace spoilers, commitment problems and external 
enforcement mechanisms, as well as implementation timetables. Chapter IV: Methodology and 
research design, single case and comparative case analyses (MSDO), case selection procedures, 
identification of dependent and independent variables, data sources and limitations, detailed 
elements of the thesis project.  
 
Chapter V closely analyses the four selected cases individually and compares them with one 
another systematically, depending on the specified constant categories of implementation. They 





Implementation of institutional-governmental power-sharing 3) Implementation of security 
power-sharing 4) Implementation of human rights and reconciliation arrangements 5) 
Implementation of economic power-sharing. In the framework of that procedure, the basic 
research question is strictly observed. This chapter deals with the respective backgrounds of 
internal armed conflicts, types of mediation, the enormous efforts made by mediators until 
peace agreements were signed, the presentation of various subject matters on power-sharing 
arrangements. Furthermore, arrangements are being examined individually, taking into account 
the given post-conflict conditions, the spheres of action and achieved agreements, ascribing 
importance to the assessment of long-term mediation over ten years. Finally, chapter VI 
contains the most significant conclusion to be drawn from this thesis. It presents the academic 




























Chapter II:  




















Intra-state conflict mediation is playing an increasingly important part of peacebuilding and 
conflict resolution. In recent years, literature dealing with international mediation has 
emphasized short-term mediation efforts, effects and success in international armed conflicts, 
aiming at achieving ceasefires and peace agreements. However, less attention has been paid to 
long-term mediation effects in post-agreement implementation processes. Peace agreements are 
sometimes doomed to fail in implementation processes. This literature review predominantly 
presents research on conflict mediation, the conceptualization of successful mediation and 
peace-agreement implementation. Research gaps based on the present literature are identified. 
It will facilitate to concretize the research question of the thesis which has not been answered 
yet.  
 
2.1 Conflict Mediation and Conflict Termination 
 
Countries having suffered from civil wars are more likely to face new civil wars according to 
statistics from the World Development Report (Call 2012, 2). In that regard, successful 
international mediation plays an important role to resolve conflicts and prevent their recurrence. 
Literature dealing with international mediation emphasizes the active role of mediation in 
connection with the termination of internal conflicts. Research questions are asked; “When” 
should third-party mediation occur in a military conflict? “How” should it occur? Which 
“strategy of mediation” would be most successful? “What” should be done in the post-
agreement process to achieve lasting peace? (Duursma 2014, 82-83). However, international 
mediation success is a relative, temporal and complex concept. Conventionally, short-term 
assessments have been used to define success in mediation evaluation (Bercovitch and Simpson 
2010, 69). Various approaches – mediator’s identity and characteristics, mediation styles, 
conflict circumstances and intensity, the number of mediators – in terms of empirical 
measurement and assessment relating to international conflict mediation outcomes have been 
widely discussed and analysed by a great number of scholars (Frei 1975, 1976; Kleiboer 1996; 
Bercovitch 1991, 1996, 2011; Carnevale and Arad 1996; Walter 2002; Bercovitch and 
DeRouen 2004, 2005; Svensson 2006, 2007, 2009; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Savun 2008; 





Wallensteen and Svensson 2014). Case analysis was conducted by Sisk (2009) to assess the 
role of international mediators in internal conflicts in South Africa, Liberia, Burundi, Kashmir, 
and Sri Lanka. 
 
One of the historical contributions in the mediation field is provided by Frei (1975). He 
statistically evaluates causal mechanism and conditions that promote mediation success through 
a systematic comparison of historical cases, facts and mediation efforts in international conflicts 
(1960-1974). He argues that mediation success depends on conflict parties and structural 
preconditions. Mediation proves successful, if the conflicting parties are widely acknowledged 
as warring factions, have less conflict inside the parties, financially dependent on external 
actors, mediation is supported by an international organization, by superpowers and mediators 
that have not been involved in the conflict with either party. The success can be weakened by 
the conflict incompatibilities in terms of decolonization, power-sharing and security issues and 
the high intensity of ongoing conflict (Frei 1975, 484-486). The acceptance of external third-
party mediation in certain internal conflicts has been interpreted as success. The variation of 
success is further conceptualized in terms of mediation occurrence and non-occurrence between 
conflicting parties by Frei (1976, 69). In the following theoretical development, the success of 
conflict mediation can be determined, when a ceasefire or peace agreement has been reached 
in a short-term process, a fact which has been commonly acknowledged (Savun 2008, 25). 
Similarly, success can be determined when a peace agreement has been signed through 
mediation (Bercovitch et al. 2009, 205-206; Pospieszna and Schneider 2011, 2). Once all parties 
are pleased with the procedure or the result, mediation is deemed successful. This subjective 
criterion is related to the perception of parties, mediators, and to some extent, to external actors 
(Bercovitch 2011, 85). The result Bercovitch has achieved is derived from two case studies 
(The Camp David and Oslo mediations) and an intensive quantitative study concerning the time 
of 1945 and 1995 (295 international conflicts and 1,666 mediation cases). The benchmark of 
satisfaction comes from Susskind and Cruikshank (1987)2. Here one can see that public 
satisfaction has been widely overlooked. It should equally play an important part in post-
agreement periods, otherwise, a conflict recurrence can occur in post-conflict societies.  
                                               
2 See, Susskind, L. E., and Cruikshank, J. (1987). Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving 






Sandu (2013) qualitatively focuses on indicators and qualities impacting successful mediation 
processes and mediator skills. An assumption is developed by his fellow practitioners of the 
Transylvanian Institute for Mediation: “Successful mediation” would be one where the conflict 
parties should not appeal to someone else with identical issue in the long-term (ibid. 31), Sandu 
emphasizes four values of success in mediation processes, pointing out the positive effect of 
mediation: fairness, efficiency, satisfaction and effectiveness. Other factors are presented that 
might influence success: Selection of a fair mediator, proper preparation for mediation, a clear 
resolution mandate and personal qualities such as listening skills, confidentiality, neutrality, 
trust, optimism and modesty (ibid. 35-39). Kleiboer (1999, 13) insists that mediation eventually 
ends in a sustainable settlement agreed and endorsed by all parties to the dispute. In contrast, 
Nathan (1999, 3) defines success as the end of hostilities between former enemies and the 
beginning of democratic rule which is to support lasting peace. Svensson (2014), however, 
suggests having a peace institution regulating core incompatibilities in conflicts within the 
framework of “power, security, and justice”. 
 
 Kleiboer (1996) critically deals with the state of the arts in terms of successful international 
mediation in the light of contextual factors i.e., “characteristics of the dispute, parties and their 
interrelationship, characteristics of the mediator and the international context”. The most 
important point of criticism is the “conceptual” vagueness in terms of “dependent variables, 
how to measure success? and the independent variables i.e., when is conflict ripe for resolution? 
when can a mediator be considered powerful?” Explaining the success of mediation is not 
explicitly determined where it ends up (Kleiboer 1996, 376). Moreover, qualitative assessments 
can be empirically backed up. Bercovitch and Simpson contend that if we have a long-term 
interpretation of success, we should acknowledge it can take 10 to 15 years to assess if a peace 
deal will endure and would therefore be effective (2010, 73). A peace agreement can last even 
more than 10 years without a full implementation (e.g., General peace agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Forces in the 
Casamance, 2004, Bodo Accord between the Government of India and the Government of 
Assam, 1993). Those peace agreements do not ensure the optimum of quality peace. The long-
term perspective of success is closely related to the implementation success of peace 





problematic, as it might ignore some of the qualitative aspects of the components of success in 
post-agreement periods. 
 
Another challenge regarding success conceptualization is the question of who defines the 
generally valid criteria of success. Should it be the third-party mediators or the rival parties?  Is 
public satisfaction the ultimate step in the perception of mediation success? It is important to 
understand that all three questions belong together and depend on one another. As the mediator 
strictly aims to reach a peace agreement, the rival parties rigorously strive for an effective 
ceasefire agreement and the public eagerly wishes a beneficial agreement on specific provisions 
such as security or social justice, the high expectations and hopes of the mediator, rival parties 
and the civilian population seem to greatly differ from each other, but viewed in its entirety, 
they complement each other in terms of success achievement. Only if different expectations are 
fully respected in a peace-building process, mediation can prove itself successful.  
 
2.2 Mediation and Peace-Agreement Implementation 
 
The book, Ending Civil Wars - The Implementation of Peace Agreements was published in 
collaboration between the International Peace Academy and the Center for International 
Security and Cooperation (Edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. 
Cousens 2002). Researchers, practitioners and diplomats contribute to implementation 
strategies and tasks based on case studies on how to ensure implementing peace agreements. 
Stedman (2002, 2) considers a mediation process as successful when a peace agreement has 
been signed and fully implemented and the help of a third party is no longer needed. This means 
sustainable peace has been achieved between former warring parties. The country’s self-
governance has been re-established, which underlines the utmost importance of sustained peace 
and prevents the recurrence of civil wars. The implementation of peace agreements is to be 
considered as a long-term temporal process that always requires improvement in the long run. 
Elizabeth Cousens, director of Strategy at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, summarizes 
long-term mediation and implementation processes in unequivocal terms: ‘it ain’t over ‘til it’s 





success via implementation will provide a novel academic impulse to political scientists 
involved in international mediation. This research is based on concrete circumstances such as 
intra-state conflicts. Therefore mediation, peace agreements and implementation processes are 
successive in this context. They are related to each other and should be jointly considered.  
 
In quantitative and qualitative literature dealing with peace duration and the implementation of 
peace agreements, consideration has been given to explaining variables. Bercovitch and 
Simpson (2010) have investigated three cases, Angola, Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone, 
emphasizing three main factors generally accepted in policy-related literature on lasting peace: 
Dealing with peace spoilers, international security guarantee, and military power-sharing. They 
explain that these factors should be considered carefully to facilitate lasting peace in post-
agreement periods. According to DeRouen and Chowdhury (2013, 1), who use logit models 
(1975-2011), the associated factors between implementation and peace agreements are 
“credible commitment problems”. They are due to the government's incapability of 
implementing peace agreements and handling disputants starting a new wave of violence. 
Stedman points out that a peace agreement might be violated by a spoiler who has been 
opposing the agreement right from the outset or during the implementation process (i.e., 
excluding conflicting parties from the same location/region). Spoilers occurred in Angola 
(1992) and Rwanda, in 1994 (National Research Council 2000, 178). In 2008, the Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (2008, 66-67) summarized the following important factors for 
implementation in the Oslo Forum Networks for Mediators: Monitoring and dispute-resolution 
mechanisms, peace spoiler prevention mechanism and providing confidence-building support 
between local and regional actors.  
 
Joshi and Darby (2013) introduced the Peace Accords Matrix which enables researchers to 
compare 35 peace agreements between 1989 and 2007. They emphasize socio-economic 
development and security-related provisions such as the military, police, DDR programs 
(disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former fighters). These provisions and 
socio-economic development particularly support successful post-peacebuilding (Joshi and 
Darby 2013, 255, 268). Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) argue that implemented military power-
sharing provisions such as the reintegration of former fighters are beneficial to sustainable 





guarantees provided by third parties. According to them, both are successful to implement peace 
but do not guarantee durable peace. The result is derived from a probit regression models. 
Arnault (2006) emphasizes the interaction of UN peacekeeping forces and implementation, 
particular focus is set on the role of the UN in El Salvador and Guatemala. 
 
According to Walter (2002), combatants eagerly require credible third-party enforcement 
comprising verification mechanisms and security guarantees, which ensures success in power-
sharing implementation. She empirically analyses numerous civil wars between 1940 and 1992. 
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 327) point out that the involvement of a third-party executioner 
minimizes the likelihood of settlement collapse by 83 per cent. Numbers of external third-party 
arrangements occurring between 1989–2007 have been provided by Joshi and Darby (2013, 
266): The most popular provision for an international settlement is involvement of the United 
Nations, the diplomatic or domestic monitoring mechanism and the UN peacekeeping 
arrangement. A statistical study undertaken by Fortna (2004) goes in the same direction to focus 
on the effect of peacekeeping: Peacekeeping following civil conflict does make a substantial 
contribution to peace preservation. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) present a new dataset in terms 
of the implementation of power-sharing pacts after the time of the Cold War. According to 
Jarstad and Nilsson (2008, 219), the presence of a UN or non-UN organisation has no bearing 
on the likelihood of peace breaking down. An important sign of peace anticipation is identified, 
in case, if the military and territorial power-sharing provisions are implemented. In contrast, 
the impact of political power-sharing is insignificant for lasting peace. In this research, 
international mediators are not included to focus on implementation. 
 
One of the less investigated factors in that context is the level of state capacity to implement 
peace agreements. Civil war-torn countries with fragile economies are not able to financially 
secure a peace process for lack of funds. “More than 20 billion dollars” were needed to 
implement the Dayton Peace Accord, “35 billion dollars” were needed in the Arusha-Peace-
Agreement (Stedman 2002, 661). This variable has been thoroughly examined by DeRouen et 
al. (2010) utilizing 14 peace agreements which show that state capacity is urgently needed to 
maintain lasting peace. Sobek (2010) has also provided a close analysis of different variables 





war is lower in countries with strong economies. If civil war should break out there, social 
conditions in those countries would generally facilitate peace negotiations.   
 
Stedman (2002, 148) emphasizes five key elements leading to successful implementation 
processes: “the peace accord itself, the implementation environment, the implementers, the 
warring parties, and verification”. 26 of 31 intra-state comprehensive peace agreements 
between 1989 and 2012 were achieved utilizing mediation efforts by accordance with the Civil 
War Mediation Dataset (DeRouen et al. 2011), the Peace Accord Matrix (Joshi et al. 2015) and 
“the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset” (Högbladh 2011). Signing a peace agreement is seen as 
a successful, short-term mediation result by some scholars. However, the impact of mediators 
(type and number) on effective implementation processes in specific provisions has been 
neglected in previous research. The following illustration summaries the causal mechanisms 
which explain sustainable post-peace building and implementation of the peace agreement in 


















 dealing with peace spoilers 
 international security guarantee  
 military power-sharing 




 credible commitment problems 
 government's incapability 
   
Stedman 
(2002) 
 peace spoiler prevention  
 state capacity 
 financial support 
 peace accord itself 
 implementation environment 
 implementers 
 warring parties 
 verification 





 monitoring and dispute-resolution 
mechanisms 
 peace spoiler prevention mechanism 
 providing confidence-building 
   
Joshi and 
Darby (2013) 
 socio-economic development  
 security-related provisions such as 
the military, police, DDR programs 








 military power-sharing provisions 
 third party enforcement  




 power-sharing provisions and 
arrangements 
 security guarantees provided by third 
parties 
   
Arnault 
(2006) 
 UN peacekeeping forces    
Walter (2002)  credible third-party enforcement 
comprising verification mechanisms 
and security guarantees 
   
Joshi and 
Darby (2013) 




 Implementation performance of the 
military and territorial power-sharing 
provisions  
   
DeRouen et 
al. (2010) 
 state capacity    
Sobek (2010)  state capacity and strong economy of 
a post-conflict country 
   
 
 
In general, we can affirm that independent variables and causal mechanisms in the above-
mentioned table have been taken into due consideration by scholars to associate lasting peace 
and the implementation of peace agreements in quantitative analysis. However, the 
implementation of peace agreements has not been thoroughly investigated on the subject of 
long-term mediators over a long time yet, as these peace agreements comprise numerous single 
power-sharing provisions. Considering that there is no comprehensive study in that field, there 
is ample scope for an in-depth comparative case study. That will enable us to qualitatively 
assess the impact of third-party mediation (single or multiple mediation, pure or power 
mediation) on various provisions of peace agreements in implementation processes. This thesis 
aims at filling a research gap in international mediation, focusing on the time after the 
termination of internal conflicts and the implementation of a peace agreement. Therefore, this 
dissertation is exploring the following research question: Under what conditions can external 





































Any observational or semi theory of social or psychological processes, at diverse aspects, that 
can be generalized to the perception of phenomena is known as a theoretical framework (Anfara 
and Mertz 2015). To understand the phenomena of mediator impact on peace agreement 
implementation process, the following steps are organized:  
 
Firstly, this chapter summarizes essential elements of the theoretical framework of discussions 
found in literature about mediation, peace-conceptualization, peacebuilding, a peace 
agreement, intra-state conflict and incompatibilities. Secondly, international mediation is dealt 
with in terms of international, regional and domestic actors, numbers, strategies, characteristics 
and success rate. The concepts of power versus pure mediation and strategic coordination of 
conflict mediation (single versus multiple mediators) are introduced. Long-term pure and power 
third-party mediation encompassing a wide range of tasks, procedures and factors during the 
implementation process of power-sharing peace agreements is discussed (e.g., monitoring and 
verification, sponsoring and donor support, resolution of dispute and commitment problems, 
security guarantee, enforcement and confidence-building, peace spoiler-prevention and 
implementation of timetable). The quality of peace agreements, mediator effect on transitional 
justice mechanisms is shown. Subsequently, internal peace agreements are summarized in 
which transitional justice regarding victim provisions has been incorporated. Thirdly, the main 
focus is set on the implementation issue of peace agreements, as it is an essential part of 
processing the research question. Finally, gaps and shortcomings that exist in the complex 
argumentation based on the present theory of international mediation are addressed.  
3.1 Internal Conflicts 
According to the definition of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), an intra-state 
conflict takes place ”between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference 
from other countries”.  It is defined in similar terms by the “Heidelberger Institute for 
International Conflict Research” (HIIK): ”intra-state conflicts are conducted between non-state 
actors and national governments. Sub-state conflicts comprise only non-state actors” (HIIK 
2016, 14).  The typology of conflicts is mainly divided into inter-state and intra-state conflicts. 





since the end of World War II. The type of intra-state incompatibilities is divided into territorial 
and governmental issues. They are ordinary types of intra-state conflicts which have different 
levels of challenges to be resolved and thus secure lasting peace (Pospieszna and Schneider 
2011, 8). 
 
The type of territorial conflict occurs within a state territory and aims at replacing or sharing 
official control in a certain limited geographical area that longs for autonomy or independence 
(UCDP 2017a). The incompatibilities may be caused by a lack of political, economic or security 
representation or lack of fairer power-sharing issues between different groups (e.g., majority 
versus minority). Those issues might be based on ideological, ethnic, religious diversities or 
some kind of oppression, discrimination against minorities and unjustified distribution of 
income. In contrast, governmental conflicts encompass the entire scope of state territory. They 
arise from the urge to control the whole state, which means the political system of the 
government, the military, economy, justice, and the constitution. Governmental and territorial 
issues have often occurred since the end of the Cold War, but governmental conflicts have 
resulted in more fatalities than territorial ones (Pettersson et al. 2019).  
 
Intra-state incompatibilities cause high numbers of casualties. Wherever a humanitarian 
disaster occurs, the United Nations Security Council bears primary responsibility for 
peacekeeping and likewise assumes an obligation guaranteed by International Law, the 
“responsibility to protect “(R2P) civilians (Bellamy 2009).  However, a common consensus in 
the UN Security Council is required. As to the Syrian Civil War, 12 UN resolutions were vetoed 
by Russia and China, which made a UN peacekeeping intervention impossible (Sciboz 2018). 
Similarly, as there was not any consensus in the Arab League, measures failed to prevent 
massacres in Syria, one of its member states. 
 
Call (2012) laments the high number of casualties in civil wars. Countries having suffered from 
civil wars are more likely to face new civil wars according to statistics from the World 
Development Report 2011. The failure of peace settlements leads to renewed conflicts, as in 
Liberia. Consolidating peace in post-war countries is a tremendous challenge. According to 





internal war recurrence. However, in matters of political exclusion, political or governmental 
power-sharing among parties is more essential than economic power-sharing. 
 
3.2 Peace and Peace Agreements 
 
A classic contribution to peace research was made by German philosopher Immanuel Kant, 
whose famous essay, ”Perpetual Peace”, makes us understand the timeline of peace 
conceptualization (Kant and Humphrey 1970). Kant aims at ensuring sustainable peace among 
states, involving people in government utilizing a republican, legal order. His thoughts and 
insights were strongly influenced by the circumstances of his time. Nevertheless, he built his 
framework of thought. According to Kant, sustainable peace at an international level can only 
be guaranteed through a generally applicable legal system, such as an international law 
respected by all participants. People’s rights should be held sacred. Needless to say, his concept 
of international law has inspired the Charter of the United Nations (Friedrich 1947). He opposes 
interference in the internal affairs of other states and argues that the degree of hostility between 
conflicting parties should not go beyond a certain limit. He maintains that overstepping the 
limit of hostility would make future peace talks difficult and that a multilateral peace treaty 
would decrease armed conflicts between states. Politics should be based on morality. 
 
A pivotal contribution to the concept of peace was made by Johan Galtung, (1969) who 
published his paper “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” in 1969. He approaches the 
terminology of “peace” and “violence” from a semantic and also ontological point of view.  He 
has turned peace research into a novel field, conceptualizing, classifying and framing 
definitions of peace and violence, focusing on the different meanings of the two terms. He 
interprets peace as a social goal and as social order and defines it as an absence of violence. He 
emphasizes six crucial dimensions of violence: the distinction between physical/psychological, 
negative/positive, object/subject aspects, and intended/unintended and manifest/latent. Some 
factors overlap. He ascribes great importance to perceived personal and structural violence, 






Peter Wallensteen’s concept of “quality peace” differs from Galtung’s “absence of violence” 
(Wallensteen 2015). Wallensteen takes a historical view of traditional rivalries between various 
countries and peace solutions. These rivalries reoccurred because of changing pragmatic, 
political conditions in the past. To avoid recurrent conflicts, there can be some kind of 
exemplary intergovernmental unification such as the EU, which has created lasting peace. 
Ending wars may be achieved by military victory or peacebuilding agreements. However, peace 
needs certain post-peace-building regulations which cannot simply be realized employing 
peace-agreements (negative peace), but by quality peace. Quality peace depends on human 
dignity, security and predictability. They may prevent recurring wars in post-conflict periods 
in different ways and enable a sustainable, peaceful social world order. For instance, the conflict 
in Sri Lanka was resolved by a one-sided victory. However, incompatibilities in terms of human 
dignity are still there, which might entail new conflicts. In his definition of peace, Call (2012) 
values the perception of peace among societies. According to him, returning refugees are 
indicators of perception. However, perception of peace, war, stability, termination of the 
conflict, onset of peace, determination of periods are relative concepts. 
 
As we can see, contemporary conceptualizations of peace through a formal social contract or 
an agreement between states on an international level are highly beneficial to sustainable peace. 
However, lasting peace should not be taken for granted. Lessons from the past should be 
heeded. The absence of a peace agreement after a ceasefire or failure to implement a peace 
agreement may generate a recurrence of armed conflicts in a post-civil war society. “A peace 
agreement is a formal agreement between warring parties, which addresses the 
disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it or by clearly outlining a process for 
how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility” (UCDP 2017a).  It might be signed 
after ceasefire agreements or a long negotiation process through mediators or absence of 
mediators. It is an important formal step, a social contract to build peace and prevent the 
recurrence of civil wars in post-conflict societies. However, peace needs regular maintenance. 
Peace should be maintained employing justice, democracy, human right, welfare, “security, 
dignity and equity”, respect, mutual integration in post-conflict societies (Wallensteen 2015, 
16, 21). In that sense, the support of third parties in post-conflict countries is important, as civil 






Call (2012) tackles the question of why terminated conflicts reoccur in some cases but not in 
others. Due to the lack of previous research, this question can barely be answered. He points 
out that research work on that issue has long been neglected, as scholars, so far, have mainly 
focused on the character of agreements, on the degree of commitment among the parties, on 
state capacity and the effort made by third parties. In contrast, there are civil war cases that did 
not comprise any real peace agreements: Kosovo (1998), East Timor (1999), Afghanistan 
(2001), Haiti (2004) and Sri Lanka (2009). He criticizes the theory of “effectiveness of 
peacekeeping” as a tool for maintaining peace, while armed conflicts were still going on in 
Liberia, Haiti and East Timor after peacekeeping agreements. He is not so much concerned 
with short-lived ceasefires nor with their statistical analysis. He is most concerned with stable 
ceasefires lasting at least for one year. Moreover, it is generally believed that the failure to 
establish peace agreements leads to renewed conflicts, as in Liberia. To avoid any type of 
misunderstanding or expectations in post-conflict periods, peace agreements have to be 
achieved subtly. Inclusionary strategies such as the integration of former enemies into political 
or security institutions fully contribute to successful peacebuilding and peace consolidation.  
 
By comparison, there have been ceasefires that finally resulted in successful peace agreements 
after some years. Basic provisions such as power-sharing, democracy and human rights were 
fully implemented. One could conclude that that type of peace agreement might ensure lasting 
peace to a higher degree than stable ceasefires. To enhance the successful implementation of 
such agreements, external support from international, regional or neighbour states is necessary.  
 
Transitional justice provisions are important parts of peace agreements that promote sustainable 
peace and peaceful coexistence. Transitional justice as a response to the systematic violation of 
human rights aims to re-establish the rule of law after a violent conflict. It should be 
administered at the turning point of a conflict-ridden past to a new peaceful settlement. 
Democratic principles should be practised in a conflict between repressive regimes and heavily 
polarized members and victims of a civil war (Kritz 1995; Crocker 2000; De Brito et al. 2001; 
Vinjamuri and Snyder 2004; Lincoln 2011). Transitional justice concepts should be intensified 
in institutional arrangements to guarantee truth-seeking and legal protection of victims in post-
peace agreement societies. To live again peacefully together, one should resort to new coping 





comprehensive reconciliation utilizing judicial and non-judicial strategies and external third 
parties. 
 
International and national institutions assume responsibility, seeking justice and truth through 
legal procedures. They have been dealing successfully with political events of great historical 
importance: the Nuremberg Trials after World War II, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South 
Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War (Crocker, 2000; Roth-Arriza and Mariezcurrena, 2006). 
The International Criminal Court, the UN, civil societies and NGOs have undertaken 
transitional justice initiatives which have led to some reconciliation in former conflict-ridden 
countries (Brahm 2006; Lundy and McGovern 2008; Gissel 2015). 
 
The literature on transitional justice provides crucial evidence of how an unlimited level of 
hostility, crime, violation, rape and loss has traumatized and divided societies, making it 
difficult to establish peace and trust between perpetrators and victims in post-conflict eras 
(Barsalou 2008; Mendeloff 2009). Transitional justice is not a particular kind of justice, but 
rather justice tailored to the needs of communities changing a phase of widespread human rights 
violations (International Center for Transitional Justice 2009). Previous literature focusing on 
the interdisciplinary nature of transitional justice emphasizes similar aspects as peace research 
(i.e., prevention of conflict recurrence, post-war peacebuilding, lasting and quality peace) 
(Vinjamuri and Snyder 2004; Lambourne 2009).  In the concluding surveys of a 2011 discourse 
in the Economist, 76 per cent of discourse respondent believed with the argument that peace 
can only be maintained by the implementation of justice (Binder 2013, 24). 
 
The transitional justice concept has been complemented through a set of individual sub-
components such as reparation programs, return of refugees, criminal justice (prosecutions), 
land issues, past mechanism (truth-seeking commission), amnesty, judicial reform (national 
reconciliation), prisoner release, gender justice, policing (security system reform), 
memorialization efforts, victims, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs 
(TJPA Database 2017; Theidon 2007). In that regard, the Transitional Justice Peace 
Agreements Database facilitates comparisons between transitional justice arrangements in 





procedures for safeguarding the rights of victims and aims at preventing prospective human 
right abuses in post-conflict societies (Teitel 2000; Bell 2009; Pham et al. 2010; Lambourne 
2009). This process is an important step to achieving reconciliation and restoring the dignity of 
war-time victims (ICTJ 2009).  
 
“Victim” has been defined in the resolution of 40/34 of the United Nations (1985), the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. 
A considerable number of countries have become prime examples of repressions endured under 
authoritarian regimes, incompatibility and intense and long-lasting armed conflicts entailing 
immense suffering among the civilian population: Bosnia, Nepal, Timor-Leste, South Africa, 
Argentina, Rwanda, Iraq, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, the UK (Northern Ireland), the 
Philippines, Sierra Leone, and DR Congo. From those post-war countries, one can see that the 
preferences of victims concerning transitional justice show disparities. According to the TJPA 
Database (2017), seventeen internal armed post-conflict countries included victim provisions 
based on reconciliation purposes of transitional justice from 1990 to 2007 (e.g., accountability; 
truth-seeking, compensation, rehabilitation of post-trauma syndrome, indemnification, social 
integration; memorial, amnesty) They are basic requirements for new cohabitation and 
reconciliation (Aiken 2010).  
 
Modern studies of transitional justice attitudes toward victims distinguish between retributive 
(i.e., trials, punishments) and restorative justice (i.e., truth, reparation, amnesty) in post-conflict 
settings. Focus is placed on a victim-centred investigation in the post-war era of different 
countries. For instance, an evidence collection has been provided by Backer (2010) about 
violations committed during the apartheid regime in South Africa through “153 victims”. These 
victims preferred punitive justice to amnesty, thus expressing pent-up frustration about the 
reconciliation commission and its inability to find out the truth. Another correlation between 
“victimization and demands for punishment and truth” is found in post-conflict Burundi (Samii 
2011, 3). Pham et al. (2004) surveyed 2,074 victims who had been exposed to trauma in the 
Rwandan Civil War and who had witnessed genocide there. The result clearly showed that the 
victims preferred criminal justice. “More respondents supported the local judicial responses 
(90.8% supported Gacaca trials and 67.8% the Rwanda national trials) than the ICTR (42.1% 





required by “85% of respondents” in the post-conflict setting of Eastern DR Congo. Victims 
preferred “national trials (45%), followed by internationalized trials in the DRC (40%)” (Vinck 
et al. 2008, 2). Taylor (2015) likewise identified the “perpetrator accountability” among the 
victims’ preferences in Colombia.  
 
In contrast, victims in the Nepalese post-conflict society desire truth-seeking for the 
disappearance of people and demand financial compensation rather than a judicial process 
(Robins 2011). Victim preferences for compensation, reconstruction or reparation have often 
been provided as options in various post-conflict settings (e.g., Uganda, Georgia/Abkhazia, 
Ethiopia/Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Iraq, the Philippines) (TJPA Database 2017). The civil war in 
Guatemala resulted in the deaths of 200,000 people; thousands were wounded or went missing. 
The struggle for truth-seeking was a big issue in Guatemala, where victims urgently required 
comprehensive truth-seeking mechanisms rather than reparations and justice (Isaacs 2010). In 
contrast, Biro et al. (2004) refer to evidence given by post-war victims in Bosnia and Croatia 
(in the cities of Vukovar, Mostar and Prijedor in 2000 and 2001). They point out “that the level 
of traumatic experience did not correlate with seeking war crime trials, or with positive attitudes 
towards the ICTY: One victim: "things lost will not be returned to me, nor will this ease my 
suffering." Another survivor said: "The best thing is to let everything be forgotten. The greatest 
justice for me would be to let me live and die in peace there where I was born." 
 
In comparison, an interdisciplinary contribution to the effectiveness of transitional justice 
mechanisms has been made employing public health investigation (e.g., trauma exposure and 
PTSD). If the healing process is to be handled effectively, social steps taken in the wake of 
severe abuse must consider the effects of trauma and deprivation (Pahm et al. 2004). The scope 
of discussion about transitional justice preferences of victims has been widened, as religious 
beliefs of victims are also taken into account. A positive correlation has been identified between 
religiousness and forgiveness (David and Choi 2006; Worthington et al. 2000). There have been 
mixed results as to victimization and preferences for transitional justice in various post-war 
countries. It is also important to assess the requirements of victims living in a city or the country.  
 
Peace agreements aim at ascertaining the full truth, some even require that human right abuses 





This is a difficult task, as members of parties would refuse to stand trial for war crimes and take 
responsibility for the past. In that regard, third-party mediators should strongly call upon the 
former warring parties to demonstrate social responsibility. External mediators can provide 
help to facilitate reconciliation processes. Reconciliation will enhance co-existence and create 
lasting peace in post-conflict societies. Pure mediators must make trials easier by having 
unbiased international judges, whereas power mediators must make use of pressure to establish 
commissions, in case parties should postpone or slow down their commitment. Further pressure 
on governments and rebel sides must be exerted by power mediators to hand over suspected 
persons who committed crimes against civilians. Multiple mediators must closely cooperate to 
find out individuals responsible for war crimes in order to practice transitional justice 
procedures without restriction. Moreover, multiple third parties should bear the financial cost 
of compensation for war-crime victims, mobilize NGO’s for documentation and initiate the 
building of war memorials.   
 
3.3 Power-sharing Concepts and Arrangements  
 
The concept of the power-sharing idea primarily originates from the “consociational 
democracy” approaches developed by Arend Lijphart (1969). Jarstad and Sisk (2009) argue 
that power-sharing doesn’t absolutely guarantee democracy. It applies to cases where certain 
rival actors or political opponents are excluded from power-sharing agreements. Power-sharing 
concepts and their purpose vary in governmental, territorial, economic and military issues. 
Numerous scholars have investigated the impact of power-sharing on democratic transitions, 
government formation, political institutions, autonomy, peace-building processes (Binningsbø 
2013, 90-95). These issues are most commonly based on territorial and governmental issues in 
countries. To overcome those incompatibilities, strict implementation of various power-sharing 
provisions is indispensable in peace agreements.  
The first few years just after the peace deal is ratified are very vulnerable, as the threat of 
conflict relapse often exists (Collier et al. 2013, 83). The large bulk of faults occur throughout 





per cent of the “125 civil wars” that erupted in “71 countries” between 1945 and 2005 did not 
resurface. One might conclude that almost every second peace accord eventually failed in post-
agreement societies. The implementation of provisions aiming at sustainable peace is especially 
difficult in the early stage. It is important that peace agreements should be drawn up clearly 
without giving rise to misinterpretation. We know from present-day literature that power-
sharing propositions facilitate the initiation of negotiations between conflicting parties and have 
a positive impact on situational conditions. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 330) maintain that 
power-sharing is “guarding against implementation failure”. DeRouen and Chowdhury (2013, 
8) argue that ”power-sharing provisions do not head off peace agreement failure or return to 
violence after peace agreements.” Walter (2002, 17) identifies a close link between third-party 
security guarantees, power-sharing arrangements, and the peaceful resolution of civil wars. In 
terms of security guarantees, pure or power mediators have different skills to maintain security. 
As to the conceptualization of power mediators, they are more likely to be successful than pure 
mediators at providing security guarantees in an implementation period.  
 
Walter argues that ending civil wars is a difficult task, as there is a permanent risk of recurrence 
in post-conflict countries in terms of “economic and political conditions”. She explains, the 
antagonists are neither capable of decisively defeating the other nor capable of reaching and 
implementing mutually beneficial agreements. They are afflicted with a circumstance in which 
the parties are unable to settle their own disagreement (Walter 2011, 32-33).  In such a case, 
third-party support for dispute resolution is extremely urgent, as sustainable peace can only be 
achieved employing skilful mediation. If governments of post-conflict countries do not strongly 
commit themselves to implement power-sharing agreements, respecting laws, building up 
democratic structures and strengthening the economy of the country, they cannot avoid renewed 
future conflicts. In a different study Walter (1997, 361) argues that “enforcement” mechanisms 
by third parties and “inclusive institutions” which guarantee pluralistic decision-making in 
political processes are necessary to implement peace agreements in short and long-term 
processes.   
 
Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) examine utilizing a self-established dataset (IMPACT) to what 
extent the implementation of political, military and territorial power-sharing stipulations has 





implementing military and territorial provisions, the likelihood of peace prevailing is 
increased”. In relations to this issue, DeRouen et al. (2009, 384) examine the impact of certain 
provisions (governmental, autonomy related and military power-sharing) on the duration of the 
time of peace. They conclude that territorial and military power-sharing is less hazardous than 
governmental power-sharing in terms of lasting intrastate peace agreements.  
 
Binningsbø and Dupuy (2009) have conducted a case analysis in Sierra Leone to investigate 
the correlation between power-sharing provisions and the termination of the civil war there. In 
their study, power-sharing is positively related to the outcome of post-agreement peace in Sierra 
Leone. A further cross-country analysis - Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia and Rwanda – was 
conducted by Spears in 2000. In his study, he examines the discrepancy between theory and 
failed practices of power-sharing arrangements, closely analysing implementation processes 
and explaining why those agreements have failed. He concludes that the successful 
implementation of power-sharing is only possible if leaders are fully committed to maintaining 
peace and establishing institutions for that purpose (Spears 2000, 117). Walter (2002) likewise 
argues that the commitment problem is a hazard problem for a negotiated peace. Moreover, 
Mattes and Savun (2010, 511) emphasize the importance of credible “international monitoring” 
and “information asymmetries” between rival parties. They advocate the idea of an accurate 
design of peace agreements to prevent civil war recurrence.  
 
Call (2012) further develops the theory of post-conflict peacebuilding and power-sharing 
procedures by emphasizing four approaches: Firstly, exclusion from the participation of other 
parties in politics, as security policy is more likely to engender war recurrence than economy-
centred approaches in previous theories. Secondly, the presence of third-party military troops 
maintaining stability once a ceasefire has been reached. Thirdly, ”the legitimacy of post-war 
regimes vs. state-building”. Fourthly, understanding governance in post-conflict societies is 
expanded beyond electoral democracy to encompass different forms of distributing power and 
animate inclusion and participation. Power-sharing is the most prevalent form of inclusionary 
behaviour. In particular, power-sharing securely maintained by military and police forces 
provides crucial guarantees to alleviate fears of physical violence against demobilized fighters. 
That particular issue triggered war recurrence in Liberia, the Central African Republic, and East 





agreements have to be achieved subtly. It is maintained that inclusionary behaviour and the 
integration of former enemies into politics or security institutions closely correspond to 
successful peacebuilding and peace consolidation in modern times. In that regard, failed power-
sharing is harmful to lasting peace in post-agreement periods. Call (2012) investigates various 
cases, starting with Liberia, which provides a perfect example of Charles Taylor’s exclusionary 
behaviour (e.g., lack of political power-sharing, repression of political opponents). It also 
underlines the correlation with civil war recurrence.  
The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset is based on “5 main characteristics of the peace 
agreement: these are provisions on military, political, territorial, justice matters and, finally, 
provisions concerned with the implementation of the accords.” (Högbladh 2011, 44). They 
include ceasefire, integration into the army, DDR, withdrawal of foreign forces, regulation of 
violent behaviour exhibited by party members in terms of governmental incompatibility 
regulation. Consequently, rebuilding a well ordered state based on democratic principles  
requires many provisions: political party (right for rebel groups to found a political party), 
integration into government/civil service, elections, interim government (rebel integration into 
the interim government), national talks to solve incompatibility, power-sharing in government, 
political provisions regarding the regulation of territorial incompatibility: autonomy, 
federalism, independence, referendums, local power-sharing, regional development, cultural 
freedom (language in schools, flag, anthem), border demarcation, local government, territorial 
provisions, amnesty, release of prisoners, national reconciliation, return of refugees, justice 
(ibid. 2011).  
I argue that we still know very little about external factors such as third-party mediators 
promoting or hampering the implementation of power-sharing provisions in post-agreement 
processes. As third-party mediation occurs in different short-term peace processes, it should 
also support the implementation of power-sharing that has been reached so far. In this context, 
third parties have different identities, qualities and quantities. Pure mediators are more able to 
provide communication and facilitation between rival parties, whereas power mediators often 
make leverage parties to reach and implement an agreement. Therefore, both types, pure and 







Security power-sharing agreements such as disarmament, demobilization, ceasefire, the 
formation of new police forces can be best put into practice by power mediators, as they have 
the military capacity to leverage hostile parties and provide professional personnel to support 
the implementation on the ground, whereas pure mediators help to establish confidence-
building which can increase trust-building. Pure mediators use their communication skills (e.g., 
persuasion) to gain support for the peaceful existence of rival parties. Another challenge for 
both types of mediators is the scope of power-sharing responsibilities during the 
implementation process. If certain mediation players (pure or power mediators) are more 
strongly represented in the field, they will be able to better monitor ceasefire processes, identify 
peace-spoilers, organize disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-fighters, 
facilitate returning IDP, initiate judiciary reforms and finance the peace process. If a single pure 
or power mediator were to strive for the implementation of all those provisions, he would 
certainly be overburdened due to the large scope of responsibilities. This would inevitably entail 
failure. Moreover, the mediator’s credibility would be highly questioned. Another failure of a 
single mediator is likely to occur if he is interested in the implementation of specific power-
sharing such as governmental power-sharing in parliament between rival parties but not in 
security arrangements in peace agreements. As a general rule in designing peace agreements, 
the presence of foreign peacekeeping troops has got a limited schedule to stay. They will have 
to leave when their time is over if the duration of their stay has not been extended by 
governments, regional organisations or the United Nations. Peacekeeping personal might be 
provided by third countries. This can happen if single third parties have their own secret 
political or financial agenda in the post-conflict country concerned. In contrast, multiple third 
parties can block each other by following such secret agendas.  
 
A single pure or power mediator has limited skills according to previous conceptualization. For 
instance, a regional organisation can provide very good diplomacy between parties to 
implement disarmament of rebels and integrate them into the new governmental security forces. 
If technical and legal assistance or financial support is not sufficient, the security power-sharing 
can fail as well. Or if the pure single mediator does not have monitoring personal on the ground, 






3.4 International Mediation  
 
What does international mediation mean? What is its aim in a peace agreement implementation 
process? Based on historical, national and local experiences of mediators in different places of 
the world, international mediation has been conceptualized differently. Mediation is a historical 
phenomenon that occurs between warring parties to solve incompatibilities employing third-
party support. Third-party conflict mediation is based on the theoretical framework of peace-
making, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and conflict resolution and is considered a crucial tool 
for ending intra-state conflicts. Bercovitch and DeRouen (2004, 153-154) state mediation as a 
dispute-management phase, where the contestants desire the help of an individual, party, nation 
or institution to resolve their disagreement without recourse to physical violence. 
 
To the present day, research facilities and third-party mediation have been particularly 
developed within the scope of intrastate conflict resolution. Mediation plays an important role 
in peace and conflict transformation periods. Third parties might be international or regional 
organizations, NGO’s, states, universities or eminent personalities (UCDP 2017a). The strategy 
of mediation can be either “communicative/facilitative, procedural” or “directive” (DeRouen 
et al. 2011, 665-666). These mediation approaches differ from third-party peace initiatives in 
terms of power, interest, circumstances, culture, history, the intensity of conflict, and the 
willingness of conflicting parties to cooperate. 
 
In the course of the last years many scholars have been conducting research on international 
mediation (Frei 1976; Zartman and Touval 1985; Stedman 1991; Sisk 1996, 2009; Bercovitch 
1996, 2011; Kleiboer 1996; De Soto 1999; Walter 2002; Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004; Doyle 
and Sambanis 2006; Zartman 2007; Savun 2008; Clayton 2013; Wallensteen 2011; Wallensteen 
and Svensson 2014). They all focus on mediation effectiveness and conceptualize mediation 
success differently from each other. Some researchers merely focus on the effect mediation has 
on intrastate conflicts, on how mediation can lead to a ceasefire or a peace agreement between 
the conflicting parties. The relationship between short-term mediation success and conflict 
termination has been eagerly debated. Less attention has been paid to long-term mediation in 





studies dealing with long-term mediation reveal that the successful implementation of peace 
agreements is due to successful mediation (Bercovitch and Simpson 2010, 73). Accordingly, 
one might assume that long-term mediation is a solid base for keeping and supporting peace in 
post-agreement periods. The concept that peace agreement processes can indeed be successful 
through long-term mediation effort is shared by Bercovitch and Simpson (2010, 94-95). 
Situational factors should also be taken into account. Long-term mediation units have special 
tasks during implementation processes, as stated below.   
 
A fundamental question about long-term mediation and post-conflict societies is raised by Call 
(2012, 237): Can external actors build legitimacy after the war?  He argues that external actors 
play a positive role, enhancing inclusionary behaviour and legitimacy-focused peacebuilding, 
despite the limits and perils of recurring civil wars. He defines four temporal junctures for post-
conflict societies regarding the transition from warfare: the decision on what structures and 
which individuals will rule for an interim period, the long-term design of the state, elections 
and the end of an interim administration and the post-electoral period. There might be a great 
deal of conflict potential in the first years after the election, which is seen to mark the end of a 
transition from war, as there might be the danger of war recurrence.   
 
All in all, the crucial conditions to prevent the recurrence of civil war in post-conflict societies 
should be duly considered because they bear a striking resemblance to implementation 
conditions during a post-agreement period. They are factors that facilitate or hamper mediation 
effectiveness: political-governmental, economic and security power-sharing, state capacity, 
electoral democracy, presence of third-party military troops maintaining stability, DDR 
programs, social factors, ethnic diversity and integration, repression of political opponents, 
state weakness, external factors from neighbouring countries leading to recurrence of civil war. 
Third-party mediators should always consider these factors to enhance proper implementation 
over a long time. In the following, the quantity, coordination and type of external mediators 
will be discussed, since external mediators bear full responsibility for the implementation of 







3.4.1 Power Mediators and Pure Mediators 
 
The conceptualization and characteristics of conflict mediation in terms of communication 
skills (e.g., persuasion) and leverage effect (e.g., coercion) have been interpreted differently by 
scholars and therefore classified accordingly (Bercovitch and Rubin 1992; Beardsley 
2009).  Power mediation and pure mediation have been classified by Zartman and Touval 
(1996) as follows: “Power - the ability to move a party in an intended direction – is often 
referred to in mediation as “leverage”. The “powerless” or “pure” mediator, however, is to 
persuade parties lacking leverage to communicate more easily with each other (Zartman and 
Touval 1996, 436-439). A similar distinction between the two types of mediation for conflict 
resolution is made by (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). They argue that power mediators possess 
sufficient power to have a significant influence on parties and negotiations. In that regard, major 
powers, such as the members of the UNSC, are likely to be effective in the conflict prevention 
of minor conflicts, as they have military and economic capacities (Melander et al. 2009). On 
the other hand, powerless mediators are supposed to open lines of communication and assume 
facilitation responsibility (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 23). These types of mediation can result in 
different outcomes in intra-state conflicts depending on conflict environments, power of 
conflicting parties, cultural backgrounds, incompatibilities, power-sharing contents or 
intensity.  
 
Due to the large variety of different statements, an empirical analysis of “pure” and “power” 
mediation in civil wars was undertaken by Svensson (2007). He points out that power mediation 
may be preferred by parties in internal armed conflicts which require particular security 
guarantees such as sponsoring post-agreement implementation processes, monitoring proper 
power-sharing and fair elections. He examines the impact of pure versus power mediators in 
terms of reaching a peace agreement with specific provisions based on territorial, governmental 
and military power-sharing in internal armed conflicts.  
 
“Power mediators are defined as mediation efforts by great powers, colonial powers, and 
neighbouring states, whereas mediators who are representatives of international, regional, or 
non-governmental organizations, individuals, and small and distant states, are classified as 





In terms of political, territorial and military power-sharing, the type of pure versus power 
mediation yields different results. “Pure mediators tend to outperform power mediators in terms 
of getting agreements with provisions for political and territorial power-sharing […] Power 
mediators are particularly suitable for reaching agreements where the military power is 
regulated” (ibid. 231). Investigations of numerous international mediators engaged during and 
after armed conflicts have shown that some countries employed “pure” mediators (e.g., El 
Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Philippines and Sierra Leone), whereas others had 
recourse to power mediators (e.g., Northern Ireland (UK), Lebanon, Bosnia, and Mali).  
According to Svensson, a combination of pure and power mediators has yielded better results 
in conflict resolution than the use of a single, one-type mediator (Svensson 2007).  
International and regional organizations are supplying external security guarantees in pre-and 
post-agreement peace affairs as “pure” mediators. Although the UN’s objective is to keep peace 
in civil war-torn countries, its peacekeeping missions have sometimes failed in countries such 
as East Timor, Rwanda, Somalia (Ghoniem 2003, 11, 21; Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 24, 157) 
or UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina concerning the Massacre of Srebrenica (Karakus 
2015a, 47). The role of UN peacekeeping forces in the modern world is multifaceted. The 
following survey shows how many mediated peace accords were achieved due to the 
intervention of UN peacekeeping forces from 1989 to 2012, Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Croatia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and 
Timor-Leste (East Timor). 12 out of 26 mediated peace-agreement cases encompassed UN 
peacekeeping force mechanisms (Joshi et al. 2015). Almost half of them adopted the UN 
peacekeeping force mechanism which decreases aggression and makes it easier to enforce the 
deal (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2018).  
Nations such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi have acquainted themselves with the role of 
UN international and regional peacekeeping forces (e.g., ECOMOG-ECOWAS). Regional 
peacekeeping forces have the same responsibility as UN peacekeeping forces and are 
committed to maintaining unity and trying to reach a peace settlement (Joshi et al. 2015). The 
international (UN) and regional security of external third parties mostly facilitated 
implementation processes. At the same time, the sponsoring of implementation processes by 
third parties is indispensable. Successful implementation also depends on how strong the 






Both types of mediation have been closely examined in pre-peace agreement processes in terms 
of conflict termination. Nevertheless, there is still a wide research gap left in post-agreement 
processes as far as the two mediation types are concerned. In that sense, the role of pure 
mediation facilitating “direct negotiation” has not yet been adequately examined. According to 
Harris and Reilly, “pure mediation involves the use of process skills, techniques and experience 
to urge the parties on, or ease their path, towards a solution which they design, re-fine and 
ultimately implement.” However, power mediators can dominate parties and drive them into a 
negotiation process: The power mediator has the power to apply appropriate sanctions to ensure 
that the agreed-upon outcomes have been achieved and that conformity is maintained (Harris 
and Reilly 1998, 108-110). The conceptualization of power mediation is extended by 
Heemsbergen and Siniver (2011, 1172). They “propose a heuristic framework which entails a 
typology of four distinct ‘routes’ to power mediation, defined here as real, made, critical and 
structural”. The power mediation type is associated with the approaches of international 
relations such as neo-realism associated with “real power”, constructivism with “made power”, 
structuralism with “structural power”, idealism with “critical power”.  
 
Nathan (1999, 3) points out that third-party mediation with “muscle” is supposed to be a risky 
strategy to deal with internal conflicts. He attaches importance to confidence-building between 
parties in the first place: “The emphasis is on facilitating dialogue and joint problem-solving 
rather on pressuring the disputants to settle. The reasons for adversaries’ resistance to 
negotiations are referred to as ‘psycho-political dynamics’.” This aspect is certainly a highly 
sensitive issue in pre-peace processes and might be difficult to handle by mediators and rival 
parties concerned.  Admittedly, both types of mediation can be diligently balanced and carefully 
evaluated by mediators in an implemented post-agreement peace process. Transitional justice 
procedures of peace agreements (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) will always involve 
highly sensitive implementation processes. 
Based on the four selected countries, the impact of the two types of mediation will be analysed 
within a time frame of 10 years to find out to what extent the two types of mediation have 
facilitated or hampered the implementation process of peace agreements. The results might 





and pure mediation have scored high and low implementation in this thesis. This discrepancy 
is to be examined in close comparative case analyses. One might be inclined to assume that 
specific names or identities of power and pure mediators largely determine the success of the 
implementation. Svensson (2007, 231) points out that “pure mediators” succeeded in reaching 
agreements, whenever “provisions for political and territorial power-sharing” were largely 
granted. In contrast, military power-sharing provisions were mainly achieved by power 
mediators. According to Svensson, such differences as to provisions achieved in 
implementation processes can only be accounted for by the specific nature of power and pure 
mediators (ibid. 246). His highly revealing observations lead to the question to what extent 
power and pure mediators can enhance successful implementations of peace agreements. 
I argue that one can draw a clear line between conflict termination and implementation 
processes. Both types of mediation possess certain characteristics, skills and qualifications. 
They therefore can contribute to successful peace agreement implementations, each in their 
way. A certain type (power or pure mediation) with different skills would be desirable in post-
agreement countries, as they might considerably enhance the success of the implementation. It 
might be possible that both types of mediation positively influence provisions in terms of 
governmental, territorial or security power-sharing. Pure mediators are international and 
regional organizations such as the UN, the EU, ASEAN, the African Union or the OSCE. The 
same applies to power mediators between neighbouring or powerful states. There is also the 
question of whether external pure and power mediators are seriously interested in 
implementation processes and whether they are accepted as peace-brokers by rival parties. 
Melin and Svenson (2009) take a clear stand on this, as they differentiate between interstate 
conflicts and intrastate conflicts. They claim that the political price of endorsing “international 
mediation” would be far more in “civil wars” than it does in “international conflicts”. 
 
Another concern has been raised over the conceptualization of mediator types in terms of skills, 
quality and power. As both types largely vary in their characteristics, their different skills can 
be successfully combined into implementation processes. As the UN and regional organizations 
are classified as pure mediators (persuasive), they can be power mediators as well. On the one 
hand, the UN can facilitate land-sharing between the government and rebels on the table, on 






In that regard, the peace-building interest of organizations, mandate time, financial support and 
number of available peacekeeping personal for implementation should be taken into account. 
The UN, the African Union, the ECOWAS, the Arab League have a military (i.e., leverage) and 
economic power and can replace a power mediator. Therefore, short-term conceptualization 
(conflict termination and effect on power-sharing agreement) and skills of power mediator can 
deviate in long-term implementation periods. The power mediators can use communication and 
facilitation skills without the necessity of military enforcement in implementation processes as 
well. Therefore, the quantity and quality of both types should be considered during the 
implementation process. They might have a different impact on governmental, territorial, 
economic and military power-sharing implementation. However, I still believe that the leverage 
effect of single power mediators is strong to prevent ceasefire violations, implementation of 
security provisions as it can swiftly employ military personal and equipment on the ground. 
The single pure mediator UN can be different from other pure mediators such as the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation or ASEAN as they do not have any military capacity. That 
means within pure and power mediation units, the skills and effectiveness for implementation 
success can vary. In the following, strategic coordination of mediation is introduced to show to 
what extent the quantity of mediators makes sense for conflict termination in internal conflicts 
and thus for implementation processes.  
 
 
3.4.2 Multiparty Mediation and Single Mediation 
 
A comprehensive analysis has been conducted in terms of strategic coordination in armed 
conflict mediation. The role of single mediators and one of the multiple mediators between 
locals, states, regional or international organizations have been widely discussed by numerous 
researchers (Crocker et al. 1999; Jones 2001; Walter 2002; Herrhausen 2007; Svensson 2011; 
Beardsley 2011; Böhmelt 2012; Vuković 2015; Menninga 2015). Böhmelt (2012, 713) 
emphasizes the double-sided effectiveness of multiple mediators. They have different strength 
and weaknesses, fully bearing responsibility for conflict termination. He points out that a 
coalition of mediators can share labour, bear responsibility in coordination and use joint, strong 





difficult cases here, or they might signal to other actors that their economy is weak or that they 
highly value the accountability of their regime type.” Vuković (2015, 66) argues that legitimate 
multiple mediation efforts by neighbouring states were successful in the case of Tajikistan. 
Mediation there was coordinated by the UN. In terms of single versus multiple mediators, 
success is also measured by duration, over several years. Beardsley (2011, 129) emphasizes 
that single mediators may outperform multiple mediations in the long run. Negative outcomes 
are often caused by a lack of coordination between multiple mediators.  
 
Stedman et al. (2002, 94) points out that about “200 official and unofficial actors” intervened 
in the Burundi peace-building process between 1993 and 1995. It has been argued that stubborn 
refusal to respond to requests from the other side may give rise to peace spoilers there, 
generating physical violence. That was the case in “Bosnia, Rwanda and Burundi” (Stedman 
2002, 90). Consequently, as far as proficient coordination is concerned, “clear leadership” and 
a stringent calculation method of priorities are indispensable (Von Hehn 2011, 388-389; Urbain 
2017, 87). Inadequate teamwork is generally observed by political representatives including 
local administration in obtaining very „different messages“ from a multitude of UN agencies. 
In contrast, mediation in coordination with UN authorities has produced good results (Stedman 
2002, 110).  
 
Stedman (2001, 14) argues that half-hearted attempts at peacebuilding were made by 
international or regional powers in conflict-ridden countries, such as Somalia and Rwanda. As 
long as the conflict environment and its impact zone were geographically limited and did not 
pose a serious threat to the integrity of the whole country, international or regional powers 
refrained from full political or military intervention. As regional and international powers are, 
in general, well experienced, militarily and financially strong, their involvement is of great 
importance: In either particular circumstance, the efficacy of implementation would be 
significantly diminished without appropriate cooperation by the UN, a related regional or 
international agency, or a capable state (Stedman et al. 2002, 112). Walter (2002, 15) noticed 
that about half of the fighters having authorized substantive arrangements for peace in the 1940-






Svenson (2017, 86) investigates the effect of multiparty mediators dealing with conflict 
termination in internal conflicts. He argues that combining different qualities of biased and 
unbiased mediators might result in a successful mediation, as they have different skills to access 
information and its flow. As the necessity of mediation coalitions in the implementation of 
peace agreements has been widely overlooked, there is a need to investigate the power or pure 
mediation types. Multiple power or pure mediators might be more likely to enhance the 
successful implementation of peace agreements than single power or pure mediators. One might 
assume that coalitions consisting of the UN and mediators from peace-supported countries 
should be far more successful than a random single mediator from a single state, regional and 
international organization. A coalition of multiparty mediators has different skills in dealing 
with conflicting parties. Besides, the UN has ample military and financial capacity, political 
power and a great deal of experience in this field. Due to its large enforcement power, it can 
solve the “commitment problems” of conflicting parties more easily (Walter 2002, 15).  
 
Jones (2001, 23) points out that post-conflict environments are highly challenging. In that sense, 
the high number of mediators might be justified to facilitate a peace-implementation process, 
provided that mediators work together in a coordinated manner, given specific implementation 
provisions (e.g., civilian security, policing, refugee resettlement, human rights, elections, 
economic reconstruction and development, governmental power-sharing in an interim 
government). However, if coordination fails among third parties, in case of overlapping 
responsibilities, incompatible priorities or subdued interest, implementation processes are also 
bound to fail.  
 
I argue that multiparty pure mediators or power mediators in cooperation could outperform 
single mediators in the implementation process of a peace agreement. They will be more able 
to share implementation tasks and tools than a single mediator to support parties. If a single 
mediator has limited personnel on the ground or limited technology to monitor ceasefire 
implementation, the peace spoilers will take advantage of an opportunity to disturb peace 
implementation between the contracting parties. This could be prevented by multiple mediators 
as one would have proper peace-keeping personnel and the other one technology. In the 
implementation process, commitment problems are likely to emerge between parties. They can 





as they might have different skills, styles, and communication channels between parties to 
persuade them. They are more capable of motivating local people, reaching distinguished local 
personalities to pressure the government or rebel groups into keeping the implementation 
process going. Implementing the disarmament of rebels requires a higher level of trust between 
mediators and rebel leaders. The trust-building process might have gone wrong with a single 
mediator if it failed to provide a security guarantee. The second or third mediators could repair 
the mistakes of the past and set up a new relationship on a long-term basis. The mediators can 
cooperate to create a new expert group that is professionalized in the disarmament program and 
sophisticated in suspending legal proceedings of former fighters after the implementation of 
disarmament.  
 
Commitment problems to peace can emerge by single mediators in the run as well. Providing 
implementation assistance by single mediators could be limited if their mandate is not extended, 
financial support is not granted anymore, or if a single country does no longer take interest in 
the peace-building process in other countries due to internal political change. On the one hand, 
one president can be fully committed to the sustainable peace process in other countries, 
whereas the new president is not. To avoid such cases, multiple mediators could be a 
replacement of the missing support for implementation.   
 
3.5 Mediator Tasks for Implementing Peace agreements  
In the following, the light will be shed on special tasks of mediators in terms of implementing 
peace-agreements. These major tasks have been selected from the previous pieces of literature 
and the Peace Accord Matrix (Stedman 1997, 2002; Nathan 1999; Hartzell et al. 2001; Walter 
2002, 2011; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Fortna 2004; Bercovitch and Simpson 2010; Pospieszna 
and Schneider 2011; Joshi and Darby 2013; DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013; Joshi et al. 2015). 
They are complementary to each other and are to enhance successful implementation. They can 
be provided in a different manner by pure and power, single and multiple mediators in long-
term power-sharing peace processes:  
 





 Sponsoring and donor support  
 Resolution of dispute and commitment problems 
 Security guarantees, enforcement and confidence building  
 Combating peace spoilers 
 Implementation timetable 
 
3.5.1 Monitoring and Verification 
 
Third parties such as international and regional organizations, NGOs, single states or institutes 
are in charge of monitoring post-agreement peace processes. Verification of an implementation 
process is closely monitored in terms of a special task force. Focus is set on whether the 
conflicting parties perform their agreed duties as part of the peace agreement provisions, such 
as elections or the release of prisoners according to a detailed implementation timeline.  
 
 
The monitoring task might be fulfilled by the same third-party mediating in the pre-agreement 
peace process or by a new third party that is active only in the implementation period of the 
agreement. Monitoring provisions is a difficult task. One could even say it is performed by an 
external actor. It involves official invitations, legal status and creates a tangible framework for 
the monitoring team. 20 out of 26 mediated peace-agreements cases included monitoring 
provisions (1989-2012) (Joshi et al. 2015). 
 
A large number of cases of civil-war torn countries confirms the necessity of a third-party 
monitoring mechanism aiming at the verification of the implementation of various 
governmental and territorial power-sharing provisions. Although 20 of the above-mentioned 
cases comprise monitoring provisions, the degree of implementation score largely differs 
between low and high over ten years. Pure or power mediators such as the UN, NATO or 
individual countries as mediators meet the needs of monitoring and verification differently. 
Some post-agreement countries insist on monitoring mechanisms to protect civilians and have 
security structures rebuilt in post-war periods. The absence of monitoring mechanisms during 
an implementation process might make it impossible to find out which party has not fulfilled 





problem” (Walter 2002, 15). The absence of a third-party monitoring mechanism or third eye 
might lead to a failure in peacebuilding.  
 
I argue that monitoring and verification mechanisms provided by third-party mediators at a 
time when power-sharing is implemented are important to enhance the peace process. The 
provisions in the agreement are supposed to be implemented within a certain time and the third 
party regularly monitors their implementation. If the implementation progress slows down or 
is postponed by one side, the third-party urges the conflicting parties to proceed with the 
implementation process. That way, leverage power, communication and facilitation skills are 
exerted by both, pure and power mediators. Pure mediators can enforce communication 
between opposing sides, whereas power mediators can put massive pressure on parties. 
However, if monitoring and verification tasks are shared between multiple third-party 
mediators in a post-conflict country, enhancing implementations will be more successful. It 
means that the number of third parties is essential.  
 
3.5.2 Sponsoring and Donor Support 
 
The civil war countries are generally exhausted in terms of economy, security and functioning 
government system. Lack of economic strength makes it difficult to rebuild a country and 
finance the implementation of peace agreement provisions in terms of a fair electoral process, 
emergency programs for the reintegration of displaced persons, refugees, justice system, 
education system, health care, disarmament, demobilized soldiers, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction, restoring the national economy, modernization and professionalization of the 
public security system. Only some post-agreements countries were given financial aid because 
there was a “major or regional power interest” in those countries, which led to successfully 
implemented peace-agreement processes (Stedman 2001, 11). External countries as well as 
multinational organisations are encouraged to contribute financially to the execution of the 
negotiated peace, as stated in the agreement (Joshi et al. 2015). 16 out of 26 post-agreement 
countries received financial donor support: Burundi, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Liberia, Macedonia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 






I argue that the lack of sponsoring and donor support for implementation can negatively affect 
the implementation progress. The implementation process of provisions needs to be financially 
supported by external countries or international donors. In that sense, the donor support of third-
party mediators is a key factor. Mediators can organise an international donor conference to 
invite donors for the country concerned. The pure or power mediators have different networks 
and connections with countries, regional and international actors. A coalition of third parties 
sponsoring the implementation of a peace agreement would be most desirable.  
 
 
3.5.3 Resolution of Dispute and Commitment Problems 
 
Although implementation processes are financially sponsored by organizations or single states, 
disputes due to a “commitment problem” sometimes occur between rival parties during the 
implementation period. Dispute resolution mechanisms are therefore compulsory (DeRouen 
and Chowdhury 2013). The credible commitment problem is one of the factors which endanger 
negotiations and the post-agreement implementation period. That means “even the combatants 
reach a mutually agreeable bargain, they will not implement its terms unless credible guarantees 
on the terms of the treaty are included” (Walter 2002, 8). They are concerned about a safe 
demobilization process without any attack from the rival side and want power-sharing to be 
guaranteed (ibid. 26). To overcome credible commitment problems or further postponement 
obstacles during a peace-agreement implementation process, credible external enforcement 
mechanisms are required in the long run to put pressure on the conflicting parties.  
 
They are urgently needed between conflicting parties showing disdainful distrust for each other 
and having very limited communication channels. This kind of assistance is provided by third 
parties such as regional security organizations, peacekeeping units or individual nations. For 
instance, during the implementation of the peace process agreement in post-war Bosnia, NATO 
alone shouldered the responsibility for the “international police force and an internationally 
appointed High Representative for civilian affairs” (Wallensteen 2012, 294). Legitimacy was 
granted in compliance with the Charter of United Nations, ”Chapter VII: Action with respect 
to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” (United Nations Chapter 






An unsettled dispute or commitment problem might cause damage in an implementation 
operation. It might even seriously violate a peace accord. That was the case when the “two 
worst humanitarian emergencies of the 1990s in Angola and Rwanda in 1994” occurred. They 
resulted in a high number of casualties (Stedman 2001, 20). An external third-party as a dispute 
resolution authority can perform long-term mediation, as in reaching a ceasefire, calling on the 
“Council of Elders and Religious Leaders for resolution” to reach a peace deal (Lomé Peace 
agreement), looking for resolution through mediation, arbitration or court (Bougainville Peace 
Agreement, Accra Peace Agreement).  
 
Dispute resolution should be provided by external mediators (pure or power mediator) having 
power, influence and experience in intervention capacity. However, those mediators sometimes 
fail to prevent disputes in post-implementation processes, although short-term mediators have 
done their best to facilitate communication between conflicting parties and even have had them 
sign an agreement. “Domestic commission (national, sub-national, or local) can be set up to 
solve disagreements that arise during the implementation process. The focus of these bodies is 
the implementation of the accord and the channelling of conflicts through institutions” (Joshi 
et al. 2015). The following 15 countries accommodated a dispute resolution provision: Angola, 
Bosnia, Burundi, El Salvador, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, and the United Kingdom (ibid. 2015). As powerful 
states and international organizations such as the UN, the African Union, the EU and NATO 
have such enormous potential, they should responsibly extend their political and economic 
influence.  
 
I argue, as the conflict causes are different in countries, various disputes in terms of economic, 
security or governmental power-sharing might emerge during the implementation period of 
stipulations. In terms of dispute resolution, pure and power mediators can use different skills to 
solve incompatibilities. If the implementation procedures of specific provisions are not clearly 
stated in detail (farmland sharing between former rebels and government, returning Internally 
Displaced People to the area, disarmament schedule for rebels), the parties involved might 
interpret them to their benefit. So, expectations in dispute cases might largely differ. This 





strong leverage applied by power mediators. In the case of ceasefire violation, a power mediator 
could be more assertive than a pure mediator, as he might be able to use military power. In 
contrast, a commitment problem or postponements of implementation can be solved by pure 
mediators using their communication and facilitation skills or applying economic sanctions. All 
in all, multiple pure or power mediators will be more effective to persuade parties to fulfil their 
promises. Different responsibilities of dispute resolution can be shared easily by multiple 
mediators. However, it should be noted that certain mediators (pure or power) enjoy more 
respect and trust in dispute situations than others on account of their high level of assertiveness 
based on previous experiences and reputation. 
 
3.5.4 Security Guarantees, Enforcement and Confidence-Building 
 
Confidence-building measures and associated stipulations in peace agreements pave the way to 
building trust and “security” between conflicting parties at the time of a ceasefire or peace 
agreement process (Hopmann 2000, 572). They could be referred to as violation preventing 
mechanisms, such as the release of prisoners, jointly controlled checkpoints, information 
exchange, and establishing a mutual local court, etc. Accordingly, confidence-building 
measures play an indispensable role in successfully implementing ceasefires and peace 
agreements. 
 
Military power-sharing, demilitarization, reintegration of rebels into national army forces and 
parliaments after peace treaties are likely to create a favourable confidence-building 
environment. Peace agreements include military reform provisions for confidence-building. 
„The accord calls for changes in the structure, leadership, or composition of the national armed 
forces, changes in training procedures; civilian control over the use of the military; the 
integration of opposition troops into the national army“ (Joshi et al. 2015). Several post-
agreement countries have reintegration provisions in their peace-agreements. Reintegration 
processes aim at normalization, the demilitarization of ex-fighters and their integration into 







Confidence-building measures such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
programs and military reform provisions could be positively associated with lasting peace 
agreements. Lack of confidence-building provisions might diminish trust between parties. 
Mutual trust is considered the key focal point in post-agreement processes. Lacking trust 
hampers the efforts of mediators. It might even impair the entire implementation process 
(Arnault 2006, 15). 
 
Third-party “security” protections and “power-sharing pacts” are the two most critical aspects 
in persuading adversaries to agree and pursue peace agreements. Then will we be able to coexist 
(Walter 2002, 17). Third-party security guarantee keeps implementation processes safe in a 
long-term time. According to Joshi and Darby (2013, 268) third party security “existed either 
in the form of a UN Observer Mission, as in El Salvador, or a UN Transitional Authority, as in 
Cambodia”. The third-party security factor is to solve any commitment problem between parties 
in case of doubt or uncertainty. Mattes and Savun (2009, 752) point out that “the presence of 
third-party security guarantees decreases the likelihood of renewed conflict by 69%”. Svenson 
(2009, 464) emphasizes the positive correlation between third-party security guarantee and 
lasting peace. He claims that security guarantees prolong and improve the durability of post-
agreement peace. However, according to Pospieszna and Schneider (2011, 17), third-party 
security guarantees do not contribute significantly to assessing long-term mediation 
effectiveness. Walter emphasizes that “third-party security guarantees” give motivational 
power to implement agreements (Bercovitch and Simpson 2010, 75-76). According to Walter 
(1997, 360), while mediation is simple to use and easy, merely having clearer intelligence and 
improved diplomatic relations between local rivals does not seem to be adequate to resolve 
major security challenges. The mediation will not be able to persuade groups to make 
agreements without preceding security guarantees. 
 
Enforcement doesn’t necessarily mean military enforcement or threatening others to impose 
mechanisms involving violence. It refers to an operating principle that encourages 
“compliance” and cooperation between parties. ”Transparency”, “bureaucracy” and conflict 
resolution tasks facilitate missions of enforcement mechanism. In case the implementation 
process is blocked by one side, a light political or economic “sanction” might give a fresh 





is also related to third-party responsibilities such as monitoring, dispute-resolution, confidence-
building and verification mechanisms. Pure or power third parties are essential factors, as they 
contribute to enhancing the quality and environment of implementation work.  
 
Fortna (2004, 288) emphasizes that foreign assistance involvement is not an ultimate solution; 
it does not ensure permanent peace in either occasion, but it does achieve peace more likely to 
last. According to Fortna’s Peacekeeping List, peace accords based on UN enforcement 
missions and other regional organizations were accomplished in the following cases (1967-
1995): Congo/Zaire, Georgia–Abkhazia, Haiti, Iraq–Kurds, Iraq–Shia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Tajikistan, Yugoslavia–Bosnia, and Yugoslavia–Croatia (ibid. 289-290). Similarly, a 
positive statistical correlation has been identified between third-party enforcement and peace 
maintenance after civil wars (Hartzell et al. 2001, 199). In South Africa and the Philippines, 
peace agreements were successfully implemented despite the absence of an external 
enforcement mechanism (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, 316). However, the implementation score 
of the peace agreement in the Philippines is low. There is concern that the peace accord might 
be violated in the future. This goes to show that the requirement of external enforcement 
mechanisms is related to various factors such as the quality of agreement or post-conflict 
conditions.  
 
I argue that the promotion of security guarantee, enforcement and confidence building can be 
differently enhanced by pure and power mediators during the implementation. One the one 
hand, pure mediators such as the UN, African Union or NATO can take full responsibility in 
the post-war country. They can send peacekeeping military forces to ensure security and help 
for confidence building in the society. The quantity and duration of peacekeepers play an 
important role during the implementation process. Shortage of staff and failing interest in 
external mediators can be hazardous to security and confidence-building. It may even endanger 
the lives of people being involved in the peace agreement process (Rwanda, Bosnia). On the 
other hand, power mediators such as the US, UK or France can also provide greater numbers 
of peacekeeping personnel, equipment and financial help for new security forces. In that case, 
greater numbers of personnel and an appropriate time to carry out the mandate are needed.  





very well in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the post-agreement period. The UN, NATO and 
the EU have shared equal responsibility for post-peacebuilding there.  
 
3.5.5 Combating Peace Spoilers 
 
As far as long-term third-party mediation is concerned, peace spoilers are a critical factor 
occurring in the framework of a peace accord implementation procedure. The notion of peace 
spoilers and long-lasting third-party involvement is closely related to each other. Due to the 
absence or weakness of pure or power mediators, peace spoilers may obstruct a peace process 
by violent activities such as the assassination of VIPs from either side, bomb attacks, 
kidnapping or hate propaganda.  
 
Peace spoilers versus third-party mediators compete in maintaining and violating peace 
agreements at the same time. So, the question may be raised whether the failure of the Arusha 
Peace Agreement was due to the weakness of the UN peace-keeping unit or to the power of 
peace spoilers in Rwanda. It is pivotal for future research to more closely investigate the 
correlation between spoilers violating a peace process and fully motivated mediators trying to 
get the process going. Stedman (1997) describes spoiler problems in peacebuilding period as 
leaders and parties who perceive the evolving peace threatens their power, values, or priorities, 
and those who use aggression to sabotage efforts to achieve it (Stedman 1997, 178). He 
emphasizes his views, giving striking examples from recent history: Rwandan President 
Juvenal Habyarimana, who declined to enforce the Arusha Accords to resolve his country's 
internal conflict; Cambodia's Khmer Rouge (KR), which ratified the Paris Peace Agreements 
but rejected to demobilize its soldiers and started boycotting elections; and the Union for Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), who approved the Bicesse Pacts in 1991 however headed 
back to fighting after losing the referendum in 1992 (ibid. 180-181). 
 
Spoilers are similarly identified by Call as leaders, parties or excluded groups having lost local 
or national power in terms of government, security, economy (Call 2012, 38). They might be 
parties that were originally active in the peace process, but eventually changed their minds and 
deliberately failed to comply with the peace process conditions. According to Stedman (1997, 





International, regional powers (e.g., the UN, ECOWAS, NATO) proved to be powerful 
mediators in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia and Kosovo, as they succeeded in maintaining 
substantial post-agreement peace there (Karakus 2015a). Thanks to their vigorous engagement 
and dedication, there have not been any reports on peace-breaking activities in those countries 
recently, as spoilers are being kept in check.  
 
The strategy, quantity, quality and identity of spoilers are classified by Stedman in terms of 
spoiler management mechanisms. There are four sections in his ”typological theory of spoiler 
management”. The first deals with the typology of potential spoilers and their leverage, i.e., to 
what extent they can obstruct peace processes. Once the spoiler’s negative influence has 
exceeded the limits to an alarming degree, a prevention strategy is generated against the spoiler 
to overcome obstacles. Secondly, depending on the level of the spoiler’s leverage, diverse 
compatible action plans can be developed for custodians to “manage spoilers”. Thirdly, as there 
are different strategies to be chosen from, the most compatible one will be applied, 
counteracting efficiently the spoiler’s negative output. Fourthly, it is important to “sensitize 
policymakers to the complexities and uncertainties of correctly diagnosing the type of spoiler”. 
The final section comprises previously gained experiences of “successful and failed cases of 
spoiler management”. They are to be critically assessed since they might eventually provide 
valuable information for future cases (Stedman 1997, 179-180). Research gaps in peace-spoiler 
activities have been identified, as little attention has been paid to micro-level spoiling effects 
of domestic actors, national communication media, social networks, NGOs and high ranked 
people. This can be discussed and developed in future research.  
 
I argue that greater numbers of powerful third parties are involved in implementation processes. 
They will be more able than single external mediators to prevent spoilers and facilitate 
implementation. Power mediators can be regularly alerted to monitor peace spoilers with their 
peacekeeping workforce and communication technology on the spot. Spoilers can be prevented 
by military means when required. On the other hand, pure mediators can forecast a potential 
peace spoiler and avert it in advance through intelligence and communication tools. Close 
communication with locals and national level leaders can help to identify them and their 
possible spoiling strategies. Society can be regularly informed about their violation potential. 





newspapers, mobilization of civilians against the peace-building process), strategic cooperation 
of multiple mediators would be best to deal with them. Whenever a third party begins to show 
weakness, the negative effect of the peace spoiler will be intensified.  
 
3.5.6 Implementation Timetable 
 
Implementation procedures leading to peace agreements are to be issued to parties concerned 
according to a detailed timetable (Arnault 2006). The performance of both sides is then to be 
evaluated. There is a need to find out to what extent the commitments made by the conflicting 
parties are met following the agreed timetable. Time lags in implementation processes may 
delay peace agreements and facilitate the advent of peace spoilers. Conflicting parties should 
strictly adhere to a specific timetable, which is a basic necessity for coordinated action in 
building up peace agreements. Moreover, the release of prisoners and disarmament of ex-
guerrillas should be coordinated chronologically in peace negotiations, which could have a 
soothing effect on the opposing parties. This might help to overcome commitment issues and 
build up mutual trust for the following step of implementation. 19 out of 26 mediated peace-
agreement cases comprised timetable provisions between 1989 and 2012, Angola, Bosnia, 
Burundi, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Macedonia, Mali, Mozambique, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor-Leste 
(East Timor), and the UK. Agreements also have several deadlines with various clauses (Joshi 
et al. 2015). 
 
If there were any delay or postponements (Arnault 2006, 4), adequate solutions should be 
proposed to overcome such problems to avoid any violent recurrence of conflict. Statistical data 
concerning conflict recurrence have been provided by Gates et al. (2016). They argue that “135 
different countries experienced conflict recurrence. 68 were minor conflicts and 24 were wars. 
The median duration of post-conflict peace spells was seven years.” As we can see from the 
above-mentioned cases, many international peace agreements contained timetable provisions. 
To avoid any type of delay, the assigned pure or power third-party mechanism can operate 






I argue that multiple third parties (pure or power mediators) can complete these special tasks 
more efficiently than a single mediator. Multiple mediators can share the responsibilities and 
work with each party separately to keep the timetable up. In case of a postponement and 
commitment problem, pure mediators can utilize their facilitation and communication capacity 
to rapidly identify the reason. It sometimes happens that in post-war countries communication 
attempts made by single pure mediators fail to convince the conflicting parties. Other methods 
such as an economic sanction are believed to give impetus to the implementation of road maps. 
In some post-agreement countries, power mediators are required to apply military leverage on 
parties to keep the process going. A coalition of power mediators is likely to exert a greater deal 
of mediation power. If parties fail to adhere to the timetable despite strenuous mediation efforts, 
the implementation process is likely to fail. Implementation processes are sometimes hampered 
by financial shortcomings in post-agreement countries due to their weak economy. In that case, 
multiple pure or power mediators could share financial costs. A single mediator would be 

























Chapter IV:  














This section introduces the research design, single case and comparative analyses, case 
selection procedures, identification of dependent and independent variables and detailed 
elements of the thesis project. There are two specific methods of processing the research 
question. Firstly, the case analysis is conducted in selected cases. This method facilitates “an 
in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social 
phenomenon.” (Feagin et al. 1991, 2). It enables us to assess the implementation 
success/performance of mediators (pure and power mediation, single and multiple mediation 
types) regarding the provisions imposed in the single cases. Secondly, the selected cases are 
investigated employing “comparative case studies” (Bennett 2004, 29), which ensures an in-
depth, comparative investigation of the research question. Comparative case analysis is 
conducted to specify the correlation between the type of third-party mediation (e.g., pure and 
power mediations) and the level of implementation success of mediated agreements (i.e., high 
and low scores) over ten years. Gerring (2004, 342) emphasizes the case study as “an intensive 
study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. A unit 
connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon—e.g., a nation-state, revolution, political party, 
election, or person—observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time”. 
Thus, this research focuses on four selected cases separately and comprises a comparison 
between the limited number of mediated peace agreement cases which have been picked on the 
base of constant variable and certain scope condition (Mahoney 2007, 128). Consequently, 
based on the determined scope condition, the “most similar, different outcome system” 
(MSDO) will be applied (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 22-23). This enables us to understand why 
the degree of successful implementation largely differs in the selected cases, although they are 
similar.  
In quantitative analysis, some scholars went far beyond the conflict termination period, 
explaining variables of security arrangements, the content of agreements, guarantee for third-
party, power-sharing and state-capacity for sustainable peace and implementation (Walter 
2002; Stedman 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Arnault 2006; DeRouen et al. 2010; 
Pospieszna and Schneider 2011). Studies relating to the implementation of peace agreements 
have mainly focused on the success and failure of peace agreements. The causal mechanism 
between certain mediation styles, quantity and the successful implementation of peace 






Svenson examines the impact of mediation on the outcome of power-sharing peace 
arrangements (2007). He argues that “power mediators outperform pure mediators”. Peace 
agreements vary in their content. Power mediators are more likely to achieve a peace agreement 
based on military power-sharing, whereas pure mediators are able to pass on “conflict-
resolution provisions” more easily than power mediators (Svenson 2007, 238). As the impact 
of pure or power mediation on the implementation of peace agreements has been subject to 
scant research so far, I feel strongly motivated to delve into this field of research, utilizing single 
case and comparative case analyses in this dissertation. I wish to point out that a comparative 
case analysis has never been methodologically carried out in that particular field before, nor 
have the selected cases ever been compared with one another. This does not only mean entering 
new territory, it also means providing an essential contribution to conflict prevention and 
sustainable peace in the framework of international mediation. 
 
The success rate regarding the implementation of peace agreements in the four selected 
countries varies between high and low scores. According to the elimination process of existing 
peace agreements, the implementation degree is high when it has reached more than 95% in ten 
years.  If the degree is less than 59% within ten years, this reveals that there is a serious problem 
as far as the implementation process is concerned. It also indicates that the peace agreement is 
likely to be violated. That kind of peace agreement is referred to as vulnerable or less successful. 
Peace agreement implementations are assessed by the rules and obligations set up by pure or 
power mediators over ten years. The implementation and outcome of intrastate peace 
agreements are evaluated in the dataset of the “Peace Accord Matrix” every year.  This unique 
quantitative data bank enables us to see high and low scores and facilitates the comparison of 
cases depending on variables (Joshi et al. 2015, 554). This type of evaluation is essential since 
peace agreements comprise objective or normative conditions such as governmental, military, 
economic and territorial power-sharing provisions to reach an agreement. However, it does not 
guarantee successful implementation in a post-agreement process over many years because a 
post-agreement is an open-end process.  
 
As to the above research question, the type pure and power mediator is identified in the context 





colonial powers, and neighbouring states, whereas mediators who are representatives of 
international, regional, or non-governmental organizations, individuals, and small and distant 
states, are classified as pure mediators”. According to that codification, the UN in cooperation 
with COPAZ in El Salvador and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the 
Philippines are pure mediators. By contrast, the Republic of Ireland, the UK in Northern Ireland 
and Syria in Lebanon are classified as power mediators who were actively engaged in peace 
processes for ten years. In the following, emphasis will be placed on the method of single-case 
and comparative case analyses applied in this thesis. Other focal topics are case selection 
procedures, operationalization of dependent and independent variables and detailed elements 
of the thesis. 
  
4.1 Most Similar Different Outcome System (MSDO) 
 
MSDO enables political scientists to examine different outcomes systematically under the same 
scope conditions, depending on the number of cases and variables (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 
20). This type of methodological procedure applied in this thesis facilitates investigating 
implemented cases in terms of power-sharing peace arrangements and third-party mediation. 
The results vary between high and low scores due to the implementation level and are assessed 
over ten years. This process sheds light on the factors which complicate or encourage the 
implementation process under the same scope conditions. The identical characteristics for case 
selection are a) intra-state conflicts b) signed intra-state peace agreements c) third parties 
involved in implementation d) implementation time is limited to ten years after signing the 
peace agreement, e) All peace agreement cases based on power-sharing arrangements are ruled 
by electoral democratic systems. The following figure comprises the major research unit with 







Figure 1: Configuration of Most Similar, Different Outcome System Design (MSDO) 
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In this dissertation, the Peace Accord Matrix has been used to assess implementation processes 
and the active involvement of third-party mediators. The data provided by this database enable 
statistical comparison (Joshi et al. 2015). PAM shows 51 different provisions occurring in 34 
different peace agreements (e.g., ceasefire, constitutional reform, DDR, dispute resolution 
committee, ratification mechanism, electoral/political party reform, human rights, prisoner 
release, verification mechanisms, military reform, transitional power-sharing government, 
decentralization/federalism, economic and social development, transitional justice 
mechanism). Based on the four selected cases, they are categorized into five following groups: 
 
1) The implementation of ceasefire arrangement 
2) The implementation of institutional-governmental power-sharing 
3) The implementation of security power-sharing 
4) The implementation of human rights and reconciliation arrangements 
5) The implementation of economic power-sharing  
 
Those five categories feature in the four selected cases and are used throughout the entire 
comparative case analysis. They face different challenges during the implementation process. 
 
4.2 Case Selection Procedures  
“Most similar case selection proceeds by (1) defining the relevant universe of cases, (2) 
identifying key variables of interest that should be similar across the target cases, (3) 





(4) selecting the desired number of cases—often a pair but sometimes more—that have the 
specified similarities and differences.”(Nielsen 2016, 571). 
It is important to clarify on what grounds those four mediated internal conflict cases have been 
selected to form a new research unit. 26 mediated peace agreements out of 34 resolved intrastate 
conflicts are documented in the Peace Accord Matrix (Joshi et al. 2015), the “Civil Wars 
Mediation Datasets” (DeRouen et al. 2011) and “the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset” 
(Högbladh 2011). The four cases have been selected based on their similarity, i.e., involving 
third-party mediators. Their similarity is assessed utilizing the same “independent variables” 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008, 304). External third parties are involved in all four cases. 
Selection bias has been avoided, as one should refrain from making general statements. 
Filtering criteria have been used to select the four final cases. The data figuring in the first table 
have been supplied by the three above-mentioned datasets, covering a period from 1989 to 
2012. They comprise all comprehensive peace agreements, mediated or not, between 1989 and 
2012. 
 
Table 1: Mediated and Non-Mediated Cases 
Countries with peace  
agreements  





experience during the 
implementation 
Yes: 1 No: 0 
1. *Angola (4/4/2002)                              88% 1 
2. Bangladesh (12/2/1997)  49% 0 
3. Bosnia (11/21/1995)                              93% 1 
4. Burundi (8/28/2000)  78% 1 
5. Cambodia (10/23/1991)                     73% 1 
6. Congo-Brazzaville (12/29/1999)     73% 1 
7. Croatia (11/12/1995)                            73% 1 
8. *Djibouti (5/12/2001)  52% 0 
9.  El Salvador (16/01/1992)                     96% 1 
10. Guatemala (12/29/1996)                         69%                1 





12. India (2/20/1993)  24% 0 
13. Indonesia (8/15/2005)                    87% 1 
14. Ivory Coast (3/4/2007)                    83% 1 
15. Lebanon (10/22/1989)                     59% 1 
16. Liberia (8/18/2003)                          88% 1 
17. Macedonia (08/13/2001)                 91% 1 
18. Mali (1/6/1991)                                 83% 1 
19. Mozambique (10/4/1992)                 92% 1 
20. Nepal (11/21/2006)  72% 0 
21. Niger (4/15/1995)                                65% 1 
22. UK (Northern Ireland) (04/10/98)    95% 1 
23. Papua New Guinea (8/30/2001)     89% 1 
24. Philippines (9/2/1996)                      59% 1 
25. Rwanda (8/4/1993)  74% 1 
26. Senegal (12/30/2004)                        33% 1 
27. *Sierra Leone (7/7/1999)               83% 1 
28. South Africa (11/17/1993)  92% 0 
29. Sudan (1/9/2005)                             73% 1 
30. Tajikistan (6/27/1997)  76% 1 
31. Timor-Leste (5/5/1999)                   94% 1 
Grand Total: 31 countries   26 peace agreements 
implemented by  
means of mediation 
*Note: Angola, Djibouti and Sierra Leone had agreements twice and the most recent ones are listed in the table.  
Source: Data collection from the Peace Accord Matrix (Joshi et al. 2015), the “Civil Wars Mediation” dataset 
(DeRouen et al. 2011) and “the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset” (Högbladh 2011). 
 
26 out of 31 peace agreements were mediated according to Table 1. Peace agreements that were 
successfully mediated show a high degree of implementations (3/4 implementation at least). 
According to table 1, 3 implementation cases are having scored the highest and 3 having scored 
the lowest. The 3 highest scores in mediated peace agreements reached 94% and more. By 
contrast, the 3 lowest scorers reached less than 60%. In the following table, six countries are 





59% of implementation have been achieved. Those countries experienced different mediation 
procedures conducted by international and regional organizations, single countries and famous 
people until a final peace agreement was achieved. After the 26 cases have been classified into 
two categories (high and low score implementation), the number of cases reduced to 6 cases. 
 
Table 2: Implementation degree of peace agreements, names of short-term mediators before 
signing agreements. 
Source: Data collections from the “Peace Accord Matrix” (Joshi et al. 2015), “the Civil Wars Mediation” 
dataset (DeRouen et al. 2011) and “the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset” (Högbladh 2011). 
 
In the following, the cases have been reduced from six to four. This elimination process is based 













Name of third-party mediators 













  UK (Northern 
Ireland)  
95% (04/10/1998) US President Bill Clinton, 
Ireland, George Mitchell, (IICD) 
 Timor-Leste  
 
94% (5/5/1999) UN 
 Lebanon  
 
59% (10/22/1989) US, France, Arab League 
Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia 
 Senegal  
 
33% (12/30/2004) AU med. 
 The 
Philippines  





availability and variation of external mediators. Although the implementation of the Senegalese 
peace agreement reached the lowest degree (only 33%), Senegal was excluded, as a long-term 
mediator could not be identified there. Timor-Leste was excluded because its implementation 
degree was slightly less than El Salvador’s and Northern Ireland’s (UK).  
 
Those four remaining countries El Salvador, Lebanon, Northern Ireland (UK), the Philippines, 
all experienced long-term external mediation. Every country that has experienced a civil war 
or intra-state conflicts, has its own different story of arranging provisions of peace agreements. 
Although the provisions of the four peace agreements were not 100% identical in detail,3 they 
were identical on power-sharing and arrangements grounds. The above-mentioned provisions 
are grouped into similar categories set up by Joshi et al. (2015, 554). Their categorization is 
extended in the following five subjects:  
 
1) Implementation of ceasefire arrangement 2) Implementation of institutional-governmental 
power-sharing 3) Implementation of security power-sharing 4) Implementation of human rights 
and reconciliation arrangements 5) Implementation of economic power-sharing. Each category 
contains different topic-related provisions. For instance, provisions of “demobilization, 
disarmament, military reform, paramilitary groups, police reform, prisoner release, 
reintegration” (Lee et. al. 2016, 498), are summarized in Category 3 (security power-sharing).  
That means, at least one security-related provision is always available in the “implementation 
of security power-sharing” category. They are constantly applied in systematic comparative 
case analysis. Another way of grouping provisions for comparative analysis would be to put 
them in two categories: governmental and territorial power-sharing arrangements. One could 
object that these categories would be too broad, and details might be lost in comparative 
analysis. In the following, the five categories set up will be examined to find out if they apply 
to all four selected cases: 
 
                                               





























El Salvador:            
Lebanon:            
Northern 
Ireland (UK):  
          
The 
Philippines:  
          
 
 
Categories are present and equal in all the selected cases. After the four cases have been 
carefully analysed and the active role of third-party mediators has been fully identified, the 
quality of third-party mediation (independent variable) will be subject to a more thorough 
discussion. The four selected cases will be presented in the configuration of the MSDO system 
design. In order to investigate the research question, the identification of dependent and 
independent variables facilitates the ability for systematic research. According to the research 
question of this dissertation, the dependent variable is the implementation success of peace 
agreements and the independent variable is mediation conducted by single and multiple pure or 
power third parties. 
 
 
4.2.1 Power Mediators and Pure Mediators 
 
Power mediation and pure mediation types have achieved different results in peace settlements 
as far as power-sharing agreements are concerned (Svensson 2007). As there is only limited 
knowledge about the roles of these two types concerning implementation processes, various 
aspects of those roles will be clarified in this thesis. External mediators acting before or after 
peace-agreement processes can be either the same or different actors. The following table is to 






Table 3: Pre-findings of mediator types between pure and power in selected cases before and 
after peace agreements. 
Country name and 
implementation 
scores with peace 
agreements 






















Power and Pure 
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USA (then US 













Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) 
Pure Mediator: 





Source: Data based on Svensson (2007) and the PAM (Joshi et al. 2015).  
 
Although third parties tried to achieve successful peace agreements in the four countries, 
implementation scores differ widely. In that regard, the number of pure and power mediators 








4.2.2 Multiparty Mediation and Single Mediation 
 
Strategic coordination between multiple mediation or single mediation aims at reaching a 
successful conflict termination or peace agreement. Scant attention has been paid to mediators’ 
impact on implementation processes.  As their quantity and strategic coordination in long-term 
implementation processes are seen as somewhat vague, this will be investigated in this thesis 
as a research gap. The four selected cases based on the diversity of long-term third-party 
mediators and the different results they have attained.  
 
Figure 2: Demonstration of single and multiple mediators in the selected cases 
Source: Data collection from the “Peace Accord Matrix” (Joshi et al. 2015) and (Svensson, 2007, 2009).  
 
As shown in the figure, the independent variable (third-party mediation) is present in all four 
cases but varies in implementation score. The core argument of the thesis greatly influences 
implementation scores. This leads to the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship between 
the mediator’s quantity and implementation success, which is fully consistent with the research 
question. As power and pure mediators reached high scores and low scores twice in all four 
cases (figure 2), the result doesn’t show any variation in success. The research field should 
therefore be extended in terms of strategic coordination between multiple mediations and single 
mediation types. The increasing number of third parties on the ground can make the process 
easier through sharing implementation tasks and responsibilities.  























































The following hypothesis is put forward by the combination of existing theories of international 
mediation: If multiple mediators (pure or power) support an implementation process, they are 
by far more successful than singly acting mediators. The validity of this assumption will be put 
to the test. The implementation processes in the four cases will be primarily analysed using the 
method of the single case study. Subsequently, they will be compared with each other according 
to the abovementioned five categories. The causal pathway will be identified, and the 
conclusion will be drawn from the empirical analysis. 
 
4.3 Data Sources and Limitations 
 
The impact of third parties on implementation processes in the four countries is assessed 
employing secondary literature, including academic articles, books, national and international 
newspapers, reports of NGOs and datasets. The major datasets such as “the UCDP Peace 
Agreement Dataset” (Högbladh 2011) and the “Peace Accords Matrix” (Joshi et al. 2015) 
comprise implementation data on intrastate peace agreements. “Introducing the Civil Wars 
Mediation Dataset” is a relevant dataset compiled by DeRouen Jr, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 
(DeRouen et al. 2011). The type of mediators (pure versus power) is determined utilizing the 
classification which has been made by Svensson (2007). It enables us to view and analyse 
statistical information about implementation rates, mediation success depending on different 
criteria, type of third parties and different levels of mediation outcomes of various cases.  
The flow of information differs widely, depending on the case. National and cross-national 
reports on how the peace agreements had been successfully implemented have proved to be 
reliable, valuable sources of information. For instance, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), the Regional Government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim, the 
Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), the Special Zone of Peace 
and Development (SZOPAD) kept reporting on the memorable peace agreement in the 
Philippines, at a national level. The Review of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland, 
the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland 





Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) continuously reported on 
the Good Friday Agreement. COPAZ reported extensively on the Chapultepec Agreement in 
El Salvador. As there were not any reports at the national level in Lebanon and an appropriate 
academic environment was missing there, the Annual Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices run by the U.S. Department of State is used for evaluation on a year-by-year basis.  
The Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by the U.S Department of State, the 
Human Right Watch, Amnesty International and the Helsinki Commission provide a great deal 
of cross-national reports. Although these organizations do not focus on the entire 
implementation of peace agreements, they regularly report on essential components of peace 
agreements such as human rights, democracy, freedom, security, election, violence, press, 
justice, institutional reforms and ceasefire. National and cross-national reports, specific 
literature dealing with politics are complementary to each other in all four selected cases. The 
combination of these sources mutually provides information about the 5 above-mentioned 

















Chapter V:   
















The following chapters describe the single case and comparative analyses concerning peace 
agreement implementations in El-Salvador (Chapultepec Peace Agreement), Lebanon (Ta’if 
Peace Agreement), Northern Ireland (UK) (Good Friday Agreement) and the Philippines 
(Mindanao Final Agreement) viewed in the long run. Firstly, the backgrounds of the respective 
internal armed conflicts and short-term mediations will be presented which led to peace 
agreements. Secondly, the implementation of the peace-agreement provisions will be 
individually investigated in each case. The effect of long-term third-party mediation on 
implementation processes will be closely examined. The provisions analysed in those peace 
agreements have been clustered in five categories according to the research design. They will 
be assessed comparatively for over ten years. Provisions are equally clustered in the following 
five categories:  
1) Implementation of ceasefire arrangements 
2) Implementation of institutional-governmental power-sharing 
3) Implementation of security power-sharing 
4) Implementation of human rights and reconciliation arrangements  
5) Implementation of economic power-sharing  
These clusters are constantly utilized for a systematic comparative case analysis. The pure third 
parties in El Salvador and the Philippines, the power third parties in Northern Ireland and 
Lebanon will be compared in the categories concerned. Pure and power mediations have 
different strengths and skills for conflict termination. The positive attributes of pure mediators 
are process skills, communication, facilitation, persuasion, arranging political and territorial 
power-sharing. Different competencies are attributed to power mediators: military and 
economic (sponsoring) capacities, leverage (coercion), security guarantee, arranging military 
power-sharing. Those strengths will be tested when the question arises to what extent they 
influence implementation processes. Success or failure of long-term third-party mediation will 
be evaluated. Conditions favouring a quick and straightforward implementation process in a 
post-conflict society will be examined. Finally, the results of the analyses will be critically 






5.1 Background of the Internal Armed Conflicts and Mediations  
The backgrounds of the respective internal armed conflicts, mediations up to peace agreements 
are briefly presented in the selected cases:  
1- El-Salvador (Chapultepec Peace Agreement)  
2- Lebanon (Ta’if Peace Agreement)  
3- Northern Ireland (UK) (Good Friday Agreement)   
4- Philippines (Mindanao Final Agreement) 
 
El Salvador (1980-1991): 
 
The Latin American continent has experienced European colonization, numerous violent 
intrastate and interstate conflicts, civil resistance, a quick succession of governments, many of 
them being military or pro-military governments. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, 
peace agreements were signed in countries where armed conflicts had taken place, in El-
Salvador (1992), Guatemala (1996) and Colombia (2016).  
Following the chronological order of conflicts and human rights violations in Salvadorian 
history, one would begin with the massacre of the Salvadorian indigenous people in the city of 
La Matanza, committed by the military regime in 1932 (General Maximiliano Hernandez 
Martinez). Society in El Salvador was historically divided into two groups: a) 14 affluent, ultra-
conservative clans of landowners who dominated the government until the peace agreement 
was signed in 1992. b)  workers and peasants (left-oriented). Property rights of indigenous 
communities were abolished in 1881-1882 by the Salvadorian government and replaced by a 
privatization policy. The new strategy of the government (1932) consisted of forcing farmers 
to plant coffee in western El Salvador, but the indigenous communities rebelled against this 
new policy. Their rebellion endangered their livelihood. They lost their lands, submitting them 
to the full control of the fourteen landowners (Benítez 2011, 10). The intensive confrontation 
between the two sides finally resulted in the genocide of the indigenous (Pipils) in 1932, which 





between 1960 and 1990. Those included anti-government paramilitary and political 
organizations (e.g., the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL), the People's Revolutionary 
Army (ERP) and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front – (FMLN). In contrast, pro-
military and nationalist organisations were also established (e.g., Organización Democrática 
Nacionalista (ORDEN), La Alianza Republicana Nacionalista – (ARENA).  
 
Salvadorians had to face numerous political crises, military coups and assassinations of people 
in the public eye.  Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero was brutally assassinated. He had 
dedicated his entire life to equality, justice and peace in El Salvador. The 12 years of internal 
conflict resulted in approximately 70,000 deaths, with neither side achieving victory. The 
internal political and military conflict continued until the UN was requested to act as a third-
party to monitor human rights violations in the framework of the San Jose Accords in 1990. 
Finally, in 1992, the Chapultepec peace agreement was signed in Mexico City (Wood 2003, 
275-277; Peetz 2008).  
 
Both conflicting parties had the urge to stop fighting and invited the UN as a third-party to 
mediate between them. This shows their strong desire for peace. Crocker et al. (1999, 356) 
argue that there seemed to be a military standoff. Neither side was capable of defeating the 
other. When the fighting ceased, it became clear that the war could not be won by military 
means, and that its continuation was causing suffering that could no longer be tolerated. The 
fight solidified the stalemate, which was costly to both parties. When conflicting parties directly 
invite third parties as mediators, while a conflict is still ongoing, third-party mediation tends to 
be more successful. The US played a pivotal role, refusing to support the Salvadorian military 
any longer. Eventually, the US forced the Salvadorian government to sit down at the negotiation 
table together with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) (Studemeister 
2001, 7). Call (2002, 388) maintains that following a series of diplomatic gestures, besides a 
collaborative letter signed by James Baker in favour of the UN's mediation in the conflict, then-
US Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar announced in April 1990 that now the UN would 







Signing the Chapultepec peace agreement (1992): The Chapultepec peace agreement „signed 
on January 16, 1992, in Mexico City, culminated twenty months of negotiations and a series of 
partial settlements between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN“ (Studemeister 2001, 
7). The agreement aimed at governmental power-sharing, the regulation of ceasefire, reforming 
the judicial system, reducing and re-establishing – disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration 
(DDR) - of military and police forces and guerrillas, the transformation of FMLN into a political 
party, participation in civil political life and the strengthening of human rights (ibid. 7-8). Even 
though fundamental reform in the country's economic system was a vital FMLN priority after 
the conflict, only around 10% of the ultimate arrangements were devoted to social and 
economic problems (Stedman 2002, 390). This might be interpreted as weakness, as mediators 
in short-term negotiation processes might apply a great deal of pressure on conflicting parties 
to establish a solid basis for dialogues to address the root causes of conflicts. Long-term 
mediators face a difficult task, as in case of failure the implementation of various provisions 
might be seriously at stake.  
 
Implementation of Provisions (1992-2002):  
The implementation of the Chapultepec Peace Agreement will be closely examined, with a 
strong focus on the third parties’ performance monitored by the ONUSAL in its reports from 
1992 to 2002. Implementation conditions, challenges, success and failure will be analysed, 
conclusions will be drawn by referring to the research question. In the case of El Salvador, the 
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) acted as a third party, assuming 
the prime responsibility for the peace-provision implementation mandated by the Security 
Council, resolution 693 on 20 May 1991. The UN cooperated very well with the national actor 
COPAZ. Its mediation type is classified as multiple pure types of mediation that provided 
power-sharing in El Salvador. 
 
Lebanon (1975-1990): 
Root causes of the Civil War in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 have been identified by 
scholars differently. They were attributed to the unfair practice of socio-economic privileges 
granted to political parties (lack of power-sharing), religion facing confessionalism and 





(right-left, pro-and anti-communism), pro-and anti-status quo for the constitution, 
assassinations of prominent personalities, opposing foreign-policy priorities and goals 
(Arabization versus westernization), foreign interference (e.g., Syria, Iran, Israel, France, Saudi 
Arabia) (O'Ballance 1998; Zahar 2005; Wimmen 2016; Hodali 2018; Enders 2017; UCDP 
2017b). All in all, one might say that the above-mentioned reasons provoked the conflict 
altogether. The causes are likewise related to the historical origins of cleavages. Zahar (2005, 
231) summarizes the causes and the onset of the conflict as follows: The Lebanese Civil War 
officially began on April 13, 1975. A primary cause was frustration with the power-sharing 
formula that favoured Christians. Traditional elites (primarily Maronites) gained the upper hand 
and access to state resources, whereas socioeconomically disadvantaged communities (mostly 
Shia) struggled for more power and access to government resources. 
 
During the civil war, Israel, Syria and the Palestinians were involved in the conflict, cooperating 
with different conflicting sides according to the political preferences in their respective 
countries. Christians collaborated with Israel, France and the USA, whereas Muslim parties 
were supported by Muslim countries such as Syria and Iran. Before the Ta’if Accord was signed 
in 1989, several ceasefires (e.g., 1975, 1976, 1977, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989) occurred due to 
the mediation efforts of third parties (e.g., the UN, the US, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Arab 
League). However, they were repeatedly violated (O'Ballance 1998). The civil war given rise 
to the killing of approximately 120,000 individuals (UN 2006, 18).  
 
Signing Ta’if Peace Agreement (1989):  
The Ta’if Peace Agreement, which mainly regulated the governmental power-sharing between 
the conflicting parties in Lebanon, was brokered by Saudi Arabia and the Arab League in the 
Saudi city of Ta’if in 1989 (Zahar 2005, 13) and guaranteed by the Syrian forces (Stedman et 
al. 2002, 567; O'Ballance 1998, 193). The power-sharing agreement primarily aimed at the 
cessation of hostilities, stability, security, good governance, institutionalization, ceasefire, 
conducting parliamentary and general municipal elections, economic recovery, social 






The implementation of the stipulated provisions within categories will be carefully scrutinized 
in the context of the third party-performance from 1989 to 1999. In particular, the Annual 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices from the U.S Department of State, Human Right 
Watch and some previous literature provide very detailed information on a year-by-year basis. 
Conditions, chances, challenges, success and failures will be examined, conclusions will be 
taken into consideration as to the outcome of the Ta’if Peace Agreement.   
 
Implementation of Provisions (1989-1999):  
Although the implementation degree of the Ta’if Peace Agreement was low (59%), the 
agreement has not been violated yet (Joshi et al. 2015). In that regard, Syria as a third-party 
nation took the prime responsibility to achieve post-war security in Lebanon, as stated in the 
Ta’if agreement. Besides, Syria and Lebanon had signed an agreement of brotherhood on May 
22, 1991, which allowed Syria a kind of guardianship in Lebanon in terms of political and 
economic security, cooperation in terms of cultural and scientific fields “for the benefit of both 
fraternal countries” (Tucker 2008, 1409). Syria used to have near-total influence over Lebanon's 
internal and external politics from 1991 until April 26, 2005. Syria became, in large part, the 
dominant domestic actor in Lebanon at the same time as the significant key entity orchestrating 
the changeover from conflict to peace throughout that time frame (Salloukh 2005, 18). After 
the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, the political climate grew tense. 
The Cedar revolution took place. Demonstrators vehemently demanded the withdrawal of the 
Syrian armed forces. They no longer tolerated Syria’s interference in Lebanon’s domestic 
affairs, pleading for an independent Lebanon (Knio 2005). Under the pressure of those events, 
the Syrian security forces finally withdrew from Lebanon on April 27, 2005. This goes to show 
how quickly the political climate in Lebanon had changed.  
 
The implementation of the stipulated categories will be carefully scrutinized in light of the third 
party-performance from 1989 to 1999.  Conditions, chances, challenges, success and failures 
will be examined, conclusions will be taken into consideration as to the outcome of the Ta’if 







Northern Ireland (UK) (1968-1998):  
 
The historical origin of Northern Ireland’s internal armed conflict goes back hundreds of years 
when Oliver Cromwell conquered Ireland and Protestant settlers from Northern England and 
Scotland took possession of Northern Ireland (Darby 1995; McCarney 1996; McCabe 2001, 
548). After the partition of Ireland (1921) into the Republic of Ireland (South) and Ulster 
(British), the Catholics in Ulster remained under British Protestant rule. The Protestants 
strongly wished Northern Ireland to remain a territorial part of Britain, whereas the Catholic 
minority envisaged unification with the Republic of Ireland. Consequently, the Irish Catholic 
minority was systematically discriminated against by the Protestant rulers over the decades. 
Unlike the Catholic minority, the Northern Irish Protestants enjoyed a high standard of living 
and full civil rights. One should have a closer look at the period from 1968 to 1998 to understand 
the social incompatibilities in Northern Ireland. Harsh discontent caused by harassing 
sectarianism and discrimination led to the first civil rights movement. The Catholics demanded 
equal rights such as the “removal of discrimination in the allocation of jobs and houses, 
permanent emergency legislation and electoral abuses” in 1967 (Darby 1995, 18).  
 
The rising civil movement with its stress on disobedience was ruthlessly suppressed by the 
British armed forces. As tensions increased, the civil rights movement gradually turned into an 
armed conflict between the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the British armed forces 
and the Protestant paramilitaries (loyalists) (ibid. 1995). Numerous bomb blasts occurred: 
Bloody Sunday (1972), the Shankill Road bombing (1993), the London Docklands bombing 
(1996), the bombing in Omagh (1998). A great number of civilians lost their lives or were 
severely wounded in the bloody armed struggle. “The violence never reached the most common 
currently agreed threshold of a ‘war’ – over 1,000 deaths in a year. Nevertheless, its impact on 
society in Northern Ireland – an enclave with a population of about 1.5 million – was 
considerable, with over 3,500 killed and up to 50,000 injured over a thirty-year period.” 
(Dorney 2015). 
 
The conflict continued with different intensity until the Good Friday Peace Agreement was 
signed in 1998. It petered out in 1999. Several secret peace talks had been held (e.g., 





Short-term mediation attempts had been carried out by third parties (e.g., Bill Clinton and US 
senator George Mitchell). Some peace talks resulted in agreements such as the Anglo-Irish 
agreement in 1985 (BBC – The Troubles 2017; Dorney 2015). However, it was doomed to fail. 
Dorney (2015) briefly outlines how the Good Friday Peace Agreement was achieved: The IRA 
announced its truce in 1997, and Sinn Fein was re-admitted to negotiations. The nationalist 
SDLP, the Irish government, the Ulster Unionist Party, the Alliance Party, the Progressive 
Unionist Party, and the Ulster Democratic Party (representing loyalist paramilitaries), as well 
as the Women's Coalition, were all interested. Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party refused 
to take part as far as Sinn Fein does. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 has been the outcome 
of these arrangements.  
 
Signing Good Friday Agreement (1998):  
 
After a long peace talk, the multilateral power-sharing peace agreement was signed by the 
Catholic (nationalist) and Protestant (unionist) parties of Northern Ireland, the Republic of 
Ireland and the United Kingdom on 10 April 1998. Referendums were held in Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland after the agreement had been signed. Voters were asked whether 
they would agree to the terms stated in the peace agreement and whether they would allow 
necessary constitutional changes (18th Amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Ireland) to facilitate the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). The majority of the voters in all of 
Ireland – nationalist, republican, loyalist, unionist – supported the new peace settlement and 
favoured constitutional changes in the Republic of Ireland. General elections were held on 25 
June 1998.  It was the first time, since 1918, that the two rival groups jointly voted in favour of 
a proposed peace agreement (Dunn and Nolan-Halley 1998, 1372-1373).  
 
 
Implementation of Provisions (1998 - 2008):  
 
Although some delay had occurred in the implementation process of the GFA, it has not been 
violated so far (after two decades). The implementation of the GFA scored very high in 2008, 
95% (Joshi et al. 2015). In appointing the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish 





a third-party of creating a post-war implementation monitoring system with reviews and 
reports. Moreover, an independent international commission was established to monitor the 
decommissioning process concerning all paramilitary arms. The commission was chaired by 
former US Senator George Mitchell (Debraggio 2010, 33). The post-conflict process in 
Northern Ireland and the performance of third parties will be discussed with special emphasis 
upon the implementation of the peace agreement.  
 
Philippines (Mindanao) (1975 – 1996): 
 
The Philippines had been part of the Spanish Empire until 1898 when the islands were “ceded 
by Spain to the United States” of America after the Spanish-American War. Philippine 
independence was proclaimed in 1946 (Republic of the Philippines) (Halili 2004, 22). The 
Filipinos belong to ethnically diverse groups with different religions. The majority of the 
Filipinos are members of the Roman Catholic Church (80-85%), whereas Muslims (Mindanao) 
account for 5-10% (Cavendish 2007, 1256; Dong 2016, 314; Abinales and Amoroso 2017, 11; 
Nolan 1996, 26).  
 
After the proclamation of the Philippine Republic, the government pursued a strong 
resettlement policy in Mindanao. The landless Catholic Filipinos were encouraged by the 
government to move from the northern and central islands to Mindanao, which was “rich in 
natural resources such as oil and natural gas” (UCDP – Philippines 2018). Mindanao was 
mainly inhabited by native Moro Muslims. Due to the government’s systematic migration 
policy, land re-distribution problems arose which resulted in a social conflict between Muslims 
and the new settlers (ibid. 2018). The conflict has been commonly interpreted as a sectarian, 
ethnic-confessional or ideological dispute between settlers and local inhabitants. However, it 
was also due to the long-lasting, socio-economic injustice committed by Spain, the former 
colonial power, and the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The GRP proved 
unable to remedy the injustice.  
 
The systematic oppression of Muslims led to violent clashes as in the “Jabidah massacre in 
March 1968” and a great number of battle-related deaths (120,000 in total) (ibid. 2018) The 





factions such as “the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement 
(BIFM)” fought for equal rights. The violent conflict bears similarities to the confessional 
conflicts in Northern Ireland (between Protestants and Catholics), in Lebanon between 
Christians and Muslims.  
 
Short-term mediations between the GRP and rebel groups (MNLF, MILF) were conducted by 
third parties between 1975 and 1994. Those third parties were the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) and single countries such as Libya (Muammar Gaddafi), Somalia, Senegal, 
Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and some unidentified Moslem groups. Those mediations culminated 
in the Tripoli Agreement (1976) and the Mindanao Peace Agreement in 1996 (DeRouen et al. 
2011).  
 
Signing the Mindanao Final Agreement (1996): 
The Mindanao Agreement was signed by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the 
GRP many years after negotiations had been held in Jakarta (1993-1996). As the Tripoli 
Agreement (1976) had proved incomplete, it could not be implemented. It was therefore 
supplemented by the Mindanao Final Agreement in 1996. The Tripoli Agreement served as a 
base for the Mindanao Final Peace Agreement which could only be achieved through the active 
participation of the two rebel parties, the MNLF and the GRP, the Islamic Conference of the 
Ministerial Six and the Secretary-General of the OIC. 
The OIC, in particular, undertook the difficult task of monitoring and implementing the process 
as a third-party providing long-term mediation. The OIC cooperated with the National Council 
and independent groups such as the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development 
(SPCPD) and a Joint Monitoring Committee which had been established by the GRP and the 
MNLF (Mindanao Final Agreement 1996). Financial support for the implementation process 






Implementation of Provisions (1996-2006): 
 
The impact of a third party such as the OIC will be examined (1996-2006). Moreover, 
importance is ascribed to the Country Reports on the Human Rights Practices in the Philippines 
(1996-2006) issued by the U.S. Department of State annually. The reports were very detailed 
and reflected the political conditions of the Philippines in those days, which enables us to 
understand the underlying causal mechanism affecting the implementation of success or failure 
of the specific arrangements. In conclusion, the most important findings will be summed up.   
 
5.2 Single Case Analysis 




Several problems posed a risk to the successful implementation of the Chapultepec Peace 
Agreement (De Soto and Del Castillo 1995, 189). In the case of El Salvador, the ceasefire was 
implemented after signing the peace agreement which was fully acknowledged as a provision 
in 1992 (Stedman et al. 2002, 389). The ceasefire was successful, as the conflicting parties were 
seriously committed to proper disarmament, demobilization of paramilitary groups and rebels 
in a set schedule under the supervision of multiple mediators. One problem arose because of 
land issues delaying the implementation process. “The provisions of the land issue had not been 
spelled out with sufficient clarity in the Chapultepec Agreement. Fortunately, with assistance 
from various quarters and the cooperation of the parties, it proved possible to resolve the land 
question in October.“ (UN 1992, 5).  
 
The lesson to be learnt from this was that incompatibilities had to be solved by third parties in 
the peace negotiation process to avoid similar obstacles during the implementation process. 
This goes to show that uncertainties might violate agreements and endow peace spoilers with 
more strength. The report emphatically praised the successful ceasefire under the supervision 





in maintaining the ceasefire, which has not once been broken.” (UN 1992:13). In 1993, it was 
reported that FMLN had failed to decommission all its weapons. This news “nearly dismantled 
the peace process in May 1993, while internal political differences produced more delays” 
(Montgomery 1995, 140). Furthermore, it was found out later that the FMLN had secretly 
delivered weapons to Nicaragua, which again seriously delayed implementation proceedings. 
Other peace spoilers “death squads” appeared. They committed heinous atrocities, along with 
the murder of former FMLN rebels, and harassed to carry out more. Admittedly, both sides to 
the Peace Accord, in collaborative efforts with the ONUSAL and the UN Secretary-General's 
publicly denounced the death squads' acts and decided to take sensible precautions to restrain 
them (Boxcar-admin 2019). 
 
The ceasefire provision was successfully completed from 1994 to 2002. A further lesson learnt 
from the implementation of this ceasefire-provision is that parties should strictly comply with 
a set schedule. Third parties ought to monitor processes more closely and cooperate with local 
and national actors. “Coordination is vital at all stages of the process, whether within the UN 
system or with appropriate regional and other organizations.” (Studemeister 2001, 39). This 
coordination will be explicitly dealt with in Chapter VII, Cessation of the Armed Forces 
(Boutros-Ghali 1995, 211). 
 
As uncertainty might violate or hamper progress, dispute issues should be resolved in peace-
talks and should not be postponed to post-agreement periods. After a time of 10 years, the 
overall result was assessed as successful. The success of the ceasefire mainly depended on the 
conflicting parties’ commitment to a scheduled plan providing proper disarmament and 
demobilization of paramilitary groups and rebels at the same time. The close cooperation and 
communication between the ONUSAL, the office of the UN Secretary-General, COPAZ, the 
government and other parties at a national level, civil societies on a local level facilitated the 
successful implementation process and banned peace spoilers. The multiple pure mediators 
paved the way for implementation, performing tasks involving monitoring, verification and 










The constitutional reform focused on the armed forces, the electoral system, the judicial system 
and human rights. Those four sections were essentially implemented in 1992/1993. Apart from 
the security forces, “the National Civil Police shall be a new force with a new organization, 
new officers, new education and training mechanisms and a new doctrine.” (Boutros-Ghali 
1995, 194-198). This doctrine was based on democratic principles, free from political 
ideologies. Human rights and constitutional civil authorities were fully respected. The rights of 
civilians engaging in political activities were not to “be impaired by police activities” (ibid. 
199). The judicial system based on the National Council of the Judiciary and Office of the 
National Council for the Defence of Human Rights was reformed (ibid. 205). The electoral 
system, in particular the political participation of the FMLN, was newly regulated. “The 
conversion of the FMLN into a political party, and electoral reform as mandated in the accords, 
have led to unprecedented levels of political pluralism, highly competitive political processes, 
and free and fair elections, and more generally to vibrant political debates in El Salvador.” 
(Studemeister 2001, 5). Only one obstacle occurred on November 25, 1992: Three weeks after 
the culmination of a shaky peace process, El Salvador's left-wing guerrillas on Tuesday halted 
the disarmament of their militia, claiming that the government has refused to make progress on 
its pledge to grant land to squatters. Guerrilla leader Shafik Handal has said no more insurgents 
will lay down their arms until the government provides legal assurances that villagers and some 
former soldiers who have seized farmland will not be evacuated (Wilkinson 1992). 
 
One obstacle was identified during the implementation process on November 25, 1992. The 
former FMLN warriors stopped demobilization, as the government had failed to implement the 
farmland issue. The failure to implement one provision also blocked the following 
implementation process, which had become a common procedure in El Salvador. The problem 
was finally solved by the ONUSAL. Needless to say, the success depended on the parties 
sticking to an imposed schedule and strictly abiding by their commitments. The commitment 
problems were solved by a mediator, the UN (ONUSAL). It closely monitored the process in 
cooperation with COPAZ.  Communication and facilitation between the conflicting parties 






Electoral/Political Party Reform 
 
Paving the way to the transformation of the FMLN into a political party, a legal basis was 
established by the legislative assembly which allowed for pluralism. Promoting the political 
participation of former rebel groups was one of the key factors for sustainable peace and good 
democracy. This enhanced governmental power-sharing, which is considered by many 
researchers as an essential element for peacebuilding (Hartzel and Hoddie 2003, 321). “On 23 
January 1992, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador adopted a new law on national 
reconciliation, granting amnesty for political crimes and offences under ordinary law, with the 
exception of cases within the purview of the Commission on the Truth or those committed by 
individuals already convicted in a jury trial.” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 243). This was the FMLN’s 
first step towards political participation. The following problems were caused by the ONUSAL 
during the implementation process of electoral/political party reform in May 1992, The 
government delayed legalizing FMLN as a political party (ibid. 245). Moreover, the parties 
interpreted the stipulations to be implemented from different points of view, thus adding further 
delay to the implementation process. However, the ONUSAL got the process back on track. 
The land issue was one of the central points of conflict, which was finally solved by the 
ONUSAL. The leaders of the two conflicting parties both had personal telephone contact with 
the Secretary-General, who strongly complained to them about the implementation delay. After 
their phone conversation, both parties promised to get the implementation back on the right 
track. They even made creative suggestions on how to solve the problem (ibid. 245-246). 
 
FMLN was successfully transformed into a political party (Unruh and Williams 2013, 321). 
The election date was scheduled for March 1994, when the FMLN would participate for the 
first time in its history. The government required monitoring for those elections. In response to 
this request, the ONUSAL established an electoral assistance division. This was “an electoral 
component for the purpose of observing and verifying the Salvadorian general elections 
scheduled for March 1994 until the proclamation of final results by the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal of El Salvador.” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 442). However, the registration of voters 
proved partially inefficient, as more than 74,000 persons who had requested registration were 





certificate.” (ibid. 51). Finally, the overall conduct of the elections was successful and in full 
compliance with the ONUSAL’s monitoring plan (ibid. 531).  
 
Granting amnesty to former FMLN members and establishing a new legal basis for their equal 
political participation in the upcoming elections were significant implementations. All that 
supported governmental power-sharing which is generally considered as one of the main factors 
securing peace. One problem occurred, as the text dealing with the provisions was diversely 
interpreted by the conflicting parties. That problem could have been avoided if the text had 
been composed in a way to set out an appropriate strategy in an unequivocal manner. A similar 
problem regarding postponements reoccurred. However, those problems were skilfully 
resolved by the mediator Secretary-General, by Mr. Handals (FMLN leader) and El Salvador’s 
President Cristiani. Communication tools with the rival parties and observers were continuously 
applied on the spot by the Secretary-General of the UN.  Multiple mediators monitored and 
verified the implementation process to make sure that the implementation of power-sharing 
would be successful.  
 
Civil Administration Reform 
 
This provision was aimed at achieving civil administration and “institution-building” in conflict 
zones after the ceasefire had occurred (Stanley and Holiday 1997). In the case of El Salvador, 
urgent actions were taken to provide services for a post-conflict society. They relate to water, 
electricity, telecommunication, roads, agriculture, education, health, new setting of the 
administration of justice, effectiveness of the legislative, functioning of the non-governmental 
organizations, guaranteeing members of the FMLN full exercise of their civil and political 
rights (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 218). Government officials such as former court judges and mayors 
in exile were free to return to the conflict zones. However, the return of those officials was 
made difficult, as the FMLN and some local communities raised concerns against it. Eager to 
resolve this issue, the ONUSAL appealed to the local communities to strive for more 
communication and overcome this problem to achieve lasting peace and reconciliation (ibid. 
244). A collaboration agreement was signed by the opposing parties, allowing officials to return 
to El Salvador (16 September 1992). That agreement had been achieved through joint action by 





implementation of the civil administration reform was successfully accomplished at the end of 
1994. According to Document 118, the Secretary-General’s report on the activities of the 
ONUSAL (14 November 1994) stated that the delay of implementations was due to the shortage 
of financial funds and resources, “lack of organization and expertise - a common phenomenon 
in developing countries […]”. In that regard, “the presence and assistance of the United 
Nations” played a vital role (ibid. 589). The security guarantee was finally established by the 
parties under the supervision of the UN. The provision was successfully fulfilled. 
 
Truth and Reconciliation Mechanism 
 
Most Salvadorians did not believe in a successful reconciliation process in El Salvador and 
feared “social violence” after the implementation process of the peace agreement (Cuevas 2002, 
39). A provision relating to reconciliation is indispensable in the process of investigating war 
crimes in post-conflict societies, as it enhances accountability and ensures human rights. “The 
Commission on the Truth was established in accordance with the Mexico Agreements of 27 
April 1991 (S/23130, pp. 5 and 16-18). It was entrusted with the task of investigating serious 
acts of violence that had occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society was deemed to 
require an urgent public knowledge of the truth.” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 433). 22,000 complaints 
were filed in court after numerous crimes had been successfully investigated by a commission. 
Crimes had been committed mainly by security forces against civilians, peasants (extrajudicial 
executions, death squads’ assassinations and torture). Judges had been killed by the FMLN 
between 1980 and 1991 (ibid. 433). The commission identified most of the serious crimes. 
Recommendations were made as to reforming the constitution. Reconciliation was 
acknowledged as a core condition to prevent further crimes in the future (ibid. 434). The ad-
hoc commission urgently requested President Christiani to dismiss 102 officers, as well as the 
Minister and Vice-Minister of Defence, the significant proportion of commanding officers and 
colonels (Call 2002, 564). Defence Minister Rene Emilio Ponce and Vice-Minister General 
Juan Orlando Zepeda stepped down, high-ranking military officials were removed from their 
posts, as the most atrocious crimes had been committed in their terms of office (ibid. 564). 
 
Further challenges occurred, when the truth commission was pleading with civilian victims to 





stories, as they did not want to be exposed personally and put their loved ones at risk. Besides, 
local human right organizations in El Salvador lacked experience in cooperating with the 
commission by comparison with other international human rights organizations. Moreover, the 
government was reluctant to provide information about criminal acts in the past. Military 
officers lied or withheld the truth (Buergenthal 1994, 513-515). “A few days after the 
publication of the Report, the government of President Cristiani and the national legislature 
controlled by his party granted an across-the-board amnesty to all individuals charged with 
serious acts of violence.” (ibid. 537). The unexpected decision triggered lively discussions on 
whether this kind of amnesty had been planned beforehand to obstruct the work of the truth and 
reconciliation commission. 
“However, while amnesties after a civil war may be a legitimate way to put an end to the 
conflict, the manner in which this amnesty was rushed through the Salvadoran legislature in 
which the FMLN was not represented- with no time or opportunity for a full national debate 
on the subject, was unseemly at the very least, indicative of a lack of respect for democratic 
processes, and thus incompatible with the spirit of the Peace Accords.” (ibid. 538). 
 
The truth and reconciliation processes were also critically viewed by the UN Secretary-General, 
who was deeply concerned about the development in El Salvador in July 1997. “In sum, a less 
than positive evaluation of the actions taken in response to the substantive recommendations of 
the Commission on the Truth is unavoidable”. This is a frustrating setback to seize the 
Commission's rare chance to make significant progress in the fight against impunity and the 
advancement of an environment of national reconciliation through its function (UN 1997b, 7). 
 
The implementation did not fully meet the expectations harboured by the commission and the 
victims. Nevertheless, the truth and reconciliation process aiming at establishing accountability 
has been unique in Salvadorian history (Call 2002, 576). The UN and COPAZ were unable to 
apply pressure on the government and the FMLN in terms of seeking the truth. In that regard, 
the UN should have utilized its position of power more effectively to implement the truth and 
reconciliation mechanism.  
 
Dispute Resolution Committee 
 
The dispute resolution committee was one of the major factors guaranteeing implementation 





commission aiming at the consolidation of peace, was established to monitor the 
implementation process. The COPAZ consisted of “two representatives of the government, 
including a member of the armed forces, two representatives of the FMLN and one 
representative of each of the parties or coalitions represented in the Legislative Assembly“ 
(Boutros-Ghali 1995, 20). In the event of any uncertainties and disputes, COPAZ, the ad-hoc 
commission supported by the UN, took charge of finding solutions, reporting on the peace 
process and consulting the conflicting parties. As the mandated ad-hoc commission (1992-
1997) had no executive power, its function was highly inefficient (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 160). 
The government was able to postpone its responsibilities due to COPAZ's failure to make 
decisions (Call 2002, 570). The establishment of the Dispute Resolution Committee was 
successful in terms of cooperation and coordination between the government, FMLN, local 




The establishment of people's confidence in an impartial legal system seems to have been 
crucial to the long efficacy of the any peace accord. El Salvador has never had this level of 
confidence in the past. As a result, it's own establishment used to be a required basis of the 
modern El Salvador (Negroponte 2012, 158). The judicial system was to be newly reformed 
following the internationally recognized values of universal human rights such as the division 
of powers. In that regard, the focus was set on the following subsections: 
“(a) Reorganization of the Supreme Court of Justice and a new procedure for the election of 
Supreme Court judges […] (b) An annual allocation from the State budget to the judiciary 
amounting to no less than 6 per cent of current income. (c) Creation of the post of a National 
Council for the Defence of Human Rights, (d) Election of the Attorney-General of the 
Republic […] (b) Judicial Training School. (c) Career judicial service.“ (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 
167-168). 
 
Although several reforms had been achieved in the field of judiciary provisions, the result hoped 
for by many Salvadorians was rather dissatisfactory. In 1992, a delay of implementation was 
experienced due to the “tightness of the timetable, an integral component of the accords, 
together with the complexity of the various commitments undertaken by the two sides, led to 
major delays in completing certain crucial commitments” (ibid. 266). That issue was solved by 
Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding of the ONUSAL. He repeatedly organized 





of pre-trial detention, several delays reoccurred. They were regularly reported by the ONUSAL 
under specific numbers such as (A/47/968 S/26033) (UN 1993, 36-38). Accordingly, the UN 
criticized the Salvadorian judiciary for its lack of proper practice: “Public discontent with the 
administration of justice has been mounting. The weaknesses in this sector are a fundamental 
impediment to the consolidation of a truly democratic State.” (UN 1997b, 18) Besides, several 
postponements were identified due to the lack of ratifications, of coordination, of capacity for 
investigation, due to the lacking political will of government officials (Popkin 2010, 86), due 
to a sluggish, languid criminal justice system in charge of punishing human rights violations 
(UN 1997b, 4-19). Call (2002, 580) adequately describes the implementation of the judiciary 
reform occurring in 1998, “the judicial system remained weak, inefficient, antiquated, overly 
partisan, and subject to corruption.” Although the UN criticized the slow implementation 
processes, it abstained from imposing sanctions against El Salvador. On the contrary, several 





“Power correlations are relative and civil-military correlations are not exception… diminishing 
military autonomy is best accomplished by augmenting civilian power” (Juhn 2006, 12). The 
provision of military reform was integrated into the peace accord as a sub-section within the 
framework of constitutional reform. The quality, quantity and doctrinal principles of the armed 
forces were newly established in line with the democratic values, political order, respect for the 
constitution and the rule of law, human rights and dignity. From now on, the armed forces were 
to act only on the level of national defence, maintaining internal peace and nothing else. 
According to the new regulations, a reform was adopted, i.e., an educational system for the 
armed forces was introduced, free from any political influence. Cleansing was conducted, 
seeking out security officers who had abused human rights in the past while on duty. All that 
was done following the criteria of human rights and dignity. Consequently, the number of 
armed forces was reduced. New reform procedures were established by the National 
Intelligence Department. The newly created State Intelligence Agency was to be directly 







Although there were considerable postponements and problems as to the implementation of a 
new structure in the armed forces (reduction of armed forces, reform of intelligence services 
between 1992 and 2002), the government was able to fully implement the provision in 
compliance with the recommendation of the UN and COPAZ. Former security force officers 
strongly opposed demobilization. They organized protests, occupying government buildings 
such as the Legislative Assembly and the Supreme Court of Justice. Demonstrators and the 
newly established security forces clashed violently in the same place where previous 
demonstrations had taken place (UN 1995a, 13-14). As the newly established government 
security forces lacked experience in handling such a violent clash, the implementation process 
was severely hampered. Whenever peace spoilers come into action, they always cause 
frustration and political deadlock. Another problem occurred, as members of demobilized 
forces were given career prospects in civilian life. This project, however, required a lot of 
money. The multiple pure mediators successfully cooperated with the different parties to 




The Ministry of Defense was in charge of El Salvador's three law enforcements, i.e., “National 
Guard, Treasury Police, and National Police” (Montgomery 1995, 168). The establishment of 
new police forces shows many similarities to the obstacles and problems of military reform. 
“National Civil Police shall be a new force with a new organization, new officers, new 
education and training mechanisms and a new doctrine.” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 198). The 
implementation was fully completed in 1997. However, demobilization and the massive 
dismissal of former security officers posed a severe problem during the implementation process, 
as Salvadorian police officers had a great deal of resistance power and formed a new 
paramilitary organization. The reorganization of security forces was a crucial factor in the 
peace-building process. “The first difficulty was the government's failure in March 1992 to 
demobilize the Treasury Police and the National Guard.” (Call 2002, 568). Another mistake 
was, when Oscar Pena Duran, a former military officer was appointed director of the PNC by 
the government. The “ONUSAL persisted in opposing the appointment as a violation of the 





from the previously supportive US government, Pena Duran was forced to resign.” (ibid. 570). 
The government took every opportunity to employ former security officers in the newly 
established police forces to maintain its former power impact (ibid. 571). It is obvious that the 
selfish strategy of the government slowed down the implementation process to a large extent. 
However, the strong pressure exerted by the US and the ONUSAL on the Salvadorian 
government largely contributed to the successful implementation. The US leverage helped the 
ONUSAL. In its reports, the ONUSAL kept referring to the financial shortcomings of the 
Salvadorian police forces, so it is understood that money played a pivotal role to implement the 
rest of the peace agreement (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 442). The disarmament process of security 
forces and guerrilla in El Salvador abandoned numerous fighters from both sides jobless and 
socially inept, causing a rise in public insecurity (Hopmann 1999, 5).  
 
 
Demobilization and Disarmament 
 
According to the Chapultepec Peace Accord, demobilization of former combatants of the 
FMLN meant returning to normal life, ending armed activities, joining the newly established 
army and police forces. This predominantly facilitated the implementation process. The number 
of regular armed forces (FAES) was reduced and its structure newly designed. FMLN fighters 
were ordered to return to designated locations stated in the agreement. The primary aim of 
demobilization was that all combatants in the country should withdraw from the conflict zones 
to their barracks and report in detail on the number of weapons they possessed (e.g., arms, 
ammunition, mines). That process was to be closely monitored by the ONUSAL in cooperation 
with COPAZ. Once the weapons had been handed in, they were destroyed in a scheduled 
timeframe (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 210-212). The implementation was slowed down by the 
government’s lethargic implementation efforts. It was supposed to be achieved in a parallel 
timeframe. The FMLN complained that “it could not comply with its calendar of demobilization 
unless the Government met the deadlines for the implementation of political agreements, 
especially those related to land, political participation by FMLN and recruitment into the 






This type of problem has been identified in other provisions as well. The ONUSAL finally 
succeeded in solving the land issue, jointly assisted by experts and parties. One of the most 
flagrant violations of the peace agreement occurred when the FMLN’s hidden armoury was 
discovered in Nicaragua. Facing this emergency issue, Boutros-Ghali wrote to the President of 
the Security Council (1993), complaining about “the maintenance of such clandestine arms 
deposits, which is considered the most serious violation to date of the commitments assumed 
under the Peace Accords.” (ibid. 458). Thanks to the initiative taken by the ONUSAL, the 
weapons were destroyed by the FMLN and the Nicaraguan government. The discovery of the 
FMLN’s clandestine arsenal in Nicaragua proved to be the biggest obstacle for the FMLN to 
be recognized as a legal, political party by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The provision was 
partially implemented after a ten-year process. It was completed in 1995, disarmament was 




The reintegration process of ex-combatants is a sophisticated work that requires the technical 
assistance of third parties. It was supplied by the UN (Del Castillo 1997; Pugh 2009). The 
political participation of the FMLN was an important step towards a successful reintegration 
process. Reintegrating the former combatants of the FMLN meant that they could fully exercise 
their civil, political and institutional rights. The confidence-building measures proved 
successful to reintegrate former FMLN combatants (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 219-210).  
 
The ONUSAL continuously cooperated with COPAZ, the government and FMLN in the 
implementation process, which ended in 2000. Problems arose when the government 
transformed the Treasury Police and National Guards into the Military Police and the Frontier 
Guards in March 1992. The government’s strategy was to keep security power on its side. This 
was highly contradictory to the spirit of the peace accord. The ONUSAL urgently requested the 
government to carry out the cleansing process. After the ONUSAL had made it clear that they 
would not agree to the government’s strategy, the government promised to put an end to the 
Treasury Police and the National Guards (ibid. 240). Due to the pressure exerted by the 
ONUSAL, the government abolished the Treasury Police and the National Guards in September 





technical assistance were urgently needed in the entire post-conflict period (Boutros-Ghali 
1995, 584). Several postponements occurred in the implementation process. Cooperation and 





In matters of guaranteeing human rights and political participation to the FLMN, a provision of 
prisoner release was stipulated by the parties. The target group consisted of persons in jail for 
political crimes. There was an “exception of cases within the purview of the Commission on 
the Truth or those committed by individuals already convicted in a jury trial” (Boutros-Ghali 
1995, 243). This step was very important, aiming at full political participation (ibid. 209-210). 
A general amnesty was proclaimed by the legislative assembly with the intention of positively 
influencing further peace settlement efforts. After six-month research the truth commission was 
able to identify who had been the perpetrator or victim (Call 2002, 575). The prisoner release 
process was assisted by the Salvadorian church, local diplomats, members of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International and Americas Watch (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 
346). Obstacles did not occur in the implementation process of prisoner release. What facilitated 
the prisoner release process was the continuous help offered by multiple local and international 




“El Salvador as “escuadrones muertes,” or death squads, operated in tandem with eighty-
thousand member right-wing organisation that supported paramilitary activities and served as 
the hub of the death squads network.”(Mazzei 2009, 130). Several paramilitary groups (e.g., 
death squads) were established during the Civil War (1960-1990). “The report estimated that 
the military and paramilitary death squads were responsible for 95 percent of all human rights 
abuses committed between 1980 and 1992, with the FMLN responsible for the remainder.” 
(Call 2002, 574). The paramilitary organizations were guilty of crimes against the civilian 
population (e.g., assassination, torture, kidnapping, genocide). Those crimes entailed violent 





the principle that any paramilitary force or group must be proscribed in a State governed by the 
rule of law.” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 197). The organization, structure and activity of private 
security were newly regulated following the principles of human rights. 
 
Implementation was difficult because the process of recovering military weapons from private 
individuals was deliberately slowed down by the government. Although a great number of 
military weapons had been recovered, the process could not be adequately completed because 
of uncontrolled weapon proliferation in the past (Call 2002, 549). Moreover, various 
paramilitary groups had joined together beyond the government’s control, adopting new names 
and refusing to dissolve. The failure of disarmament was, to some extent, due to an inadequate 
reintegration program, lack of funds and lack of career prospects for ex-warriors. “Over two 
years after the accords were signed, only 6,000 of 18,000 ex-soldiers had received their 
severance pay.” (ibid. 563). The government failed to fully implement the stipulation. 




Respecting and observing human rights are a solid basis for living together in post-conflict 
societies. Human rights are an integral part of peace accords to prevent conflict recurrence, to 
create reconciliation and ensure lasting peace. They are enshrined, interalia, in the UN Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedom. In the Chapultepec Accord, human rights and the judicial system were 
dealt with together, as mentioned above. A new office was created, named “the National 
Council for the Defence of Human Rights.” The human rights process was slowed down due to 
a financial issue, in 1992. This was a common problem that equally occurred in the 
implementation process of other provisions (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 247). Although core human 
rights issues were solved, which was a positive development, many problems remained. The 
right to life and liberty was continuously violated for political motives, physical and 
psychological abuse of detained or imprisoned persons, abductions, torture, an inefficient 
judicial system to protect the rights of individuals, lack of investigations (ibid. 247). The lack 
of judges and court personnel at district courts posed an insoluble problem (ibid. 248, 254, 378). 





with international standards. Moreover, FMLN leaders and supreme court members were 
assassinated by illegal groups (ibid. 46, 373). In the reports issued by the ONUSAL the 
following facts were considered as serious obstacles on the way to improve human rights 
practice according to universal standards: “... the high crime indexes, particularly the proven 
existence of complex organized-crime networks, coupled with the impunity resulting from the 
inadequate functioning of the justice system, are currently the greatest obstacles to the effective 
exercise of human rights in El Salvador.” (ibid. 574-575). What made the implementation of 
the human rights provision extremely difficult were financial issues, frequent impunity due to 
the lack of investigations or court judges, vengeance committed by death squads. The 
“accountability for past human rights violations” has equally been identified by Call (2002, 
563) as a major obstacle in the implementation process. Over the years, respect for human rights 




Refugee crises always occur in civil wars. The return of refugees and displaced persons to their 
homes poses a major challenge for post-war countries. It was expressly stipulated in the 
Chapultepec Agreement. “It is estimated that about half a million persons were displaced and 
approximately 45,000 became refugees. Many of the displaced persons have settled in 
communities, some of them on abandoned lands.” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 242). Although the 
implementation of the refugee provision was a matter of great interest for displaced 
Salvadorians, many refugees and displaced persons living in the USA were reluctant to return 
home. The offers were not accepted as one would expect, on account of economic and security 
reasons.  As only very few legal issues concerning the return of refugees were reported in El 
Salvador, the third parties did not have to bother about implementation.  
 
Internally Displaced Persons 
 
750,000 civilians have been forcibly displaced, as seen by figures (Call 2002, 548). Their return 
posed a new challenge as to land ownership in conflict zones. It also affected their right to vote 
or to run for office. The land question has been characterized as one of the major cause of the 





many local inhabitants. Whereas the landowners’ right to stay on their land was guaranteed in 
the agreement, peasants were evicted by armed forces. Serious diplomatic efforts were pursued 
by the Under-Secretary-General, ONUSAL, COPAZ, by the government and FMLN to solve 
this problem. As they proved successful, occupation and eviction were suspended (Boutros-
Ghali 1995, 242). The idea that landowners, peasants, former FMLN members and fighters 
should share farmlands, posed a new challenge. “In August 1993, the Government presented a 
plan to accelerate land transfers to former combatants of FMLN and landholders” (ibid. 555). 
The Land Transfer Programme (PTT) tackled the issue of sharing lands in disputed areas. The 
implementation process continued for years, facing all kinds of bureaucratic and technical 




In the Salvadorian post-conflict society, the mass media widely promoted the political 
participation of FMLN and the importance of reconciliation. They were a strong pillar of the 
democratic spirit of the Peace Agreement, widely supporting peace restoration, trying to 
prevent further political conflicts. COPAZ took charge of monitoring the process and made new 
suggestions. At the same time, ONUSAL verified the implementation process (Boutros-Ghali 
1995, 218). FMLN “obtained licenses for two radio stations and one television channel.” (ibid. 
243). It was found out in 1994 that the ARENA and the Convergencia Democratica had violated 
Article 18 which regulated the rules of electoral propaganda.  ONUSAL cooperated with the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal in order to cope with complaints effectively. 
 
“Some 300 complaints were presented to ONUSAL during the campaign period, most of 
them (23 per cent) dealing with arbitrary or illegitimate action by public authorities. The 
remainder consisted of acts of intimidation (21 per cent), destruction of propaganda materials 
(18 per cent), aggression (9 per cent), murder (7 per cent) and miscellaneous complaints (22 
per cent).” (ibid. 529). 
 
The implementation of the media reform was successfully implemented in 1995 (Joshi et al. 








Economics and Social Developments 
 
The agrarian issue, one of the main causes of the civil war, was a serious problem in the post-
war implementation process. It constituted a key factor for economic and social development 
in the post-conflict period. The government established a “National Reconstruction Plan” for 
sharing land between former warriors (Del Castillo 2008, 111). Moreover, a “Forum for 
Economic and Social Development” was created in which the government and “labour and 
business sectors” worked together to find answers to land issues (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 161). A 
problem occurred in conflict zones when the present residents of lands were told to remain on 
their lands and own them. The security forces evicted the peasants from some areas, as they 
wished to occupy these lands themselves. COPAZ and ONUSAL mediated between peasants 
and the government, trying to find a solution but eventually failed. Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali personally intervened on October 13, 1992, urging President Christiani to fulfil 
his commitments regarding land transfers (ibid. 256). Although the process was hampered by 
technical, financial and logistical issues, the land was “legally transferred to almost 35,500 
beneficiaries”, according to a UN report. Implementation in that regard was completed, as Kofi 
Annan cooperated with the UNDP and donor governments (UN 1998, 2). The provision was 
fully implemented thanks to Kofi Annan’s intensive diplomatic efforts (1997-1998). Although 
the UN and COPAZ worked closely together, they could not entirely resolve the commitment 
problem. In the end, Kofi Annan’s constant pressure on the Salvadorian government helped to 




Donor support of third parties is very important to facilitate the transition process from conflict 
to lasting peace. This “would permit the financing of peace accord programs” (Eriksson and 
Arnold 2000, 37). Financial issues as to reconstruction and reconciliation are a common 
problem in post-conflict societies. 
“On 1 April 1993, at the Consultative Group Meeting of donors convened in Paris by the 
World Bank, the Government of El-Salvador asked the international community to fill a $600 
million gap in the financing required for programmes directly related to the peace accords 
for the period 1993-1996. Of the $1.2 billion needed overall, the Government had already 
committed over $300 million and the international community just under $300 million.” 






Donor countries, international and regional institutions (e.g., The World Bank, IMF, Inter- 
American Development Bank, the US) took great interest in financing the process with certain 
preferences, such as primarily “infrastructural and environmental projects” and less “the 
promotion of democratic institutions, the reintegration of ex-combatants, housing, purchase 
farmland, agriculture.” (ibid. 44-45). Preference issues were resolved without too much delay, 
with the help of the UN and donor countries. Resolving those problems strongly facilitated 
further implementations. The need for technical help was also fully met.  
 
Detailed Implementation Timeline 
 
Implementations continuously faced delays and postponements. A contractual commitment 
should be measured by the conflicting parties’ compliance with the set schedule of 
implementation. In the Agreement, the schedule was very well detailed, comprising specific 
steps to be done on specific days. However, details as to certain provisions had not been worked 
out by third parties (e.g., the specification of conflict zones, land redistribution to peasants, 
reconstruction and reformation of security forces). Moreover, considerable delays occurred 
after the discovery of secret FMLN weapons in Nicaragua and after armed forces had forcibly 
occupied the land of farmers. Those delays occurred in different periods. Problems of timetable 
and uncertainty were solved, new agreements were reached between the parties thanks to 
ONUSAL’s brilliant mediation skills (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 598). 
 
The implementation process was closely monitored by ONUSAL and COPAZ. Delays and 
commitment problems hampered the process. Until 1996, numerous obstacles as to time 
commitment were caused by both parties. In the course of the mediation process, they have 
gradually removed thanks to the help of pure mediators, the UN (ONUSAL) and COPAZ. They 
gave advice, technical assistance and financial support. Studemeister (2001, 40) argues that 
“the international community should be prepared for the fact that institution-building is a slow 
process; its progress cannot necessarily be tied to a strict timetable.” Numerous delays occurred 







Natural Resource Management 
 
The content of this provision was based on the land distribution between peasants and has been 
dealt with in the provision of economics and social development. 
 
Review of Agreement 
 
Based on the New York Agreement of September 1991, the “National Commission for the 
Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ)” was established for supervising implementation processes 
and giving advice on how they should be conducted efficiently (Tyroler 1991). COPAZ closely 
worked together with other parties such as ONUSAL and civil societies, in compliance with 
the Chapultepec Peace Agreement. COPAZ did not have any executive power in parliament. 
However, it benefitted from certain privileges such as having direct access to the president. The 
parties were supposed to inform COPAZ regularly about their implementation efforts. As 
agreed, COPAZ was given the task of preparing draft laws and amendments to accelerate the 
implementation process which was to be submitted to parliament (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 160). 
As COPAZ did not have the right to enforce sanctions, the government repeatedly slowed down 
the implementation process, reluctant to follow the advice offered by COPAZ (Call 2002, 569). 
COPAZ as a national and internal third-party between ONUSAL, the government, civil 
societies and FMLN poured oil on troubled water and got the negotiations back on track, 
whenever a setback occurred. Difficulties mainly occurred in the following topics:  
 
 truth and reconciliation 
 disarmament-demobilization-reintegration process 
 farmland redistribution 
 return of refugees and internally displaced persons 
 judicial system for the protection of human rights 
 lack of investigations into previously committed crimes against people 
 a reorganisation of security forces (e.g., purification and reduction of armed forces).  
 





in January 1996 (Krennerich 2013, 358). All in all, one can say that the role played by COPAZ 
was highly beneficial to the implementation process. The pressure exerted by ONUSAL and 
the US, the positive cooperation of the third parties greatly facilitated the implementation of 
these provisions. 
 
Verification and Monitoring Mechanism 
 
The implementation process in El Salvador was regularly monitored by ONUSAL until April 
30, 1995. The UN observer mission (ONUSAL) in El-Salvador was legally based on “the San 
Jose, Mexico City and New York Agreements of 26 July 1990, 27 April 1991 and 25 September 
1991.” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 218). It was mandated by the Security Council “on 20 May 1991” 
in connection with resolution S/RES/693(1991) (The UN Security Council 1991, 33). 
ONUSAL subdivided its responsibilities into "Human Rights Division," a new "Military 
Division", "Police Division" and an “electoral division” which monitored the elections (Call 
2002, 555). After the agreement had come into force, ONUSAL cooperated with COPAZ, the 
government and the FMLN to verify, guarantee, supervise and support the implementation 
process. 
 
 ONUSAL regularly issued reports about the implementation efforts taken by the parties. 
Whenever the process was hampered by delays, postponements and commitment problems, 
ONUSAL pressured the parties into putting the process back on track. After ONUSAL had 
completed its mission, MINUSAL started to work on a smaller scale, pursuing the same goal 
in El Salvador on May 1st, 1995. It was financially supported by Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
(UN 1995b, 1-2). This mission was replaced by ONUV later (May 1st, 1996- December 31st, 
1996). “ONUV consisted of only eight staff members plus three civilian police consultants, and 
its mandate was to follow up the implementation of pending aspects of the peace accords in El 




The UN and COPAZ are classified as pure and multiple mediation types. They both provided 





The implementation of provisions was put into practice stepwise under the clear leadership of 
the UN. The UN (ONUSAL) closely cooperated with groups such as COPAZ, civil societies 
and parties at national and local levels. COPAZ dealt with them in a prudent, well-organized 
manner. It seriously took into account the particular conditions that had caused the conflict in 
El Salvador.  Furthermore, it was largely responsible for the design of the Chapultepec Peace 
Agreement, which proved to be successful, as misunderstandings had been cleared up and 
conflict recurrence was prevented. Its skilful negotiation style had already been displayed in 
previous mediation efforts between the Salvadorian government and guerrilla groups. The 
implementation of certain provisions proved difficult, such as the truth and reconciliation 
provision, the disarmament demobilization-reintegration provision (DDR), the farmland 
redistribution, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, the judicial system for 
the protection of human rights, the lack of investigations into previously committed crimes 
against people. Some issues such as farmland, redistribution or disarmament of rebels needed 
proper technical and scientific assistance from third parties. 
 
Mediators should be technically trained and legally supported. They should have prior 
knowledge of the core causes of the conflict, which requires short- and long-term mediation 
experience. However, specific technical knowledge alone is not sufficient in an implementation 
process. Multiple long-term mediators should have enough financial capacity and security 
personnel. They should also possess a great deal of leverage power, should be able to 
communicate and cooperate with others skilfully. They should also know how to provide 
power-sharing in an implementation process. The UN demonstrated all those qualities when it 
successfully dealt with COPAZ, FMLN and the Salvadorian government. It set a perfect 
example of a successful, long-term implementation of a peace agreement.  
 
ONUSAL likewise displayed excellent communication skills, when it was dealing with various 
commissions and leaders of both parties at local and national levels during the implementation 
process. It always acted cautiously and regularly warned UN bodies about new obstacles 
occurring in the implementation process.  Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary-General, 
repeatedly addressed both sides personally, complaining to them about specific commitment 
problems and implementation postponements. For that reason, the UN found it necessary to put 





emerged, expert commissions were created to provide help. Another pivotal factor that 
facilitated the implementation process was financial support for the promotion of democratic 
institutions and the reintegration of ex-combatants. Lack of financial support for 
implementation would have seriously hampered the peace process. The UN acted jointly with 
the Salvadorian government, the Salvadorian church, local diplomats, members of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International and Americas Watch for 
granting amnesty to former FMLN members. The Salvadorian government established a new 
legal basis for equal political participation in future elections, which guaranteed the political 
inclusion of former rebels. The UN firmly supported the practice of governmental power-
sharing, as it was very much aware that it was the basis for securing peace. As required by the 
Salvadorian government, the UN established a monitoring system to be applied in the next 
national elections. New challenges arose, when an FMLN arms cache was discovered in 
Nicaragua and when the Salvadorian government granted a general amnesty to assassins from 
both sides (death squads, illegal organisations).  
 
One aspect that has often been neglected is the impact of national and local media on peace 
implementation processes. They play a significant role in restoring peace and preventing further 
political conflicts. They can decrease the power of peace spoilers through peace journalism. 
Their role should be examined more closely in scientific terms.  
 
The Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador also assumed responsibility in the peace-building 
process. It successfully brought about a prisoners’ exchange between the government and 
guerrillas. Archbishop Romero was assassinated by a rightist paramilitary in 1980, which made 
the peace-making efforts of the church look weak and vulnerable. However, the Catholic 
Church (Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas) continued to strongly commit itself to peace-
building activities from 1984 to 1991 (Chavez 1984). Their activities did not result in any 
ceasefire or peace agreement.  
 
As the UN was the biggest security power in El Salvador, it conducted most negotiations. It 
also enjoyed a high level of confidence and was generally considered an unbiased and 
influential third party internationally. It was genuinely determined to resolve the peace problem 





Rwanda, Bosnia and South Sudan failed. Maybe other external third parties such as ODECA 
(Organication de Estados Centroamericanos), CELAC (The Community of Latin American and 
the Caribbean States), the US or Cuba would have been able to provide a successful 
implementation in El Salvador. Although the US has a great deal of military and economic 
capacity, it would have certainly been rejected as a third-party mediator by FMLN, since the 
US had supported the Salvadorian government in times of the Cold War (financial support, 
intelligence and combat equipment). Despite its former generous support, the USA pressured 
the Salvadorian government into peace talks and forced it to implement the agreement. On the 
other hand, the Salvadorian government wouldn’t have agreed to have Cuba as a third-party 
mediator on account of its communist ideology. It was obvious that both parties would 
eventually ask the UN to be their peace mediator. As there were not any other external third 
parties in the Salvadorian post-agreement process, a proper implementation process would have 
seemed impossible there. Powerful peace spoilers and commitment problems occurred 
regularly. The final peace agreement solved many core issues in terms of government policy 
and security in the post-conflict era. It should be continuously respected by all Salvadorians to 
preserve lasting peace. After 10 years the implementation score reached 96% (Joshi et al. 2015). 
 
 
5.2.2 Lebanon: Implementation of the Ta’if Peace Agreement 
 
Power-sharing Transitional Government 
 
This provision deals with the transition process from war to peace, in which the former 
conflicting parties were to share the power of a state apparatus such as executive, legislative 
and judicial power. This provision likewise occurred in the post-war periods of several 
countries such as Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda (DeRouen et al. 2010, 337; Pospieszna and 
Schneider 2011, 20). In the case of Lebanon, the legislative assembly, i.e., the chamber of 
deputies which regulates government policy, was reformed. There were 108 seats in parliament, 
equally shared by Christians and Muslims, proportionately shared by the denominations of each 
sect and by the different administrative districts (UN 2014). The provision was fully 
implemented in 1992 after law 154 had been passed in parliament (Joshi et al. 2015). A change 





new power-sharing transition government, the President must be a Maronite, the Prime Minister 
must be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the House of Deputies must be a Shi'a Muslim. 
Christians and Muslims are divided proportionally among the 128 deputies. In 1992, a general 
election took place, albeit in an environment of antagonism (CHRRP 1992, 1044).  
 
Lebanon and Syria signed a mutual accord that underlined the strategic cooperation of both 
countries and in which the single power mediator Syria was to provide security to Lebanon. It 
allowed Syria to deploy approximately 35,000 troops, plus intelligent services in different parts 
of Lebanon (ibid. 1044-1045; Rosiny 2015, 491). The implementation of this accord secured 
Syria’s guardianship in Lebanon. The entry of Syrian armed forces into Lebanon meant direct 
involvement of the Syrian government in Lebanese domestic political affairs. Although there 
is not sufficient proof that Syria pushed through the successful implementation of a transitional 
government, it cannot be denied that the strong presence of Syrian military forces in Lebanon 
guaranteed a successful implementation of governmental power-sharing. 
 
Executive Branch Reform 
 
This provision aimed to achieve the power and structure of the executive in post-war Lebanon. 
The rights, duties and obligations of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet were explicitly determined. This reform faced serious obstacles after the newly elected 
Maronite president Rene Moawad (Cristian Maronite) had been assassinated in November 
1989. Another Maronite, Elias Hrawi, was elected president by Parliament, an event critically 
commented on by Krayem (1997): 
 
“Members of this sect were to occupy major positions in key ministries, in the army and in 
the courts. Such positions included the commander-in-chief of the army, the highest judicial 
position (President of the Court of Cassation), the positions of the Director-General of both 
internal security and intelligence and that of Governor of the Central Bank.” 
 
The authority of the central government had not yet been fully established in Lebanon because 
of internal and external armed militant groups occupying about 30% of Lebanese territory 
(CHRRP 1989, 1468). Their power overlapped with the power of the central government at a 
national level. The Lebanese Army Commander General Michel Awn strongly opposed the 





threat to a fully independent Lebanon. This led to a war between Awn’s troops and the Syrian 
army. Awn lost. This enabled the central authority to further expand its executive power (Zahar 
2005, 234). This was the first direct Syrian armed confrontation with Lebanese armed groups 
in Lebanon. If Syria’s military intervention in Lebanon (security guarantee and peace spoiler 
prevention) had not occurred, previously armed groups in Lebanon would have conserved their 
political and military status quo, which would have seriously hampered the implementation 
process. So, the power of balance was ensured, and the executive branch provision was fully 
implemented in 1990. 
 
Legislative Branch Reform 
 
Along with the establishment of the Chamber of Deputies assuming legislative power, the 
establishment of a second senate was agreed upon as an additional chamber (Bicameralism). 
The idea was to grant representatives of religious groups or “spiritual families” a privilege 
allowing them to use “veto power” in state affairs. However, a new senate could not be 
established, as sectarianism was considered to be the main reason for the civil war, posing a 
serious risk to national cohesion (Rosiny 2015, 492). The first national election in 1992 didn’t 
fulfil the required quality standard in terms of security compliance and full participation of all 
parties. It could not “reflect the full spectrum of the body politic and cast doubt on the people's 
ability to change their government democratically.” (CHRRP 1994). Christian communities in 
Lebanon mainly boycotted the election because of the hateful presence of the Syrian army in 
their country and also because “Sunni prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri” (assassinated in 2005) 
enjoyed a close relationship with Saudi Arabia (Rosiny 2015, 497). The provision was largely 
implemented despite serious shortcomings (failure to establish a second Senate, Christians 
boycotting the polls) (Joshi et al. 2015). The implementation process was very much geared to 
the benefit of Syria, the power mediator. Syria’s political influence on Lebanon was not 
apparent at first glance. 
 
Electoral/Political Party Reform 
 
The regulation reform of the electoral law and political party system in the Ta’if Accord is 





“D. Parliamentary Election Law: Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance 
with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee 
common coexistence between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient 
political representation of all the people's factions and generations [...]” (Ta’if 
Accords 1989).  
 
In order to guarantee the representation of different religious communities, “Law 154 of 1992 
raised the number of parliamentary seats to 128 instead of 108, thus adding 29 new seats to the 
pre-war parliament.” (Salloukh 2006, 644). The Lebanese electoral system is dissimilar from 
other democracies due to its “confessional” political system (specified seat balances in 
parliament). Despite controversial discussions in Lebanon, structural sectarianism and 
confessionalism have helped to enhance the country’s national unity in the post-war period. 
The Christians boycotting the 1992 elections because of the presence of foreign troops in their 
country, clearly manifested a great deal of national pride. Besides, “there were credible reports 
of the Syrian Government's involvement in the formation of candidacy ticket alliances” 
(CHRRP 1992, 1049). It could therefore be assumed that after the implementation of the 
provision, Syria might have misused its presence in Lebanon to influence domestic policy there. 
It might also be proof of Syria’s biased mediation practice and justified interference in 




Administrative decentralization as a major element in governmental power-sharing between 
parties was part of the Ta’if Peace Accord for governorates and municipalities but was not 
implemented (Karam 2012, 38; Harb and Atallah 2015, 188; Joshi et al. 2015). The main 
obstacle to achieving decentralization was the general fear of confessional secession at a 
national level (Harb and Atallah 2015, 192). A further implementation action was not identified 
until 1999. Only in 1999 did the Syrian government put pressure (leverage and enforcement) 
in Lebanon to initiate further implementation actions.  
 
Civil Administration Reform 
 
This provision named “G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism” dealt with sharing public jobs. 





employment were agreed upon in terms of qualification requirements. They deliberately 
excluded names of confessions in “the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint 
institutions, and in the independent agencies.” (Ta’if Accords 1989). The names of sects or 
denominations did not figure on identity cards anymore. Interior Minister Ziad Baroud issued 
a circular on February 11, 2009, permitting the Lebanese to remove any link to their faith from 
the Civil Registry (HRW 2009). The Lebanese government tried to get rid of job selection 
practices based on confession (lower-paid administrative jobs). This proved to be a difficult 
task at the beginning (CHRRP 1991, 1492). 
 
The final implementation was realized by Prime Minister Hariri between 1993 and 1997. He 
established the “Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform” in 1993 (OMSAR), 
which performed implementation activities in administrative issues (El-Zein and Sims 2004, 
280). Consequently, the amendments stuck at an impasse for two key reasons: 1) the absence 
of an arbitrator; and 2) the consensus governance mindset (Karam 2012, 37). The arbiter role 
was to be played by a national reconciliation commission which was to be formed by the former 
conflicting parties, neutral parties and NGO’s. Syria assumed the long-term mediation 
responsibility to pressure the conflicting parties into reaching mutual understanding. Another 
problem occurred in Lebanon: “contradictory interpretations of legal texts and the Constitution” 
(ibid. 37). The same issue was identified in El Salvador, where political parties interpreted 
provisions differently for their benefit. An important step towards peace occurred one decade 
later when the names of people’s religious beliefs were barred from IDs in 2009 (Human Rights 
Watch 2009). This was done to combat religious excesses in Lebanon and promote national 
unity. 
 
Dispute Resolution Committee 
 
The dispute resolution committee was stipulated under the “B. Courts” regulation. “2. A 
constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the 
constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential 
and parliamentary elections.” (Ta’if Accord 1989). In 1993 (Law No. 250), the independent 
constitutional council consisting of 10 members (Christians and Muslims), five “by the 





ratification and “amended by law No. 43” in 2008 (International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems 2009). The commission was not instructed to monitor the implementation process of 
the Ta’if Agreement. Their duty was to control the constitutionality of the laws. Nevertheless, 




“[3]. To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the Higher Judiciary Council 
shall be elected by the judiciary body.“ (Ta’if Accords 1989). The partiality of the judiciary 
was repeatedly criticized in the report on human rights practices. It was claimed that local or 
national powers such as the militias on a local level, influential politicians or Syrian intelligence 
officers constantly intervened “to protect their supporters from detention and prosecution” 
(CRHRP 1989, 1471; CRHRP 1990, 1525; CRHRP 1991, 1488; CRHRP 1992, 1047; CRHRP 
1994; CHRRP 1995). Although the implementation took place in 1989 without any noticeable 
resistance, the lack of impartiality affected the reputation of the judiciary. Moreover, the 
interference of the Syrian intelligence service in the Lebanese judiciary proved Syria’s selfish 
political intentions. Syrians constantly pressured the Lebanese judiciary into arresting 
demonstrators against their presence in Lebanon (Assi 2016, 97).  
 
Military and Paramilitary Reforms 
 
A military reform was intended in the agreement to ensure domestic security in cooperation 
with internal security agencies and to defend the homeland against external threats (e.g., Israel). 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and General Emile Lahoud (1989-1989) were unable to reach a 
compromise on the reconstruction strategy of Lebanon. As Lahoud did not trust Sunni security 
officers, he controlled the Republican Guards and Hariri the internal security forces (Knudsen 
and Gade 2017, 26). The implementation of military reform was blocked because of General 
Aoun’s stubborn attitude against “Syrian tutelage, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement” in 
Lebanon. He argued that the Syrian presence in Lebanon might cause sectarianism and do harm 
to national unity (Rosiny 2015, 491). He strongly opposed the new legal government and the 
armed forces, mobilizing his loyal armed forces which consisted mainly of Maronite Christians 





defeat Aoun. The clash between Aoun’s and Syrian troops “resulted in casualties on both sides 
and among the civilian population” (CRHRP 1990:1527).  
 
General Aoun was defeated by the Syrian army in October 1990 (Picard and Ramsbotham 2012, 
71). This military victory (security guarantee and peace spoiler prevention) enabled Syria to 
take Lebanon under its tutelage. When the Lebanese parliament decided in favour of a general 
demobilization and the reorganization of all militias to establish a national army, Hezbollah and 
Palestinian militias were excluded in the demobilization process, as they were defending South 
Lebanon against Israel (ibid. 24). Although this provision was implemented about essential 
issues (Joshi et al. 2015), shortcomings were obvious. The Lebanese armed forces could not 
operate as a single power for a long time. “Syrian military and intelligence units in Lebanon” 
conducted “their activities independently of the agreement” (CRHRP 1995). Syrian presence 
in Lebanon also proved beneficial to internal security. However, Hezbollah forces are still 
acting independently to maintain regional security. In this context, “Syria has violated the 
sections of the Ta’if Accord calling for a Syrian military redeployment and the reigning in of 
outlaw militia groups. Presently, Syria has neither effectuated a redeployment nor moved to 
disband and disarm the remaining militias in Lebanon.” (Slomich 1999, 637).  
 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
 
Lebanon has been facing an enormous challenge, as lots of its people were internally and 
externally displaced due to cruel intrastate conflicts. Moreover, it has had to come to grips with 
the Palestinian refugee question since the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 (Picard 
and Ramsbotham 2012, 100). Upwards of 600,000 Lebanese were relocated during the military 
conflict, and the soon declared motivating them to come back home. Limited resources, and 
also persisting insecurity among the displaced, stalled the plan (CRHRP 1994). Unfortunately, 
this provision could not be entirely implemented for the following reasons (Joshi et al. 2015): 
political incompatibilities, economic weakness and insecurity in the country negatively 
impacted returning preferences of Lebanese. Palestinian refugees in the country were not 
granted Lebanese citizenship due to their involvement in internal conflicts in Lebanon. They 
were considered an economic burden on account of their integration into the social system. As 





naturalization of Palestinian refugees constituted a challenge to the confessional balance in 
Lebanon (CRHRP 1989, 1474-1975). Although the government was handing out work permits 
to Palestinian refugees, Palestinians suffered systematic discrimination in “government services 
as the national social security fund or to be employed by the government. Some encounter 
difficulties in obtaining employment in the private sector as well.” (CRHRP 1993, 1050). After 
the peace agreement had been signed, the entire Lebanese cabinet opted against Palestinians 
permanently staying in Lebanon (Talhami 2003, 97). Syria did not deal with refugee and IDP 
problems. 
 
As in the case of El Salvador, developmental deficit, poverty, lack of perspective caused 
insecurity, unrest and chaos in the country. Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon were a serious 
problem, as they were dominated by Palestinians who administered justice according to their 
judicial system, showing disrespect for the young state authority which was still weak in the 
post-agreement period. After the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, the refugee 





Development, reconstruction and reconciliation in the educational system were agreed upon for 
schools and universities. Primarily, an obligatory elementary school for all children was 
required. The state was to have control over books at private schools, encouraging “national 
belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and everything that unifies textbooks on the 
subjects of history and national education” (Ta’if Accords 1989). The spirit of the Ta’if Accords 
aimed at the abolishment of sectarianism and confessionalism. Nevertheless, it was noted in the 
Report on Human Rights Practices that private Lebanese schools propagated religious “hatred” 
and “confessional segregation” (CRHRP 1989, 1773; CRHRP 1992, 1048). Children from 
lower-income families had to work for money, lacking the opportunity to attend school. Even 
if poor families could afford sending their children to school, boys would generally get more 
education than girls who usually remained at home, doing housework (CRHRP 1995). Social 
inequality was not reduced by the government. The UN was unable to help financially due to a 





et al. 2015). The development of the educational system was more positive at Lebanese 
universities. The government-guaranteed academic freedom for “professors, curricula, or 
student groups” which wanted to establish campus associations (CRHRP 1994). Syria never 
forced the Lebanese government to seek improvement in that field and “abolition of political 




The media provision was regulated in the section “G. Information” to “[...] serve the cautious 
tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.” (Ta’if Accords 1989). As the Lebanese 
mass media emphatically voiced the specific political attitudes of the conflicting parties in 
Lebanon, access to printed media of rival parties was deliberately hampered in areas dominated 
by one major party (CRHRP 1989, 1473). “The 1991 Lebanese-Syrian security agreement 
contains a provision effectively banning informational activity that could endanger the security 
of either state.” Several newspapers (e.g., Nida' Al-Watan, Al-Safir and Al-Sharq) were 
temporarily banned since they targeted rival politicians, which was not in the spirit of the 
provision aiming at abolishing sectarianism (CRHRP 1994). Although some bills were 
submitted in parliament, this provision could not be implemented as required (Joshi et al. 2015). 
Syria did not seem to take any serious interest in a proper implementation process, nor did it 
pressure the conflicting parties into doing so. 
 
Economic and Social Developments 
 
This provision was to cope with the economic and social development of Lebanon. “E. Creation 
of a socio-economic council for development: A socio-economic council shall be created to 
ensure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the state's 
socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.” (Ta’if Accords 1989). The Hariri 
government seemed to be successful in restoring trust of the public, stabilizing the economic 
system, and launching a plan to rebuild the economy's facilities (CRHRP 1994). Although 
Lebanon urgently required a proper reconstruction in terms of economic and social 
development, the council that was to solve this problem had not been established in parliament 





abuses, stunted democracy and a lack of reconciliation, Syria provided the space for Lebanon 
to re-forge its national institutions, begin economic recovery” (Mac Ginty 2016, 154). 
Substantial, external support was lacking during the first 10 years of the implementation period, 




As mentioned before, “the Ta’if Agreement ratified by Parliament in November 1989. [...] gives 
Muslims and Christians an equal number of seats in an expanded 108-seat parliament and 
transfers some powers from the President to the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers.” 
(CRHRP 1989, 1475).  
 
Detailed Implementation Timeline 
 
Although the Ta’if Peace Agreement (1989) did not contain a detailed timeline for specific 
provisions (as in the Chapultepec Peace Agreement), it stipulated that the Syrian armed forces 
should assist the Lebanese forces over “two years” after the ratification. However, the 
withdrawal of the Syrian armed forces occurred 15 years later (2005). In terms of disarmament, 
the militias were to deliver their weapons to the Lebanese government “within a period of 6 
months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter.” (Ta’if Accords 1989). It 
is obvious that the agreement failed, as it did not maintain the time envisaged in the agreement. 
It clearly shows the negotiators’ inability to implement the agreement in a phased approach. 
This demonstrates Syria’s lack of comprehensive overview and its inefficiency as a third party. 
 
Withdrawal of Troops 
 
The provision was regulated within section C “Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli 
occupation” (Ta’if Accords 1989). The provision was intended to maintain full sovereignty 
over Lebanon’s territory and borders which had been internationally recognized. Two 
countries, Israel and Syria, retained a strong military presence in Lebanon. Israel had 
approximately 1,000 soldiers in Lebanon, whereas Syria had 30,000 to 35,000 in 1990 (CRHRP 





The continuous presence of Syrian soldiers in Lebanon caused an internal armed conflict in 
1990, between General Aoun and other Lebanese armed forces backed by Syria. The Ta’if 
Peace Agreement referred to resolution 425 of the UN Security Council which had ordered a 
full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon, which finally occurred in 2000 (Picard 
and Ramsbotham 2012, 37). Due to the pressure exerted by the UN Security Council on Israel 
and Syria, the withdrawal of both armed forces from Lebanon finally took place.  
 
The Ta’if Peace Agreement was not sufficiently detailed and designed. As the verification 
mechanism proved inefficient (disarmament of the militias, withdrawal of the Syrian armed 
forces within two years), the implementation process was considerably delayed. Facing the 
failed implementation of other provisions, the Lebanese parties postponed implementing 
provisions. During the implementation process, the "powerful, traditional elites (mostly 
Maronites) were fighting to maintain their privileges, while socio-economically disadvantaged 
groups (mostly Shi`a) were fighting for more power and access to state resources (Zahar 2005, 
231). Although the conflict in Lebanon seemed to be primarily due to confessional disputes, it 




In the case of Lebanon, Syria as a third-party mediator is characterized as a single power 
mediator type. It was responsible for internal security and governmental power-sharing for 
conflicting parties. Syria’s power mediation was only partially successful in the peace 
agreement implementation. It directly interfered in Lebanon’s internal affairs due to a bilateral 
„agreement of brotherhood”.  By interfering in Lebanon’s domestic policy, it acted mainly for 
its benefit. Although it gained support from Muslim parties in the Lebanese Parliament, the 
Christian Maronites were strongly opposed to Syrian interference in Lebanon. For that reason, 
a recurrence of internal armed conflicts occurred (Maronites against Syrian troops). If single 
countries such as Israel, France, Saudi Arabia, Iran or Turkey had acted as mediators in 
Lebanon, they would certainly not have been able to achieve better mediation results, since the 
rival parties in Lebanon are strictly divided into religious groups and stubbornly insist on their 
cultural identity (Muslims versus Christians). The presence of an unbiased power country or an 





been more beneficial to the peace process in Lebanon. The UN is generally considered a non-
denominational international agent. It would have certainly been welcomed by the conflicting 
parties in Lebanon, as it is neutral and strives for international peacekeeping.   
 
In terms of strategic coordination, Syria didn’t cooperate with the opposition and other 
international organization such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. It was 
unable to establish a national-level monitoring committee consisting of members of rival 
parties. It was unable to deal with the disputes of rival parties efficiently. It could not resolve 
commitment problems or cope with numerous postponements of implementation processes at 
a local and national level. Its exclusionary behaviour as a third party reflects a selfish interest 
in Lebanese policy. 
 
The inclusion of territorial or governmental power-sharing provisions in peace agreements 
increases the chance for successful implementation in the long run.  Although governmental 
power-sharing was guaranteed in the constitution in terms of several seats and governmental 
representations, several provisions were neglected and not implemented (Joshi et al. 2015). 
Excluding Maronite Christians from governmental power-sharing in Parliament would be a big 
mistake, as this would possibly cause another internal conflict, so their political participation 
should be fully guaranteed. The Muslim population in Lebanon is steadily increasing and will 
be much higher than the Christian population in the future. Therefore, a demographic change 
might require a new constitutional constellation. Another problem is the huge number of Syrian 
and Palestinian refugees and their integration into Lebanese society.   
 
Although Syria’s military intervention prevented peace-agreement violation and kept the 
implementation process going, the final implementation scores remained low after 10 years. 
The strong presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon could not prevent the military revolt of Army 
Commander General Michel Awn, who used his military power to block governmental power-
sharing in the Constitution to secure Maronite privileges and maintain the status quo.  
Lebanon’s political sectarianism and pluralistic democracy have remained the subject of 
vigorous political discussion. Future research is to examine to what extent sectarianism should 






The fact that there is hardly any detailed official documentation on the agreement 
implementation achieved by Syrian and Lebanese authorities, makes it difficult to precisely 
assess Syria’s role in Lebanon. In the case of El Salvador, the UN and COPAZ regularly 
informed the public about the reasons for success and failure in the implementation process. 
They assumed full responsibility whenever some failure occurred. Moreover, they stayed in 
close contact with the parties involved. Lebanon experienced a great number of cruel events 
such as massacres, assassinations and human right crimes. The transitional justice and 
reconciliation mechanism could have facilitated reconciliation in Lebanese society but failed in 
many respects. Moreover, there was not any international third committee to monitor a proper 
way of implementation. Although a great number of provisions were implemented (Joshi et al. 
2015), a lack of quality was identified. Syria’s inefficient performance as a third party 








The ceasefire provision was not dealt with in the Good Friday Agreement. Unlike the ceasefire 
in El Salvador, the ceasefire in Northern Ireland was first declared by the IRA and some rival 
paramilitaries in 1994, before the signature of the peace agreement (Connolly 2006, 412). The 
ceasefire decision was taken unilaterally by the IRA. It was the result of secret talks held from 
1990 to 1998, by John Hume of the SDLP and Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein (Debraggio 2010, 32; 
Nolan 2012, 21). The ceasefire deals greatly facilitated negotiations between the governments 
of the Republic of Ireland, the UK and the warring parties in Northern Ireland. When the British 
government and the IRA disagreed on the deadline for decommissioning arms, the ceasefire 
was violated by the IRA in 1996 (Debraggio 2010, 33; Mac Ginty et al. 2007, 6). A lasting 
ceasefire was closely related to disarmament. It was understood that the peace process should 
commence by decommissioning IRA weapons. After considerable delays, the 







A further obstacle to the ceasefire implementation occurred, when an IRA splinter group, 
emerged.  It called itself “The Real IRA” and repeatedly broke the agreed ceasefire (heavy 
bombing in Omagh 1999 and Derry 2011). It targeted business and trade, even killed two 
soldiers in 2009 (Nolan 2012, 44). This splinter group posed a serious threat to the ceasefire. In 
1999, the issue of decommissioning arms reoccurred in the peace process. “The Loyalist 
Volunteer Force (LVF) warned that there would be a great strain on its ceasefire if the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) did not begin decommissioning.” (CAIN 1999). Former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair greatly contributed to resolving the problem of “the decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons and the release of paramilitary prisoners” (BBC 2017a). Eight years after 
the signature of the GFA, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) reported that 
one of the last remaining paramilitary groups, PIRA, had officially declared the termination of 
armed actions (2006): The PIRA leadership has pioneered a new decision to give up the armed 
program in favour of a political trajectory. The good news raised hopes for a lasting ceasefire 
(CAIN 2006). Although there had been various attempts at violating peace talks before and 
after the signature of the peace agreement, the leaders of the main parties remained patient, 
fully determined to secure peace and prevent peace spoilers. Intensive dialogues between 
multiparty commissions such as the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, the British-
Irish Council and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 
ensured the ceasefire. These groups also closely monitored them. The completion of 
decommissioning (disarmament) was the last stage of the ceasefire process in Northern Ireland. 
The final ceasefire implementation mainly succeeded on account of multilateral monitoring, 
security guarantee, confidence-building, dispute resolution efforts and cooperation between 
power mediators and other independent teams.  
 
Power-sharing Transitional Government 
 
The transitional power-sharing government in Northern Ireland proved to be a sensible phase 
of implementation procedures. In that regard, it should be noted that it was not only composed 
of the conflicting parties of Northern Ireland but that the UK also shared its governmental power 





of Northern Ireland was held on 25 June 1998 (CAIN 1998). The seats were allocated according 
to the D’Hondt method (See Appendix B).  
 
A coalition government was formed. David Trimble (UUP) and Seamus Mallon (SDLP) were 
nominated “as First and Deputy First Minister Designate at the inaugural meeting of the shadow 
Assembly on 1 July 1998.” (Wilford 2000, 581). Besides, 10 ministerial posts were nominated 
by the coalition parties. However, the IRA’s delay in decommissioning weapons suspended the 
power-sharing and executive process in 2002. The issue was resolved by the Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD). The inspectors of IICD reported that 
the IRA continued to cooperate in the decommissioning process. Martti Ahtisaari and Cyril 
Ramaphosa, who were inspectors, confirmed on 30 May 2001 that the arms depot “remained 
secure. We observed that the weapons and explosives continued to be safely and adequately 
stored. We remain confident that they cannot be used without our detection.” (IICD 2001). 
After IICD’s positive report, the executive power body continued to work successfully. The 
issue of the IRA’s reluctance to decommission its arms reoccurred in 2002.  
 
The paramilitary Ulster Defense Association (UDA) equally failed to meet its obligations as to 
disarmament. This caused the suspension of the executive until 2007. From 2002 to 2007, the 
independent monitoring commissions (IICD), representatives of the Republic of Ireland and the 
UK tried their best to resolve the issue. They met in Leeds Castle several times to work out a 
solution. The solution process of power-sharing was also postponed due to national and 
European elections in the UK. As money was needed for the implementation process, one 
billion pounds in financial support was provided by the Republic of Ireland and the UK. On 28 
July 2005, the IRA declared an “end to armed campaign” (BBC 2009). On 7 March 2007, the 
Northern Ireland elections took place, after the issue of the IRA’s disarmament had been 
resolved due to the multilateral meetings, inspections of independent monitoring and 






NORTHERN IRELAND: FINAL RESULT 
Party Seats Seats +/- Votes* Votes % +/-% 
DUP 36 +6 207,721 30.1 +4.4 
SF 28 +4 180,573 26.2 +2.6 
UUP 18 -9 103,145 14.9 -7.7 
SDLP 16 -2 105,164 15.2 -1.8 
AP 7 +1 36,139 5.2 +1.6 
GP 1 +1 11,985 1.7 +1.4 
PUP 1 0 3,822 0.6 -0.6 
UKIP 0 0 1,229 0.2 +0.2 
Source: BBC (2007) Northern Ireland election overview 
 
Sinn Fein and DUP increased the number of their parliamentary seats compared to previous 
elections in 1998. The power-sharing of the executive was maintained at the same level as in 
the election of 2007. As governmental power was now being adequately shared in Stormont 
(Northern Irish Parliament), the provision had been fully implemented (Joshi et al. 2015). The 
main obstacle to the implementation of the power-sharing provision had been the delayed 
decommissioning of weapons, as the IRA was reluctant to disarm. There had also been a great 




The territorial definition of the border in Ireland required an amendment in the Constitution of 
the Irish Republic. The constitutional reform was implemented by referendum in the Republic 
of Ireland on 22 May 1998. “The Irish parliament passed the 19th Amendment to the 
Constitution Bill which would allow for the necessary changes following the Good Friday 





territorial claims to Northern Ireland. It emphasizes the cultural unity of Irish people in different 
parts of the island. 
 
Inter-Ethnic / State Council 
 
Although there was dissatisfaction with the establishment of the Civic Forum (e.g., lack of 
gender balance, members of anti-agreement unionist groups), the Forum started working on 9 
October 2000. “The Forum must report back to the Assembly every twelve months.” (BBC 
2018). Its duties such as the consultation of the government “on social, economic and cultural 
issues” are stated in detail in the GFA, paragraph 34 (Nolan 2012, 171). It is necessary to solve 
issues effectively by multi-party committees, forums, councils, groups, conferences. As 
systematically dealing with issues facilitated the implementation process, the provision was 
largely implemented. The implementation of this provision shows multi-party power mediators 
successfully cooperated with other external and internal experts.  
 
Electoral / Political Party Reform 
 
The parliamentary system of Northern Ireland is entirely different from the electoral system in 
Lebanon with its confessional segregation and guaranteed number of seats. The Northern 
Ireland assembly consists of 108 seats and their allocation is based on the D’Hondt System. 
The proportional representation system is based only on one transferable single vote. The voters 
were familiar with the electoral system which originated in 1973 and which had been practised 
before the governmental power-sharing in Northern Ireland (Barnett 2017, 55).  Sinn Fein 
achieved significant electoral gains in the second election, particularly after the GFA and 
disarmament of the IRA. This shows that, as soon as an armed conflict has been terminated, the 
political arms of insurgent movements stand a good chance to gain public support. No 
reciprocity problems were reported for full implementation. 
 
Decentralization / Federalism 
 
Decentralization was achieved by a properly working parliamentary system based on the 





in politics was guaranteed in the agreement, the power-sharing process was repeatedly 
hampered. It was even suspended because of the decommissioning issue between 2002 and 
2007. The draft law had been adopted by the House of Commons and the House of Lords at 
Westminster on 19 Nv, 1998 (Hazell 2000, 2).  
 
Dispute Resolution Commission 
 
The agreement stated that legislative disputes in Northern Ireland were to be resolved in courts. 
The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was established for that purpose on 17 De, 
1998. The conference encouraged cooperation between both countries to resolve 
implementation issues, monitored the governmental development, established institutions, 
decommissioned arms, engendered reconciliation in Northern Ireland. The conference settled 
the following issues in bilateral cooperation: 
 
“Asylum and immigration, including common travel area issues, European Union and 
international issues, social security including methods of fraud detection, education, policy 
on the misuse of drugs: combating organized crime and associated money laundering, fiscal 
issues [...], rights, policing, criminal justice, normalization of security arrangements and 
practices, cross-border security co-operation, victims of violence, prison issues, drugs and 
drug trafficking,” (CAIN 2018). 
 
The representatives of Northern Ireland were also invited to the regular meetings. The meetings 
were held regularly from 17 December 1999 to 26 February 2007. The implementation process 




It was stipulated in the agreement that a review group should be formed to establish a 
functioning and equitable criminal justice system with an effective legal prosecution for the 
communities. This group made “294 recommendations” and brought about a great deal of 
improvement concerning the Northern Ireland Parliament (CSCE 2004, 145). However, the 
amending proposals failed to reform criminal justice in Northern Ireland at that time. The fact 
that the “preliminary implementation plan” was drafted as a Criminal Justice Bill (2001) was a 
step forward. Later, in 2004, the Justice Act received “Royal Assent” (McKernan and McQuade 





discussed the significance of implementation and emphasized the importance of cooperation 
regarding criminal justice, only several changes were made in public prosecution (2005) and 
policing (2006) (CAIN 2006). It took 10 years altogether to complete the implementation 
process. In the case of Northern Ireland, a truth commission was missing. The creation of a 
truth commission would have been of great help. It could have helped traumatized victims and 
facilitated reconciliation between the post-conflict communities. The two power mediators 
worked well together with the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference to enable the 




It was stated in Annex A that a new police service should be established in Northern Ireland. 
An Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland was set up with experts and 
international representatives on policing (Patten 1999). Although the Unionists and Sein Fein 
initially opposed the implementation of recommendations in the first phase, the 
recommendations were fully implemented (2002-2007) (Joshi et al. 2015).  
 
The commission found fault with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which had been the 
police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 to 1998. It criticized the inordinate employment of 
personnel from unionist and nationalist communities. Furthermore, the RUC was seen 
traditionally as a symbol of “oppression” in the Protestant communities (Patten 1999, 2). By 
the draft resolution, a 50:50 basis police recruitment from Catholic and Protestant communities 
was recommended (ibid. 88). The RUC was renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland on 
November 4, 2001, and the Police Committee universally acknowledged on a "badge for the 
new service on December 12” (BBC 2015a). The latest statistics as to the number of staffs in 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland are as follows: 
 
Table 4: Police service of Northern Ireland 
















% Perceived Protestant 67.16 78.09 
% Perceived Roman Catholic 31.50 19.35 
% Not Determined 1.34 2.56 
% Female 29.09 58.58 
% Male 70.91 41.42 
% Ethnic Minority 0.52 0.63 
Total 6756 2383 
Source: Police Service of Northern Ireland 2017 
 
The police reform in Northern Ireland has similarities with the police reform in El Salvador 
regarding its proportional recruitment between rival parties, new structure and policy, form, 
training, education, development in human rights. International representatives on policing 




The demobilization issue focused on the removal of the British security forces from Northern 
Ireland. The removal of the troops lasted until 2007. The delay of the removal was due to the 
IRA’s delayed decommissioning of arms. According to Archick (2017, 7), the British army 
concluded its 38-year military campaign in Northern Ireland in July 2007 as part of the peace 
settlement and strengthened security conditions. While a force of 5,000 British soldiers is 
stationed in Northern Ireland, they are no longer responsible for security and will be dispatched 
elsewhere in the part of the world. The PSNI is now in charge of policing in Northern Ireland. 
The implementation was largely successful in Northern Ireland despite numerous 










Disarmament was a key issue before and after the signature of the Good Friday Agreement. It 
was stipulated in Art. 7.4 that the implementation procedures should be monitored by the 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD): The Independent Body 
would then track, evaluate, as well as ascertain advancement upon on decommissioning of 
illegal weapons, and also provide constant updates between both government agencies (Good 
Friday Agreement 1998). The first meeting was chaired by former Prime Minister Tony Blair 
and Bertie Ahern TD on 19 December 1999. The regular meetings lasted from 4 July 1999 to 
2011 (IICD 1999-2011). Several problems occurred while the decommissioning of paramilitary 
organizations was going on (IRA). Due to continuous, multilateral pressure from different 
independent commissions, political figures and parties, the implementation was successfully 
completed. The consolidation of governmental power-sharing had also provided an impetus for 
the implementation process. The BBC (2009) confirmed that the IRA had finalized its 
decommissioning of arms on 28 July 2005. In the report made by IICD in September 2005, the 
inspectors stated: Nevertheless, we may document that the weapons used in the recent events 
include a wide variety of bullets, shotguns, automatic weapons, mortars, rockets, handguns, 
bombs, destructive materials, and other arms, covering all of the components listed in the 
security forces' figures. 
 
An approximate estimate of the IRA’s quantity of arms was made, based on Security 
Estimates/Jane's Intelligence Review, which was published by the BBC in (2005): “1,000 rifles, 
2 tonnes of Semtex, 20-30 heavy machine guns, 7 Surface-to-air missiles (unused), 7 flame 
throwers, 1,200 detonators, 11 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 90 handguns, 100+ 
grenades”. All in all, the implementation process was sped up by continuous, multilateral 
pressure from mediators, different independent commissions, international commissions, 




A program facilitating the return of paramilitaries from prisons into society was established 





by using re-training and educational facilities. The voluntary bodies administered reintegration 
procedures in Northern Ireland, which were financed by the European Union (Williamson and 
Halfpenny 2000). The provision was fully implemented in 1998 (Joshi et al. 2015). The 
reintegration process in El Salvador was more difficult than the one in Northern Ireland due to 




Amnesty for prisoners was one of the most notable features of the ceasefire and the Peace 
Agreement. Paramilitaries were released as long as they remained fully committed to the 
ceasefire agreement. The paramilitary organisations were “The Continuity Irish Republican 
Army, the Loyalist Volunteer Force, the Orange Volunteers”, the “Real” Irish Republican 
Army, the Red Hand Commando, the Red Hand Defenders, the Ulster Volunteer Force” (The 
Sentence Review Commissioners 2008). Sinn Fein and the British Government did not agree 
on the timing of the prisoners’ release (time-varying between 1 and 3 years). Due to the 
mediation of then US President Bill Clinton and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, time was 
shortened to 1 year (Debraggio 2010, 37). 
 
The Sentence Review Commissioners was appointed by the British Parliament in July 1998 by 
the GFA (The Sentence Review Commissioners 2008). It was to review and regulate the 
prisoner release. Up to 500 loyalist and republican inmates convicted until the deal could be 
freed by July 28, 2000 (BBC 2015b). The agreement was fully implemented thanks to the 
Sentence Review Commissioners. Although former US President Bill Clinton was a power 
mediator, he was in full command of communication and facilitation strategies which are 
usually attributed to pure mediators.  He and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams made strenuous 




Under the regulation for security issues in the Good Friday Agreement, it was agreed that the 
Secretary of State will interact including the Irish Government and political factions on 





whenever relevant (Walsh 2017, 221). Different independent commissions were established to 
monitor paramilitary issues concerning the ceasefire, the decommissioning of arms, prisoner 
release, demobilization, re-integration. Several key measures were taken by paramilitaries to 
secure the ceasefire and peace agreement. The provision was largely implemented within 10 




In the Good Friday Agreement, the rival parties unanimously declared to respect human rights. 
They are equivalent to those adopted by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was established. Its task consisted of dealing 
efficiently with human right issues by monitoring human rights activities. “The inaugural 
meeting” of the commission was held on 1 March 1999 (NIHRC 1999). It emphasized the 
following aspects: 
“Advising the Westminster government, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, and 
key agencies on legislation and compliance with human rights frameworks, Our work to 
promote awareness of human rights through education, training and research, Our 
international treaty monitoring work, Our legal advice work including taking strategic legal 
cases, Our engagement with other national human rights institutions in the UK, Our work as 
part of the Joint Committee with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC)” 
(NIHRC 2020). 
 
The implementation was successful under the supervision of the British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference. Multiple challenges had to be overcome (e.g., deep-rooted 
sectarian hatred, mutual discrimination, harassment, violence). There are still socially explosive 
areas in Northern Ireland (i.e., traditional parades organized by Protestant Unionists and Irish 
Nationalists, “peace walls” in working-class urban areas separating Catholics and Protestants). 
 
Right to Self-Determination 
 
The right to self-determination was achieved by a referendum in Northern Ireland in 1998. The 
question was: “Do you support the Agreement reached the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland 
and set out in Command Paper 3883?”. The result was: “Yes 676,966 (71.1%), No 274,879 
(28.9%) “(Riley 2000). Accordingly, the right to self-determination was guaranteed and thus 





part of the United Kingdom, the North Ireland voters can decide at any time if they wt 
sovereignty united Ireland in the future (McCabe 2001, 551). By comparison, the Spanish 
constitution recognizes the autonomies in Spain; however, it prohibits an independence 
referendum for its autonomies. We experienced the Independence Referendum in Catalonia 
which was rejected by the constitutional court of Spain in 2017. In the case of Colombia, the 
peace agreement was rejected by a narrow majority in the referendum of 2016. The result was: 




In the wake of constitutional changes, the agreement provided the citizens of Northern Ireland 
with a referendum of choice between having Irish, British or both citizenships (Debraggio 2010, 
46). The amendment concerning citizenship in the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland was 
changed on 24 June, 204 (Ward 2010, 46). A public referendum in Ireland supported the change 
with the following results. “The total number of votes recorded in favour of the proposal was 
1,427,520 and the total number recorded against the proposal was 375,695.” (Gov.ie 2016). 




Women’s rights constitute an important step and quality test for equality. Women are eager to 
participate in policymaking processes, fight for fair participation in the public sector. As far as 
their political participation in Northern Ireland is concerned, the Northern Ireland Assembly in 
2011 had “the lowest proportion of female representation of any of the four parliaments in the 
UK. The Republic of Ireland is lower still (15%), and considerably lower than the worldwide 
average, which the Inter-Parliamentary Union puts at 20%.” (Nolan 2012, 166) This clearly 
shows a lack of female equality in Northern Ireland. The gender issue remained an unresolved 









Minority rights (Education Reform, Official Languages and Symbols) 
 
In the agreement, the stipulation for education is closely related to the language issue. As the 
UK is a contracting party in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
(ECRML), changes were made in North Ireland education (1998). The UK fulfilled its 
responsibilities in matters of education and language. The North/South Ministerial (Irish) 
Council was established on 13 December 1999 to implement language procedures. The most 
important cooperation area was agreed upon in terms of education (North-South Ministerial 
Council 1999). The implementation was successful. There had been no obstacles. Although the 
language reforms had proved successful in promoting cultural diversity, sectarianism between 
Protestants and Catholics could not be prevented. “While 6.5% of children now attend 
integrated schools, this means the other 93.5% are separated into Catholic and Protestant 
schools” (Nolan 2012, 10). This means there is a serious lack of integration concerning 
Protestants and Catholics. The same problem is also identified in Lebanon where children 
attend schools according to their religious faith. Several regulations were made in the Good 
Friday Agreement as to flags, symbols and emblems which were to inspire mutual respect and 
enhance integration into the post-conflict society rather than cause further separation. Important 
changes as to flying and removing Union Flags in Northern Irish government buildings on 
specific days were brought about by Parliament (Legislation.gov.uk 2000). Research on 
Northern Irish flags and emblems in different locations and different years showed that the 
frequency of flying a flag had been reduced “from 161 in 2006 to 73 in 2009” (Nolan and Bryan 
2016, 30). The flag issue, however, could not be fully solved between Nationalist and Unionists 




The agreement dealt with the reparation issue which was regulated under “Strand Three: 
Reconciliation and Victims of Violence”. Reparation procedures constituted good 
arrangements for victims in terms of restorative transitional justice, as they promoted 
community-based reconciliation in Northern Ireland. In 2006, “The Commission for Victims 
and Survivors for Northern Ireland” was established “to promote the interests of victims and 





number of troubles related deaths had risen to “3,649” (Potter and Campbell 2014, 16). The 
Peace III Program (2007-2013) allocated nearly 37 million pounds in support to organizations 
that offer care to survivors of domestic violence (ibid. 2). However, reparation does not only 
refer to financial or material recovery. In the case of Northern Ireland, no truth commission 
would help traumatized victims, prevent future conflicts or facilitate reconciliation between 
post-conflict communities. In that regard, no action was identified by the mediators.  
 
Economic and Social Development 
 
The Good Friday Agreement regulated the economic and social development of the divided 
society in urban, rural and border areas, addressing issues such as gender equality, 
transportation and infrastructure, employment, security etc. A commission was established to 
implement necessary changes, in particular as to discrimination and equal chances in 
employment. The commission was “providing protection against discrimination on the grounds 
of age, disability, race, religion and political opinion, sex and sexual orientation” (Obe 1998). 
The commission regularly monitored and reported on current problems and various solution 




The Good Friday Agreement was ratified by two concurrent referendums in the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland on 22 May 1998. By the same token, it was ratified by the House 
of Commons, the House of Lords and the royal on 19 Nov 1998 (Hazell 2000, 2). The 
implementation of provisions was regularly reviewed and subsequently ratified by the North-
South Ministerial Council, the British-Irish Council, and the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference. Those councils closely cooperated with further established councils such as the 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) or Equality Commission, 
in matters of specific stipulations. Full implementation was identified employing multilateral 










The most important time schedules in the peace agreement process were the ratifications in the 
Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the British Parliament, which were mostly 
implemented on schedule. In contrast, the decommissioning process of arms was deliberately 
delayed by the IRA and other paramilitary groups. Although delays in the implementation of 
some provisions had occurred, the provisions were all implemented according to the set 




In the course of constitutional reforms, people’s freedom of choice was guaranteed in the Good 
Friday Agreement 1998. It was concluded that the incoming government should respect the 
validity of any course of action a majority of the citizens of Northern Ireland make about their 
position, either they chose to remain in the United Kingdom or endorse an independent united 
Ireland (Gov.uk 1998). That means voters are free to decide on Northern Ireland’s future by 
referendum. Full independence from the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland has never 
been a serious issue, as self-determination has been guaranteed to the people of Northern 
Ireland.  Brexit will affect Northern Ireland’s economic, social and foreign affairs with the EU 
and the UK in the long run. It might also influence the integration process of Unionists and 
Republicans. As the Republic of Ireland is an EU member, there might be border restrictions 
again, which might lead to new tension.  
 
Review, Verification and Monitoring Mechanisms of Agreement 
 
The implementation of the Agreement with its specific provisions was regularly reviewed, 
verified, sponsored and monitored by power mediators, British, Irish and North Irish officials, 
assisted by several national, international and independent commissions and mixed councils. 
Commitment problems and spoiler problems were resolved, confidence-building was 
improved.  Reports were issued to the parties, instructing them how to reform and implement 








In the case of Northern Ireland, the most important third parties assisting and monitoring the 
implementation process of the Friday Agreement were the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and the 
Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland. They were established by external 
third parties, the UK and the Republic of Ireland (multiple power mediators), as those two 
countries were considered to be guarantors of a long-term implementation process. Under their 
leadership, further independent commissions guaranteed security, disarmament and established 
governmental power-sharing. Due to the enormous efforts of those mediators, successful 
implementation was achieved. Their success mainly derived from the constant, fruitful 
dialogues with the rival parties in Northern Ireland and the creation of independent international 
and national commissions. They resolutely aspired for lasting peace and seriously committed 
themselves to the prevention of recurrence conflicts. They strove for social integration of all 
citizens in Northern Ireland and organized financial support for the peace process. 
 
 




Several ceasefire arrangements were identified before and after the signature of the peace 
agreement between the Government of the Republic Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF. Some 
were long-lasting but not sustainable. In 1975, „Marcos called for a ceasefire and opened the 
door to negotiations. “More negotiations followed in 1993 and in 1997 (GRP-MILF General 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines – 18 July). A committee 
for the monitoring of ceasefire was agreed upon, regarding resolution No.1 (Stankovitch 1999, 
36, 88-89; Bell and Utley 2015, 4). 
 
The Mindanao Final Agreement did not specify any particular ceasefire provisions, as several 





talks and the Final Agreement. The OIC, a joint committee of the MNLF and the government 
were appointed to monitor and implement the ceasefire by the Tripoli Agreement (1976). 
However, one of the main conflicting parties, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was 
reluctant to comply with the Mindanao Final Agreement, which might have severely hampered 
the ceasefire. Fortunately, MILF and the government signed the “Agreement for General 
Cessation of Hostilities” on 18 July 1997 (Stankovitch 1999, 89) and likewise the new Tripoli 
Peace Agreement in 2001, which was crucial to the success of the implementation of the 
ceasefire provision (Amer and Zou 2011, 69).  
 
According to the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in the Philippines, several violent 
clashes occurred in Mindanao. When the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) conducted 
anti-insurgency missions, 14 civilians were killed during the first half of 1997 and shortly 
afterwards, “10 Muslim students and a teacher“ (CRHRP 1998). The commanding officers of 
both parties then readily agreed on monitoring the ceasefire more efficiently (Bell and Utley 
2015, 6). 
 
Some violent clashes erupted between AFP and MILF in August 2001. The implementation of 
the ceasefire provision was severely endangered. As the US government was tightening its 
counter-terrorism policy after 9/11, Philippine president Joseph Estrada followed suit, 
proclaiming an “all-out war policy” aiming at suppressing autonomy endeavours. In 2003 
fighting broke out between AFP and MILF (Amer and Zou 2011, 69; Özerdem 2012, 405-406). 
 
“One of the key security challenges for the peace process in this period was the availability 
of small arms, which has in fact, always been a critical issue in the Mindanao context for the 
sustainment of the conflict. For example, over 1.3 million arms were in circulation in 2006 – 
only half a million of which were registered, while Mindanao was home to 45 legal weapons 
businesses and 522 authorised arms dealers.” (Özerdem 2012, 406) 
 
The third-party monitoring of the ceasefire conducted by the OIC was very weak. One of the 
main challenges was that the OIC did not have any peacekeeping military personnel in the 
conflict area. A peacekeeping unit was recruited from the member states by the OIC after 
signing the Tripoli Ceasefire Agreement in 1976 to monitor and prevent violations in 
Mindanao. It utterly failed (Lingga 2006, 8). The International Monitoring Team (IMT) did not 





GRP and MILF (Herbolzheimer 2015). The US launched a tough counter-terrorism policy 
targeting Muslim groups after the 9/11 events. GRP reacted similarly, adopting strict military 
measures against insurgents.   
 
As there had been several cases of kidnapping, AFP conducted military operations in Mindanao. 
Internally organized crime in the region affected the ceasefire process and the failing 
decommissioning of weapons facilitated the recurrence of violence. Although there were 
several violations of the Peace Agreement, the parties did not officially withdraw from the 
agreement. The OIC, the single pure mediator and arbitrator, was unable to prevent violation 
and peace spoilers. Nevertheless, it provided successful ceasefire mediation before the 
signature of the agreement and subsequently settled the dispute between the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) and GRP in Mindanao (Kohen 2006, 339). Challenging geographic 
conditions made proper monitoring extremely difficult. 
 
Power-sharing Transitional Government 
 
Governmental power-sharing was agreed upon within the framework of the Regional 
Autonomous Government in the peace accord which required ratification by the Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The OIC (2006) reports the issue with Muslims in 
Southern Philippines that GRP had failed to fulfil its commitment as stipulated in the Peace 
Agreement, in terms of national government positions, executive council, legislative assembly 
and administration. It was pointed out in the report that “the Senate and Congress, instead of 
ratifying the agreement, have made an organic act—RA 9054 on March 31, 2001”. The 
government’s one-sided action meant “disregarding the MNLF participation as the principal 
party to the agreement”. The agreement could therefore not be implemented (OIC 2006, 11-
12). Implementation efforts varied over time, as different presidents took different approaches 
to solve the implementation problem: Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) 
and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010). So, the OIC kept urging the Philippine government 
to overcome impediments. Peace policy in Mindanao was largely affected by changes in 








Executive Branch Reform 
 
Article 65 of the Mindanao agreement is an essential part of the following stipulation for 
executive reform: “It shall be policy of the National Government that there shall be at least one 
(1) member of the Cabinet (with the rank of Department Secretary) who is an inhabitant of the 
Autonomous Region to be recommended by the Head of the Autonomous Government.” In 
2005 the candidates were elected in the autonomous region of Mindanao (ARMM) but were 
not appointed to the executive government branches by the central Philippine government as 
mentioned above. They were only appointed to certain posts such as “Nasser Pangandamam, 
Department of Agrarian Reform, and Mr. Zamzamin Ampatuan, National Anti-Poverty 
Commission Chairman.” (OIC 2006, 7). The failure of implementation was mainly due to the 
one-sided Republic Act 9054 (2001). Atty Randolph Parcasio, legal counsel and spokesperson 
for the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), criticized that “RA 9054 was passed in the 
Senate at a time when “nobody was looking” [...] The government was having a serious 
commitment problem in terms of autonomy, law-making and further rights which were 
stipulated in the Agreement. The MNLF continued to question the legitimacy of RA 9054 
because, in their eyes, it remained violative of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (iag.org.ph 
2015)”. The OIC did not appeal in due time.  
 
Legislative Branch Reform 
 
Although the executive council, the legislative assembly, the administrative system and 
representation in the national executive government council were not established as regulated 
in the Peace Agreement, regional legislative power (based on the Republic Act No 9054) was 
conveyed to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Exceptions were 
regulated in 2001: 
 
“(a)Foreign affairs; (b)National defence and security; (c)Postal service;(d) Coinage and fiscal 
and monetary policies; (e)Administration of justice. It may, however, legislate on matters 
covered by the Shari'ah. The Shari'ah shall apply only to Muslims. Its application shall be 
limited by pertinent constitutional provisions, particularly by the prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment and by pertinent national legislation that promotes human rights and 






The OIC (2006) reported that the provisions had only been partially implemented, as the 
stipulated changes had been made by the government unilaterally (Joshi et al. 2015). As no 
communication took place between The OIC and the Government, the role of the OIC was 




The constitutional reform was based on the Republic Act No. 9054 in 2001. It was carried out 
by the government in a one-sided manner without the participation of the OIC and the MNLF 





Article 4 of the Agreement called for more cooperation between Muslims, Christians and other 
cultural communities. The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) 
was established in the framework of Executive Order NO 371. It aimed at full participation of 
the main cultural community representations (Stankovitch 1999, 89). Following the Agreement, 
a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) was established in Mindanao, so special 
heed was paid to underdeveloped areas. This was one of the most important reform projects in 
Mindanao to promote peace, economic and social development, infrastructure, 
telecommunication, reconciliation between rival groups (Muslims and Christians) and, in 
particular, the integration of Mindanao into the Philippines (Lawphil 2018b). 
 
Moreover, SPCPD did not have any law-making authority. While the presence of 
“nongovernment organizations (NGO's), and people's organizations (POs)” in the Consultative 
Assembly was guaranteed by the Republic Act No. 371, the OIC was excluded from direct 
cooperation for regional peace and development. So, it could not cooperate with other 






Nevertheless, the OIC kept emphasizing the significance of the provision implementation in 
the Autonomous Region in its reports (OIC 2006, 6). The structure and aims of the Southern 
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) are, to some extent, similar to those 
of COPAZ in El Salvador and the British-Irish Inter-Governmental Conference in Northern 
Ireland. As the OIC possessed inadequate communication skills, it was unable to develop 
appropriate powers of persuasion. Moreover, it was not authorized to impose sanctions against 




The Peace Agreement provided for an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, in which the 
demarcation line was to be approved by plebiscite in specific areas. The Republic Act No. 9054 
stated: 
„(1)The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao which, under the provisions of Republic 
Act No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, is 
composed of the four provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, is 
hereby expanded to include the provinces and cities, enumerated hereunder, which vote 
favorably to be included in the expanded area of the autonomous region and for other 
purposes, in a plebiscite called for that purpose in accordance with Section 18, Article X of 
the Constitution“[...] 
 
The plebiscite in question caused incompatibilities between the Government and MNLF. The 
MNLF would not accept the GRP's unconstitutional referendum organized on August 20, 2001. 
The GRP threatened and assaulted MNLF groups for blatantly ignoring the binding referendum, 
eventually capturing and illegally imprisoning Leader Nur Misuari (OIC 2006, 8). The 
government’s actions violated the ceasefire, caused a breach of confidence, severely hampered 
the implementation process. In August 2001, the plebiscite resulted in the creation of a new 
province, Basilan. “One new city, Marawi, voted to join Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, 
and Tawi-Tawi provinces in the ARMM.” CRHRP (2002). The provision was partially 
implemented in a one-sided manner (Joshi et al. 2015). MNLF strongly opposed it.  
 
Decentralization / Federalism 
 
An “Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao “(ARMM) was required by the Congress of the 





reform was carried out in the Republic Act No. 9054 (2001), which guaranteed decentralization 
through governmental and territorial power-sharing. Although not all FMLN demands such as 
plebiscite were approved by the Government, the regional autonomous region was established. 
The provision was implemented almost completely (Joshi et al. 2015). The OIC criticized 
Republic Act No. 9054 for being contrary to the 1976 Tripoli and the 1996 Mindanao Peace 
Agreement (OIC 2006, 10).  
 
Civil Administration Reform 
 
The reform of the civil service commission which had not been implemented yet by the 
government (Joshi et al. 2015), was dealt with in Article 72 of the Agreement. No action was 




Articles 69, 70 and 71 of the Peace Agreement stipulated that the central government should 
employ qualified and recommended personnel from the Autonomous Region, at least one 
person in the Bar Council, one person in the “Supreme Court and at least two in the Court of 
Appeals” [...] Although those demands were to be implemented in the Republic Act No. 9054 
(2001), they were never implemented (Joshi et al. 2015). Moreover, “Section E, Article 152 of 
the Agreement simply states, without elaboration, that the Regional Legislative Assembly of 
the area of autonomy shall establish Shari'ah Courts in accordance with the existing laws.” 
(Bauzon 1999, 259). According to the OIC reports, “there are today five Sharia District Courts 
with two District Judges, and 30 Sharia Circuit Courts with 27 Circuit Court Judges functioning 
within and outside the ARMM.” (OIC 2006, 7). According to Human Rights Practices (CRHRP 
1996-2006) the judicial system of the Philippines was inefficient and “suffered from corruption 
and inefficiency”. The transitional justice mechanism was not integrated into the Agreement, 
nor was it released in the Republic Acts, although 120,000 people had lost their life due to 
internal-armed conflict since 1969 (Herbolzheimer 2015). So, the provision could only be 







Military and Police Reforms 
 
The Agreement did not provide any provisions in terms of disarmament, demobilisation or 
reintegration (DDR) program. Terms like “disarmament” and “demobilization” did not figure 
in the text because they might have been interpreted by MNLF members negatively, in terms 
of capitulation or total surrender (Makinano and Lubang 2001, 25). Nevertheless, a vigorous 
socio-economic development program was designed specifically for Mindanao (Santos 2010, 
178). Articles 19.a and 20.a of the Agreement stated that 1,500 MNLF combatants in the PNP 
and “5,750 MNLF members” were to “be integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP), 250“ of whom were to work in auxiliary services. The recruitment area was to be in the 
Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in Mindanao. Due to the integration 
program, 7,000 rebel fighters were successfully integrated into the national army and police 
forces. The number of MNLF fighters being integrated was considerably smaller in comparison 
to the former MNLF army (Santos 2010, 163). Nevertheless, this was symbolically significant 
in terms of the cessation of hostilities. Full implementation was achieved in terms of military 




In Article 19.a of the Agreement, it was stipulated that particular socio-economic, cultural and 
educational integration projects were to help former MNLF members and their families, who 
were excluded from the reintegration program, to enter the national security forces. Various 
commissions and experts cooperated in the Mindanao reintegration program (e.g., the 
Commission on Higher Education and National Peace Unification, Development Council). 
They provided training and courses in „agriculture, education, arts, and sciences, basic literacy 
programs, health and medical care”, and an “internationalization program”. The “Bring a Rifle 
Improve your Livelihood” program encouraged disarmament (Makinano and Lubang 2001, 31-
32; Stankovitch 1999, 280). The UN provided financial support for the integration programs 
through the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT). The overall budget allocated to the 
Peace Program (2005-2010) amounted to 16,201,360$ (United Nation Development Program 





various commissions, groups, councils and experts. It, therefore, constituted a successful 




Human rights had only been partly respected in the Philippines for many years. According to 
the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in the Philippines (1996-2006), both opposing 
parties violated human rights. Those violations were investigated by various NGOs and neutral 
observers. They were highly diversified: “arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or 
correspondence; use of excessive force and violations of humanitarian law in internal conflicts”, 
violence against women. A ray of hope in that dark chapter of history was that the government 
allowed activists to investigate complaints of human rights violations throughout the country 
(CRHRP 1996-2006). 
 
The CHR, its core task ought to prosecute cases of crimes against humanity, raised the volume 
of local monitoring inspectors; during mid-year, there are far „more than 13,000 local human 
rights“ personnel worldwide, up to „8,000“ at the later part of 1998 (CRHRP 2000). A great 
number of activists were killed. “The resulting report (the ‘Melo Report’) was made public on 
22 January 2007. It reported the human rights group Karapatan’s claim that at least 724 activists 
had been killed since President Arroyo came to power, Amnesty International’s official list of 
244 victims” (Kraft 2010, 187). The provision could not be properly implemented (Joshi et al. 
2015). The OIC did not carry out any activity in that context. 
 
Education Reform, Official Language and Symbols 
 
In Articles 94 to 125 of the Mindanao Peace Agreement, it was stipulated that the educational 
system which had been under the supervision of the Regional Autonomous Government should 
be, from now on, by the educational policies, standards and authorities of the National 
Government. Articles 95 and 97 emphasized that the educational system should “perpetuate 
Filipino and Islamic ideals and aspirations, Islamic values and orientations of the Bangsamoro 
people” and should “promote solidarity, unity in diversity”. Those aspirations were similar to 





promote the kind of unity and reconciliation between rival societies as could have been desired. 
Moreover, the educational reform proclaimed freedom of language at schools in the 
autonomous region. Article 114 stated that the “regional languages may be used as auxiliary 
official languages in the region as well as auxiliary medium of instruction and communication.” 
The urgently required reforms in the Philippines were carried out under the Republic Act 9195 
and DepED Order No. 51. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) criticized that the 
educational reform lacked financial funds, that Muslims were not treated equally, having any 
access to higher education in the Southern Philippines. The OIC promised to provide financial 
aid for “Muslim Minorities in the non-OIC Member States” (OIC 2006, 4-7). The provision 




Article 103 of the Peace Agreement structured the protection of cultural diversity, languages, 
values, traditions and history of Muslims, Christians and indigenous societies in education. The 
provision and educational reform were mainly implemented (Joshi et al. 2015). 
 
Economic and Social Developments 
 
In the framework of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the Southern Philippines 
Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was created by Republic Act Order No. 371 in 
1996 and likewise the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in 2001, which 
received international financial support from Japan etc. (The World Bank 2002). The OIC 
reported that the Philippine national government financed an amount of up to “67 Billion Pesos” 
for the “infrastructure and other government programs” in the Autonomous Region (OIC 2006, 
8). The OIC blamed the national government’s discrimination policy and unfair distribution of 
wealth, as, in their view, the government-controlled the “natural resources in the Muslim areas” 
and was responsible for the underdeveloped conditions in Mindanao (OIC 2006, 6). The 
Philippines Country Report on Human Rights Practices (1997) reported that Nur Misuari had 
been complaining that the country's financial assistance for the zone remained insufficient, and 
also that new employment and spending fell short of expectations (CRHRP 1998). The Asian 





the island in almost all aspects of socio-economic development” in 1998 (CRHRP 1999), 10 
years after the signature of the Agreement, the CRHRP (2006) estimated that the “percentage 
of the population under the poverty level in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) was almost twice as high as the national average, with per capita income of $309 
(P15,760) per year.”  Regional economic and social development plans (e.g., establishing an 
Islamic Bank) and further financial support for the region were postponed for many years. 




Although the Philippine government had passed republic acts in favour of Mindanao autonomy, 
the SZOPAD and the SPCDP, The OIC (2006, 11) still criticized the national government’s 
strategy of ratification and its implementation plan as follows: 
 
“Phase two of the September 2, 1996 Peace Agreement can never be implemented because 
the Senate and Congress, instead of ratifying the agreement, have made an organic act—RA 
9054 on March 31, 2001, as a solid stumbling block on the path towards the implementation 
of PA 1996. The GRP has already violated the PA 1996 unilaterally by disregarding the 
MNLF participation as the principal party to the agreement, let alone the OIC, in any plan of 
action.” 
 
The government had been acting in an exclusionary behaviour. The cooperation between the 
OIC and the government had failed. The OIC was simply too inactive, failing to provide an 




Article 12 of the Peace Agreement stated that the OIC’s assistance was needed to finance the 
implementation process. So, the OIC and several single countries participating in the GoP—
UN/Multi-Donor Program financially supported the Southern Philippines in its economic and 
social development and helped to provide sustainable peace for more than ten years. Between 
1997 and 2000, the program funded $40 million (UNDP 2003). Moreover, at the same time, 
the US-funded $2.15 million for “NGO activities” in Mindanao (Heard and Magno 2000, 2). 
During and after the implementation period, the Philippines and the Autonomous Region in 





fully implemented (Joshi et al. 2015). Lack of external financial support had delayed the 
implementation process. 
 
Detailed Implementation Timetable 
 
The Peace Agreement had set up specific dates concerning constitutional lawmaking and 
further reforms for Mindanao (referendums, Special Zone of Peace and Development in the 
Southern Philippines (SZOPAD). Nevertheless, the implementation process was repeatedly 
postponed. This was due to several reasons: ceasefire violations, financial shortcomings, 
constitutional reviews, exclusion of conflicting parties, timing incompatibilities as to 
referendums and national elections. Further reasons for the delay are identified by Dictaan-
Bang-oa (2004, 161): Trust was a huge barrier for the Moro people. Trust was difficult to come 
by, particularly in the government, which had failed to demonstrate its seriousness in resolving 
their complaints. The administrative strategy, a lack of resources among supporters, and the 
lack of access of project areas, among other factors, have all led to the lag in execution, 
according to project implementers. 
 
The OIC as the main third party and other external actors utterly failed to accelerate the 
proceedings. As mentioned before, delays always constitute a risk that the agreement might be 
violated by spoilers. In the case of the Philippines, this risk was identified by Dr. Danda 
Juanday, a member of the board of the Bangsamoro Development Council and executive 
director of the Bangsamoro Development Agency. He feared that “delaying the negotiation will 
give way to the breaking up of the Moro front into small groups which will be an invitation to 
“catastrophe”. There are radical members of the Moro front who might take over the 
moderates.” (Ampatuan et al. 2010, 40). Ten years after the implementation period, several 
improvements had been achieved in Mindanao which is not being discussed in this thesis, as 
they did not occur in the time set in this thesis. The OIC were unable to pressure the government 









Natural Resources Management 
 
Articles 134, 143 and 147 regulate the issue of mining and mineral processing in the 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Article 147 stated that the strategic 
minerals should be defined later and be shared equally between the government and the 
ARMM. Although Mindanao is very poor compared to other regions in the Philippines, it is 
very important to the national wealth of the whole country in terms of mineral resources and 
productions. Alparslan Özerdem emphasizes that the region “produces 90 per cent of the iron 
ore, 89 per cent of the nickel and cobalt, 62 per cent of limestone, almost 100 per cent of all the 
banana and pineapple exports, 50 per cent of all the corn and coconut, 50 per cent of all the 
fish, 40 per cent of all the cattle and 20 per cent of all the rice.” (Wolff and Dursun-Özkanca 
2016, 399).  The Republic Act 9054 Art X (2001 stated new regulations as to tax collection, 
defining strategic minerals, the inhabitants’ preferences for mineral processing (Lawphil 2018). 
The OIC strongly criticized the government’s one-sided decision on strategic mineral 
regulation, blaming the government for having violated the Peace Agreement. 
 
“The GRP, acting through Congress, has unilaterally arrogated to itself the power to define 
strategic mines and minerals, which violated Paragraphs 146 and 147 of 1996 PA. This 
contravenes the agreement, which mandates that the MNLF and the GRP, with the positive 
contribution of the technical experts of the OIC, will mutually agree on the definition of the 
strategic mines and minerals on a later date.” (OIC 2006, 9) 
 
The regional recovery was not as effective as expected. The provision was not implemented as 
agreed (Joshi et al. 2015). The OIC did nothing else but report about the lack of implementation. 
 
Review of Agreement, Verification and Monitoring Mechanism 
 
Articles 12 and 13 of the Agreement gave authority to the OIC and other parties to review the 
implementation process. The OIC’s first general and comprehensive review was reported 10 
years after the signature of the agreement. The OIC did not regularly issue any reviews. When 
it issued its reports, they were not considered adequate by the Government. The provision was 









24 different provision types were involved in the Mindanao Final Agreement (MFA).  
Examining each provision one by one, over 10 years, reveals under what conditions they could 
be implemented or not. Articles 12 and 13 of the Mindanao Final Agreement (MFA) gave 
authority to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as the third party assisting, to 
guarantee and monitor the implementation process. The OIC’s mediation in the Mindanao 
peace process has the features of a single pure mediator. There was also the considerable impact 
of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) as a third party and of other independent 
organizations on the peace process (1996 – 2006).  The Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices on the Philippines between 1996 and 2006, submitted annually by the U.S. 
Department of State to the U.S. Congress, greatly contributed to this purpose.   
 
The OIC Secretary General Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu pointed out that partial success in 
Mindanao had been achieved after the 10-years long peace process: “Regrettably, this peace 
agreement did not bring real peace. Disagreement on the interpretations of some provisions of 
the agreement led to resumption of hostilities” (Lingga 2006, 9). The OIC was less capable of 
achieving a successful peace agreement implementation in Mindanao. The main obstacle to 
implementation was that the government acted in a one-sided manner, releasing the Republic 
Acts, systematically discriminating against the OIC in the implementation process. The OIC 
was too weak to put pressure on the government and did not ask the UN for help. However, it 
operated successfully as a short-term mediator in agreements as to ceasefire. “According to 
Misuari, the talks and the agreement would have been impossible without the OIC because the 
MNLF was determined for sovereignty’ “(Stankovitch 1999, 76). Although the peace 
agreement was an extremely arduous task, the implementation of the MFA scored as much as 
59% (Joshi et al. 2015). If countries or organizations (e.g., US, Malaysia, Australia, UN, 
ASEAN) or a strong coalition of third parties had pressured the Philippine government into 
seriously overcoming commitment problems, the peace process would have been far more 
successful. The US, in particular, had close relations with the Philippine government and it had 
succeeded in El Salvador at a moment when the implementation process had come to a stand-
still there.  However, as it had shifted its international security policy against Muslim insurgents 





ASEAN could have been a powerful actor. It was not involved in the peace talks, although one 
of its purposes is “to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen 
peace-oriented values in the region” (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1967, 3). The 
UN did not engage in the peace process as a third-party either. Nevertheless, it provided 
financial support for integration programs through the Action for Conflict Transformation 
(ACT). As it was successful in El Salvador and was supported by the US, it could have 
contributed to better implementation as a neutral and powerful international third-party in 
Mindanao. International and regional organizations and third countries are not always interested 
in being involved for various reasons (i.e., personal capacity, financial issues or authorizations). 
 
There was always the danger that the fragile agreement would be shattered. MNLF rejected a 
plebiscite conducted by the Government. “For refusing to accept the said plebiscite the GRP 
provoked and attacked MNLF forces and finally arrested illegally detained Chairman Nur 
Misuari” (OIC 2006, 8).  The government’s action violated the ceasefire, caused a breach of 
confidence and violated the demarcation of territorial lines. All this could have been prevented 
if power mediators had been there. 
 
Including territorial or governmental power-sharing provisions in peace, agreements increase 
the chance for successful implementation in the long run. Power-sharing was partially 
implemented in terms of extensive, territorial power-sharing provisions (Joshi et al. 2015). 
Implementation efforts in terms of power-sharing varied over time, as different presidents took 
different approaches to solve the implementation problem. When the Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established, there was no third-party security guarantee 
during the implementation process. The presence of UN peacekeeping forces would have 
balanced the power and improved security guarantee, enforcement and confidence building. As 
the Philippine government remains pragmatic and is likely to change its policy regarding 
Mindanao because of national elections, the peace process might be jeopardized and engender 
a new conflict in future. To avoid it, the peace process should be regularly monitored by 








5.3 Comparative Case Analysis 
5.3.1 Implementation of Ceasefire Arrangements 
 
„Ceasefire agreements, or the first or last in a series of agreements, does not include any 
resolution of the incompatibility. Typically, ceasefires are but concerned with ending the use 
of force by the warring sides“ (Kreutz 2010). The termination of an armed conflict can be 
temporary or permanent in a particular area. Its implementation can be effectively consolidated 
by mediators providing regular monitoring, assistance and security. As ceasefire agreements 
usually occur before signing peace agreements, which opens the way to peace-talks, some 
countries have reached ceasefires only after peace agreements. Ceasefire implementation is to 
be found in all of the four selected cases. The success level of ceasefire implementation was 
achieved differently by single or multiple mediators, pure or power mediators.  
The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) acted together with COPAZ 
as third parties, assuming the prime responsibility for the ceasefire implementation mandated 
by the Security Council, resolution 693 on 20 May 1991.  COPAZ, the commission aiming at 
peace consolidation, was established to monitor the implementation process in El Salvador. It 
was supported by the UN. In the case of uncertainties and disputes, COPAZ as the ad-hoc 
commission took charge of identifying obstacles, finding solutions, reporting on the peace 
process and consulting the conflicting parties. In El Salvador, the ceasefire was implemented 
after signing the peace agreement, which was fully acknowledged as a provision in 1992 
(Stedman et al. 2002, 389). The ceasefire was successful for some time, as the conflicting 
parties were seriously committed to proper disarmament, demobilization of paramilitary groups 
and rebels on a set schedule. Some problems arose because of land issues, delaying the 
implementation process. The land issue was finally resolved due to the strategic coordination 
of the UN and COPAZ in cooperation with rival parties (UN 1992, 5). 
When FMLN had failed to destroy all its weapons in 1993, the implementation process was at 
stake (Montgomery 1995, 140). It had also secretly delivered weapons to Nicaragua, which 
again seriously delayed implementation proceedings. Moreover, an armed group of peace 
spoilers were identified, the anti-communist “death squads” which had been established by 





FMLN combatants in different locations. Violence increased prior to the general elections. 
Human rights violations and complaints were regularly collected by ONUSAL. Close 
communication and cooperation between ONUSAL, COPAZ, the Salvadorian Government and 
FMLN prevented further violation of the ceasefire. The Government took action against illegal 
groups, investigating each case and punishing the perpetrators (ibid. 4-6). Multiple mediators 
continuously put pressure on the conflicting parties, admonishing them to strongly commit 
themselves to the implementation of the ceasefire. The successful coordination of those third 
parties will be dealt with more closely in Chapter VII, Cessation of the Armed Forces (Boutros- 
Ghali 1995, 211). Studemeister strongly suggests that mediators monitor processes very closely 
and cooperate with actors (Studemeister 2001, 39). As uncertainty might violate the ceasefire 
progress, disputed issues should be resolved during peace-talks and not be postponed to post-
agreement periods. The success of the ceasefire mainly depended on the third parties’ 
coordination and commitment to a scheduled plan providing proper disarmament and 
demobilization of paramilitary groups and rebels. Securing ceasefire was hampered by rivalling 
political parties after the election.  
External third-party mediators repeatedly warned the conflicting parties of the imminent danger 
of peace spoilers but failed to prevent acts of violence. The close cooperation between 
ONUSAL, COPAZ, the government and other civil societies facilitated the implementation 
process and banned peace spoilers. Signatory parties are continuously warned by third parties 
to distance themselves from splintering groups and other paramilitary armed groups in post-
agreement processes. As to El Salvador, the presence of the UN could not prevent minor 
ceasefire violations which might have endangered the entire peace process. In Northern Ireland, 
splinter armed groups (e.g., the Real IRA) were established by separatists who opposed the 
peace agreement. They were neither supported by the signatory parties nor the citizens of the 
post-conflict society. In Lebanon, the former army commander did not recognize the peace 
agreement, putting the ceasefire at risk. For that reason, power mediator Syria and various 
splinter groups waged war against each other. Thanks to Syria’s military power, massive peace 
spoilers were kept away. If multiple power mediators had been in charge of the implementation 
process, the armed conflict between Syria and the Maronite general could have been avoided 





In Mindanao (Philippines), several ceasefire arrangements were identified before the signature 
of the peace agreement between the GRP and MNLF. Some were long-lasting but not 
sustainable. The Mindanao Final Agreement did not specify any particular ceasefire provisions, 
as several ceasefire agreements had already been achieved previously which had paved the way 
for peace talks and the Final Agreement. The OIC, a joint committee of MNLF, and the 
government were appointed to monitor and implement the ceasefire following the Tripoli 
Agreement (1976). However, one of the main conflicting parties in Mindanao, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) was reluctant to comply with the Mindanao Final Agreement. This 
could have severely hampered the ceasefire.  MILF and the “government signed a ceasefire 
agreement in 1997” (CISAC 2019; Stankovitch 1999, 89) and likewise the new Tripoli Peace 
Agreement in 2001, which was crucial to the success of the implementation of the ceasefire 
(Amer and Zou 2011, 69).  
According to the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in the Philippines, several violent 
clashes occurred in Mindanao. When the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) conducted 
anti-insurgency missions, a numerous civilian was killed (CRHRP 1998). The commanding 
officers of both parties then readily agreed on monitoring the ceasefire more efficiently (Bell 
and Utley 2015, 6). Due to several kidnapping cases, AFP kept conducting military operations. 
Some violent clashes erupted between AFP and MILF in August 2001. Implementing and 
guaranteeing the ceasefire were severely endangered due to other conflicting parties in 
Mindanao. As the US government was tightening its counter-terrorism policy after 9/11, 
Philippine president Joseph Estrada followed suit, proclaiming an “all-out war policy” aiming 
at suppressing autonomy endeavours. In 2003, fighting broke out between AFP and MILF 
(Amer and Zou 2011, 69; Özerdem 2012, 405-406). Compared to the positive effect of third 
parties on the ceasefire in Northern Ireland, Lebanon and El-Salvador, the consolidation of the 
ceasefire proved weak in Mindanao. The OIC, acting as a single pure mediator, failed to 
guarantee the non-resumption of hostilities. It neither had any military peacekeeping personnel 
nor any field experts. Monitoring proved difficult because of the difficult geographical 
circumstances. Although peace negotiations were repeatedly suspended because of renewed 
armed conflicts involving large numbers of casualties, the agreement in Mindanao was 






As the failure to decommission weapons facilitated the recurrence of violence, 
organized crime hampered the ceasefire process in Mindanao. Despite serious violations of the 
peace agreement, the third parties did not abandon their efforts to achieve an effective ceasefire. 
The OIC provided successful ceasefire mediation before the signature of the agreement and 
settled the dispute between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and GRP in Mindanao 
(Kohen 2006, 339). The UN and the OIC are pure mediators belonging to international 
organizations. However, the UN’s power to communicate and cooperate with implementers is 
by far larger than the OIC’s. This makes a big difference in matters of success. As the UN 
closely cooperated with COPAZ and other local actors in El Salvador, this facilitated country-
level control over the ceasefire.  
The OIC identified implementation problems in terms of peace spoilers. It very irregularly 
reported on the problems in Mindanao and did not take any initiative to prevent violations at 
the right time. Its lack of regular communication and cooperation with local and national actors 
considerably slowed the peace process down.  This corroborates the assumption that to enhance 
the successful implementation of the ceasefire, sharing responsibilities among multiple pure or 
power mediators is by far more effective than single pure or power mediators acting by 
themselves. Besides, the UN is being a pure mediator, has more leverage and facilitation impact 
than the OIC to prevent ceasefire violations because the UN Security Council is authorized to 
impose sanctions against governments. Both pure mediators, the UN and the OIC, equally face 
the same challenges to prevent peace spoilers. Only close cooperation with the conflicting 
parties and shared interest in the implementation process can minimize the risk of spoilers. If 
there had been one more mediator in Mindanao, he would have been able to consolidate the 
ceasefire implementation more effectively. It implies that uncertainties, the absence of multiple 
and powerful mediators give more strength to peace spoilers. Proper ceasefire implementation 
needs specific solutions and a fixed schedule. In that regard, the Chapultepec Agreement was 
more clearly conceived than the Ta’if Peace Accord and Mindanao Peace Agreements. 
Accuracy is one of the key elements of the implementation process, eliminating uncertainties.  
In Northern Ireland, the ceasefire provision was not dealt with in the Good Friday Agreement. 





IRA and some rival paramilitaries in 1994, before the peace agreement was signed (Connolly 
2006, 412). The ceasefire decision was taken unilaterally by the IRA, which could be 
interpreted as a result of secret talks (Debraggio 2010, 32; Nolan 2012, 21). The ceasefire deals 
greatly facilitated the negotiations between the governments of the Republic of Ireland, the UK 
and the warring parties in Northern Ireland. When the British Government and the IRA 
disagreed on the deadline for decommissioning arms, the ceasefire was violated by the IRA in 
1996 (Debraggio 2010, 33; Mac Ginty et al. 2007, 6). A lasting ceasefire was closely related to 
disarmament which was fully supported by multiple powerful third parties. Therefore, it was 
generally assumed that the peace process should commence with the decommissioning of IRA 
weapons. At a later date, the decommissioning process was successfully completed in the post-
agreement period in 2005 (BBC 2009). An obstacle to the ceasefire implementation occurred 
when a new armed group that had split from the IRA emerged. This splinter group posed a 
serious threat to the ceasefire. In 1999, the issue of decommissioning arms reoccurred in the 
peace process. The then Prime Minister Tony Blair greatly contributed to resolving the problem 
of “the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons and the release of paramilitary prisoners” 
(BBC 2017a). In that context, British peace facilitation in Northern Ireland was similar to US 
peace facilitation in El Salvador. However, there was no US peace facilitation in Mindanao.   
Eight years after the signature of the GFA, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
(BIIC) reported that one of the last remaining paramilitary groups, PIRA, had officially declared 
the termination of armed actions in favour of lasting peace (BIIC 2006). Although there had 
been various attempts at violating the peace talks before and after the signature of the peace 
agreement, the leaders of the main parties remained patient, fully determined to secure peace 
and prevent peace spoilers. The intensive dialogues between the multiparty commissions such 
as the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, the British-Irish Council and the 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) ensured the ceasefire. 
These groups also closely monitored the ceasefire. Their role in the peace process resembles 
the role COPAZ played in El Salvador. However, international monitoring of ceasefire was 
missing in Mindanao and Lebanon. The completion of decommissioning (disarmament) was 
the last stage of the ceasefire process in Northern Ireland. In comparison to El Salvador, the 
ceasefire in Northern Ireland began before the IRA and some rival paramilitaries signed the 





mutual trust. Intensive dialogue meetings were held in which multiparty commissions 
emphasized their cooperation and ensured the success of the ceasefire implementation (British-
Irish Intergovernmental Conference, British-Irish Council, Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning). In contrast, Syria (power mediator) used its great military 
power to enhance the ceasefire in Lebanon. In Mindanao, the single pure mediator OIC was 
unable to prevent any ceasefire violations, as it acted alone and did not have the capacity to 
prevent it. It did not show much interest in the implementation process either. In Lebanon, Syria 
could have stopped ceasefire violation after the armed conflict had come to an end.  
 
Thanks to the third parties’ mediation efforts numerous ceasefires were achieved in Lebanon. 
The last ceasefire was violated by former military general Aoun, whose army was defeated by 
the Syrian troops. Although the UK and the Republic of Ireland (power mediators) had 
sufficient military capacity to guarantee the ceasefire in Northern Ireland, they primarily used 
communication, providing a guarantee, technical assistance and dialogue. Syria, however, 
exerted its military power to enhance the ceasefire which resulted in a large number of 
casualties and triggered off new hostility. It put the rival parties in an uncomfortable situation 
and diminished public confidence. Its single military presence in Lebanon led to high 
uncertainty among Christians. Multiple mediations involving France, the US or the UN could 
have resolved the internal, military power-sharing arrangement more effectively. It could have 
brought about a stable armistice which would have inspired confidence in the peace process. 
Multiple mediations would have kept a proper balance of power between the rival parties.   
Based on the findings in the comparative case analysis, it can be assumed that multiple pure 
mediations or multiple power mediation are more successful than single pure mediation or 
power mediation to enhance ceasefire implementation in a post-conflict country. It implies that 
multiple mediators are more effective than single mediators. The two mediator types have 
different characteristics. Power mediators generally display military capacity, leverage, 
financial power, whereas pure mediators are believed to exhibit communication and facilitation 
skills. However, power mediators can also display characteristics generally attributed to pure 
mediators and vice versa. So, a power mediator may equally display communication and 
facilitation skills like a pure mediator. This was the case in Northern Ireland, where the 





simultaneously throughout the entire peacebuilding process. However, if a pure or single power 
mediator were to act solely, his individual skills would be weakened. So, both types of 
mediators (power and pure) should exploit their full potential of communication, facilitation 
and persuasion to convince the rival parties to avoid military leverage. If the mediators are 
multiple in the field, they can share responsibility for ceasefire implementation in different parts 
of conflict zones. They are more able to provide confidence-building, solve commitment 
problems, prevent peace spoilers and enforce security guarantee in post-conflict societies.  
 
5.3.2 Implementation of Institutional-governmental Power-sharing  
 
Achieving institutional-governmental power-sharing in conflict zones was an important goal 
after the ceasefire had occurred and the peace agreement had been signed. In El Salvador, the 
following actions were primarily taken to provide services for a post-conflict society: new 
setting of the administration of justice, effectiveness of the legislative, functioning of non-
governmental organizations, guaranteeing FMLN members the full exercise of their civil and 
political rights (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 218). Within the framework of institutional reform, the 
government officials such as former court judges and mayors in exile were requested to return 
to the conflict zones. However, the return of those officials was made difficult, as FMLN and 
some local communities raised concerns against that project. Eager to resolve those issues, 
ONUSAL appealed to the local communities to strive for more communication and overcome 
that problem to achieve lasting peace and reconciliation. A collaboration agreement was signed 
by the opposing parties, allowing officials to return to El Salvador (16 September 1992). The 
agreement had been achieved through joint action, by ONUSAL and the Supreme Court of 
Justice (ibid. 278). As a result, the implementation of the civil administration reform was 
successfully accomplished in 1994. If a single, pure third-party had been trying to achieve the 
same result independently, it might have failed to enhance implementation because of the lack 
of communication. Similarly, the OIC was not able to support governmental power-sharing on 
its own in Mindanao. Thanks to the efforts of third parties, the establishment of governmental 






In El Salvador, the Secretary-General stated that the implementation of power-sharing had been 
delayed due to the lack of “financial funds and resources” (ibid. 589). In this context, the 
financial sponsoring of power-sharing implementation is of great importance. Thanks to its 
credibility and reliability, the UN succeeded in raising funds for the implementation process.  
In contrast, the IOC, the other pure mediator, was financially weak and unable to support the 
implementation process financially. In Northern Ireland, money was not an issue as the two 
power mediators were able to arrange enough financial support. Syria (single, power mediator) 
was unable to solve the financial problem in Lebanon.  
In El Salvador, the constitutional reform was implemented by the UN and COPAZ. It 
emphasized the armed forces, the electoral system and the judicial system. Those sections were 
implemented in 1992/1993 (Joshi et al. 2015). In Northern Ireland, institutional changes given 
a constitutional reform took place following the peace agreement. The territorial definition of 
the border in Ireland required an amendment in the Constitution of the Irish Republic. The 
constitutional reform was implemented by referendum in the Republic of Ireland on 22 May 
1998 (CAIN 1998). As a result of this reform, the Republic of Ireland no longer makes 
territorial claims to Northern Ireland. The right to self-determination was achieved by a 
referendum in Northern Ireland in 1998 (ARK 2002). Accordingly, the right to self-
determination was guaranteed and implemented there. Brexit might affect Northern Ireland’s 
economic, social and foreign affairs with the EU and the UK in the long run. It might also affect 
the integration process of Unionists and Republicans (pro- or anti-EU). New border restrictions 
with the Republic of Ireland might constitute new difficulties. This could result in a new 
referendum in favour of a United Ireland. The multiple mediators utilize their communication 
and facilitation power for institutional-governmental power-sharing. The constitutional reform 
in Mindanao was carried out by the government in a one-sided manner without the participation 
of the OIC. In Lebanon, constitutional reform was lacking and only in 1999 did the Syrian 
government put pressure (leverage and enforcement) on Lebanon to initiate further 
implementation actions. 
Paving the way for FMLN to establish their political party, the legal basis was established by 
the legislative assembly which allowed pluralism. Promoting the political participation of 





enhanced governmental power-sharing, which is considered by many researchers as an essential 
element for peacebuilding (Hartzel and Hoddie 2003, 321).  This was to be FMLN’s first step 
towards political participation. As ONUSAL raised concerns as to FMLN’s credibility during 
the implementation process of an electoral/political party reform in May 1992, the government 
delayed legalizing FMLN as a political party (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 245). Moreover, the parties 
interpreted the stipulations to be implemented differently, thus adding further delay to the 
implementation process. ONUSAL got the process back on track. The land issue was one of 
the central points of conflict which was finally solved by ONUSAL. The leaders of the two 
conflicting parties kept in touch with the Secretary-General by telephone. He expressed his 
disappointment to them about the implementation delay. After their telephone conversation, 
both parties promised to get the implementation back on the right track. ONUSAL’s 
communication and facilitation efforts could not have been better (ibid. 245-246).  
 
FMLN finally participated in the 1994 elections for the first time in its history. As the 
Government had required monitoring for those elections, ONUSAL established an electoral 
assistance division (Unruh and Williams 2013, 442). However, the registration of voters proved 
partially inefficient (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 51). In the end, the overall conduct of the elections 
was successful and in full compliance with ONUSAL’s monitoring plan. Similar monitoring 
efforts made by third parties could not be identified in Lebanon or Mindanao. Granting amnesty 
to former FMLN members and establishing a new legal basis for their equal political 
participation in the upcoming elections were indeed significant domestic events in El Salvador. 
Those provisions strongly supported governmental power-sharing and thus contributed to 
ensuring peace, which is generally considered as one of the main factors of securing peace. One 
problem occurred, when the agreement dealing with certain provisions was interpreted 
differently by each of the conflicting parties, as some passages of the agreement had been 
formulated inaccurately. The problem was resolved by the Secretary-General, Mr. Handals, the 
FMLN leader, and El Salvador’s President Cristiani. The cooperation between the third parties 
and the signatory parties was not always as effective as required. In Mindanao, there was no 






In El Salvador, the judicial system was to be newly reformed following the internationally 
recognized values of universal human rights such as the division of powers (Boutros-Ghali 
1995, 167-168).  In 1992, a delay of implementation was experienced due to the “tightness of 
the timetable” (ibid. 266). That issue was solved by ONUSAL’s Under-Secretary-General 
Marrack Goulding. He repeatedly organized consultations with the parties involved and delays 
were regularly reported by ONUSAL (A/47/968 S/26033) (UN 1993, 36-38). Also, several 
postponements were identified due to the lack of ratifications, of coordination, of capacity for 
investigation, due to the lacking political will of government officials, due to a sluggish and 
languid criminal justice system (UN 1997b, 4-19). The UN levelled further criticism at the lack 
of implementation in the judiciary and identified further shortcomings. Many issues in terms of 
the judiciary were resolved by Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding (ONUSAL), who 
personally intervened. Although the UN criticized the slow implementation processes, it 
abstained from imposing sanctions against El Salvador.  
 
On the contrary, several recommendations were made by the UN to facilitate the 
implementation of provisions soon. In Lebanon, the judiciary reform was regulated in the Ta’if 
Agreement (1989). The partiality of the judiciary was repeatedly criticized in the report on 
human rights practices. It was argued that local or national powers such as the militias at a local 
level, influential politicians or Syrian intelligence officers constantly intervened “to protect 
their supporters from detention and prosecution” (CRHRP 1989, 1471; CRHRP 1990, 1525; 
CRHRP 1991, 1488; CRHRP 1992, 1047; CRHRP 1994; CHRRP 1995). Although the 
implementation of judiciary reform took place in 1989 without any noticeable resistance, the 
lack of impartiality seriously affected the reputation of the judiciary. Moreover, the interference 
of the Syrian intelligence service in the Lebanese judiciary shed light on Syria’s selfish political 
intentions. It implies that as long as Syria as a single mediator had free rein in Lebanon, it could 
not be bothered about improving implementation processes there.  If multiple mediators or 
INGOs had been actively involved in the peace processes in Lebanon and Mindanao, they could 
have made sure that all mediators equally supported the implementation processes there.  
 
As to judiciary reform in Mindanao, the Reports on Human Right Practices (CRHRP 1996-
2006) stated that the judicial system of the Philippines also “suffered from corruption and 





been successfully carried out. The implementation was conducted without any direct 
involvement of the OIC. In Northern Ireland, the judiciary reform for institutional arrangements 
was stipulated in the agreement that a review group should be formed to establish a functioning 
and equitable criminal justice system with an effective legal prosecution for the communities. 
This group made “294 recommendations” and brought about plenty of improvements 
concerning the Northern Ireland Parliament (United States. Congress. Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe 2005, 37-38). However, the amending proposals failed to reform 
criminal justice in Northern Ireland at that time. Although the members of the British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference regularly discussed the significance of implementation and 
emphasized the importance of cooperation regarding criminal justice, only several changes 
were made in public prosecution (2005) and policing (2006) (BIIC 2006). It took ten years 
altogether to complete the implementation process employing the direct involvement of third 
parties and commissions. In other cases, a review group for the judiciary was not formed by 
mediators. In Lebanon in term of administrative power-sharing, the names of sects or 
denominations did not figure on identity cards anymore. The new selection criteria for 
employment were agreed upon in terms of qualification requirements and not based on 
confession (UN Peacemaker 1989). The final implementation was achieved by Prime Minister 
Hariri (1993-1997). He successfully performed other implementation activities in 
administrative issues (El‐ Zein and Sims 2004, 280). As things had gone out of control in 
Lebanon, Syria assumed a long-term mediation responsibility to pressure the conflicting parties 
into reaching mutual understanding.  
 
As there was no governmental spirit of compromise in Lebanon, a problem occurred which was 
similar to the one in El Salvador (misinterpretation of legal texts). The provision to be 
implemented was interpreted differently by the conflicting parties, each of them seeking its 
advantage. In such conflicts, legal experts and short-term mediators should closely cooperate 
with long-term mediators to clarify the implementation details. Although administrative 
decentralization and governmental power-sharing were the essential elements of the Ta’if Peace 
Accord for Governorates and Municipalities, they were not implemented (Karam 2012, 38; 
Harb and Atallah 2015, 188). The main obstacle to achieving decentralization was the general 






To guarantee the representation of different religious communities, the number of 
parliamentary seats was increased to 128 and equally shared between them (Salloukh 2006, 
644). Although the confessional, political system in Lebanon has always been a highly 
controversial topic, structural sectarianism and confessionalism have helped to enhance the 
country’s national unity in the post-war period. Christians protested against elections because 
of the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon (CHRRP 1992, 1049). Syria misused its presence 
in Lebanon to influence domestic policy for its benefit. The rights, duties and obligations of the 
President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet were explicitly determined. This 
reform faced serious obstacles, after the newly elected Maronite president, Rene Moawad 
(Cristian Maronite), had been assassinated in November 1989. Assassinations are disastrous 
peace spoilers. Mediators in the four selected cases were unable to prevent them. Another 
Maronite, Elias Hrawi, was elected president by Parliament. If Syria’s military intervention in 
Lebanon had not occurred, previously armed groups would have preserved their political and 
military status quo, which would have seriously hampered the implementation process. So, the 
power of balance was maintained by the Syrian army. The struggle against an internal armed 
force was put to an end by third parties having a strong military capacity over a long time. In 
the other three cases (El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Philippines), military intervention initiated 
by mediators was not an option.  
The first national election in Lebanon (1992) did not fulfil the required standard of quality one 
might have expected to expect in terms of security compliance and full participation of all 
parties (CHRRP 1994). The implementation process was very much in favour of Syria playing 
the role of the third party, although Syria’s political influence was not apparent at first glance. 
In contrast, the Northern Ireland elections took place on 7 March 2007, after the issue of the 
IRA’s disarmament had been resolved thanks to the strenuous efforts of the third parties 
organizing multilateral meetings and inspections of independent monitoring groups.  Sinn Fein 
and DUP increased their numbers of parliamentary seats compared to the previous elections in 
1998. The power-sharing of the executive was maintained at the same level as in the 2007 
elections. The governmental power was now adequately shared in Stormont. The main obstacle 
to the implementation of the power-sharing provision was the delayed decommissioning of 





which severely hampered implementation. The third parties’ strong commitment and Tony 
Blair’s promising, personal promise finally helped to resolve the decommissioning problem. In 
contrast, the OIC was incapable of controlling the disarmament or reintegration of former 
fighters in Mindanao. The President of the OIC never communicated personally with the leaders 
of the conflicting parties in Mindanao, as implementations were in a deadlock there.  
The transitional power-sharing government came into action in the transition process from war 
to peace, in which the former conflicting parties were to share the power of a state apparatus 
such as executive, legislative and judicial power. In Lebanon, the new power-sharing transition 
government decreed that the President would have to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni 
Muslim, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim. Lebanon and Syria signed 
a mutual accord that underlined the strategic cooperation of both countries and in which Syria 
was to provide security to Lebanon. The implementation of this accord secured Syria’s 
guardianship in Lebanon. Syria guaranteed the successful implementation of governmental 
power-sharing. 
The Philippine Government failed to implement the reform of civil administration according to 
Article 72 of the Agreement (Joshi et al. 2015). In terms of boundary demarcation, the Peace 
Agreement provided for an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, in which the 
demarcation line was to be approved by plebiscite in specific areas. The plebiscite caused 
incompatibilities between the Government and MNLF. As a result, government forces attacked 
MNLF (OIC 2006, 8). The Government’s activities caused a breach of confidence and 
hampered the implementation process. The OIC reported that in August 2001, the plebiscite 
had resulted in the creation of a new province, Basilan. MNLF strongly opposed it. As to 
decentralization by Article 2 in the Peace Agreement, an amendment concerning the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was required by the Philippine Congress. 
Although the government had a serious commitment problem and decisions kept being 
postponed, the reform was carried out in the Republic Act No. 9054 (2001), which guaranteed 
decentralization through governmental and territorial power-sharing. Although not all of 
FMLN’s demands (plebiscite) were approved by the Government, the regional autonomous 
region was established. The OIC only criticized the Republic Act No. 9054, for being contrary 





mediators in El Salvador closely communicated with the Salvadorian Government in every 
single step of implementation failure. The same efforts were made by the multiple mediators in 
Northern Ireland.  
Article 65 of the Mindanao Agreement is an essential part of the reform of the executive. In 
2005 the candidates were elected in the autonomous region of Mindanao (ARMM) but were 
not appointed to the executive branches of the Government by the central Philippine 
Government as stated in Article 65. The failure of implementation was mainly due to the 
Government’s one-sided Republic Act 9054 (2001). Atty Randolph Parcasio, the legal counsel 
and spokesperson for the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), criticized the Senate’s 
delaying tactics (iag.org.ph 2015). The OIC remained passive. If there had been an international 
committee in charge of the implementation of institutional-governmental power-sharing, 
democratic processes would have been more respected.  The government was having a serious 
commitment problem in terms of autonomy, law-making and further rights stipulated in the 
Agreement. MNLF continuously questioned the legitimacy of the Republic Act because, in 
their opinion, the Republic Act had violated the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The OIC did not 
engage in any dialogue with the Government to solve commitment problems. In El Salvador 
and Northern Ireland, the multiple third parties were striving hard to avoid commitment 
problems and fulfil the criteria laid down.  
Article 4 of the Mindanao Agreement called for more cooperation between Muslims, Christians 
and other cultural communities in terms of “inter-ethnic/state relationship”. The Southern 
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established in the framework of 
Executive Order NO 371. It strove for the full participation of the main cultural community 
representations. By the agreement, a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) was 
created in Mindanao. Particular emphasis was put on people’s needs in that underdeveloped 
area. Reform projects were launched to promote peace, economic and social development, 
infrastructure, telecommunication, reconciliation between rival groups (Muslims and 
Christians) and, in particular, the integration of Mindanao into the Philippines (Lawphil 2021). 
Moreover, SPCPD did not have any law-making authority like COPAZ in El Salvador. While 
the presence of “non-government organizations (NGOs), and people's organizations (POs)” in 





from direct cooperation for regional peace and development. Nevertheless, in its reports, the 
OIC kept emphasizing the significance of the provision implementation in the Autonomous 
Region (OIC 2006, 6). 
The structure and aims of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development 
(SPCPD) are, to some extent, similar to those of COPAZ in El Salvador and the British-Irish 
Inter-Governmental Conference in Northern Ireland. However, their efforts to achieve 
implementation were very limited. The inter-ethnic/state relationship was successfully 
guaranteed through the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and 
Development (SPCPD) and the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). However, 
the transitional justice mechanism was not dealt with in the Agreement and the Republic Act, 
although 120,000 people had lost their lives in internal-armed conflicts since 1969 
(Herbolzheimer 2015).  
 
Although the executive council and the legislative assembly had not been appointed in the 
national executive government council as regulated in the Peace Agreement, regional 
legislative power was conveyed to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  
The OIC reported (2006) that the provisions had only been partially implemented, as stipulated 
changes had been made by the Government unilaterally without the participation of the OIC 
and MNLF during the law-making process.  
Governmental power-sharing was agreed upon within the framework of the Regional 
Autonomous Government in the peace accord which required ratification by the Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). According to the Secretary-General’s report on the 
question of Muslims in the Southern Philippines, issued by the OIC in 2006, the GRP had failed 
to fulfil its commitment as stipulated in the Peace Agreement, in terms of national government 
positions, executive council, legislative assembly and administration. It was pointed out in the 
report that the government’s one-sided action meant “disregarding the MNLF participation as 
the principal party to the agreement”. The agreement could therefore not be implemented (OIC 
2006, 11-12). Implementation efforts varied under different presidents in the course of time. 
The OIC, as a pure mediator, kept urging the Philippine Government to finally overcome 





any military capacity or authorization to impose sanctions against the Republic of the 
Philippines.  
As in El Salvador, the US would have been able to pressure the Philippine Government into 
achieving full implementation. However, it was reluctant to engage in mediation between two 
conflicting parties (Christians vs. Muslims), especially because US foreign policy was strictly 
directed against Muslim rebels after the 9/11 events. The OIC seemed to have not exhausted all 
its possibilities in terms of communication, persuasion and facilitation. In contrast, the UN 
undertook a major effort to achieve peace in El Salvador. It closely cooperated with multiple 
local actors and rival parties. In Northern Ireland, the power-sharing process was repeatedly 
hampered and even suspended. The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference encouraged 
cooperation between both parties to resolve implementation issues, monitored the 
governmental development, established institutions, decommissioned arms, engendered 
reconciliation in Northern Ireland (CAIN 2018). The implementation process was reviewed by 
the commission in reports. The commission’s functions were similar to those of COPAZ in El 
Salvador.  
 
The parliamentary system of Northern Ireland is entirely different from the electoral system in 
Lebanon with its confessional segregation and guaranteed number of seats. No reciprocity 
problems were reported for full implementation in Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein made significant 
electoral gains in the second election, particularly after the Good Friday Agreement and the 
disarmament of the IRA. This shows that as soon as an armed conflict has been terminated, the 
political arms of insurgent movements stand a good chance to gain public support. Although 
there was dissatisfaction with the establishment of the Civic Forum (e.g., lack of gender 
balance, members of anti-agreement Unionist groups), the Forum started working on 9 October 
2000. Its duties such as the consultation of the government on social, economic and cultural 
issues are stated in detail in the Good Friday Agreement, Paragraph 34 (Nolan 2012, 171). It is 
necessary to solve issues effectively through multi-party committees, forums, councils, groups, 
conferences. Systematic dealing with issues greatly facilitates implementation processes. 
 
The transitional power-sharing government in Northern Ireland proved to be a sensible phase 





the first assembly election was held in Northern Ireland on 25 June 1998. David Trimble (UUP) 
and Seamus Mallon (SDLP) were nominated candidates for ministerial office (Wilford 2000, 
581). However, the IRA’s delay in decommissioning weapons suspended the power-sharing 
and executive process in 2002. The issue was resolved successfully by the Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD). The IICD inspectors reported that the 
IRA had continued to cooperate in the decommissioning process. The inspectors, Martti 
Ahtisaari and Cyril Ramaphosa confirmed on 30 May 2001 that the arms depot was under 
control (IICD 2001). After IICD’s positive report, the executive power body continued to work 
successfully. The issue of the IRA’s reluctance to decommission its arms reoccurred in 2002. 
The paramilitary Ulster Defence Association (UDA) equally failed to meet its obligations as to 
disarmament. This caused the suspension of the executive until 2007. From 2002 to 2007, the 
Independent Monitoring Commissions (IICD), representatives of the Republic of Ireland and 
the UK tried their best to resolve the issue. They met in Leeds Castle several times to work out 
a solution. As money was needed for the implementation process, £1bn in financial support was 
provided by Ireland and the UK. On 28 July 2005, the IRA declared an “end to armed 
campaign” (BBC 2009). The postponement of implementation was likewise caused by 
disarmament problems in El Salvador. The UN successfully resolved it through intensive 
communication.   
All in all, in the four cases the implementation of institutional-governmental power-sharing 
mainly depended on the quantity, dedication, expertise and full interest of multiple third parties. 
Although the communication and facilitation skills displayed by the pure mediators proved 
successful, the UN and COPAZ outperformed the OIC as the single pure mediator.  The OIC 
was weak and not as much dedicated to the implementation process as the UN or 
intergovernmental third parties in Northern Ireland. The OIC and Syria did not get involved in 
every step of the implementation process and completely exhausted their communication and 
facilitation skills. The OIC did not organise any personnel on the ground or include other 
international organisations which could have informed them about the ongoing 
implementations efforts. Syria had a great deal of security forces and intelligent services in 
Lebanon. This shows that Syria was not engaged in any diplomatic efforts or dialogue attempts 
in Lebanon. The signatory Governments in the four selected cases did not equally show 





even went so far as to exclude the OIC, the only pure mediator, from the implementation process 
dealing with governmental power-sharing. Moreover, the implementation process in the 
Philippines had run into trouble because of changing governments. The Salvadorian 
government repeatedly tried to ignore third parties and the opposition. Only the strong 
commitment of the UN and COPAZ could overcome resistance and peace spoilers. The 
intergovernmental power mediators in Northern Ireland largely differed from single power 
mediator Syria. A group of specialists took charge of the implementation process under the 
leadership of the two mediators. Several trustworthy politicians, regional organisations and 
peace-building countries were involved in completing the implementation of institutional-
governmental power-sharing. Although the UK and the Republic of Ireland had sufficient 
leverage power, they did not use it and entirely relied on experts and communication with the 
signatory parties. Syria, however, fully used its military power and refrained from using 
communication or facilitation skills. It did not appoint any experts concerning the specific 
implementation of power-sharing, as it fulfilled selfish political interests in Lebanon. Only 
multiple mediators in post-agreement societies are able to prevent such infringements in the 
future.  
5.3.3 Implementation of Security Power-sharing 
In El Salvador, demobilization and disarmament for security reforms were regulated in the 
Chapultepec Peace Accord. Demobilization of former FMLN combatants meant returning to 
normal life, ending armed activities, joining the newly established army and police forces which 
could facilitate other parts of implementation procedures. The number of regular armed forces 
(FAES) was reduced and its structure newly designed. FMLN fighters were ordered to return 
to designated locations stated in the agreement. The primary aim of demobilization was that all 
combatants in the country should withdraw from the conflict zones to their barracks and report 
in detail on the number of weapons they possessed (e.g., arms, ammunition, mines). This was 
to be closely monitored and verified by ONUSAL and COPAZ. Once the weapons had been 
handed in, they were destroyed in a scheduled timeframe (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 210-212). 
Implementation was slowed down because of the government’s lethargic implementation 





in the land-sharing provisions in El Salvador. ONUSAL finally succeeded in solving this issue 
with COPAZ, jointly assisted by experts and rival parties.  
Compared to the Philippines, the agreement did not contain terms such as disarmament, 
demobilisation or reintegration (DDR) program because MNLF members might have 
interpreted those terms negatively, in terms of capitulation (Makinano and Lubang 2001, 25). 
Articles 19.a and 20.a of the Agreement stated that 1,500 MNLF combatants in the PNP and 
“5,750 MNLF members” were to “be integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP), 250” of them were to work in auxiliary services. The recruitment area was to be in the 
Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in Mindanao. The symbolic step in matters 
of integration was made, when 7,000 fighters of the MNLF were integrated into the regular 
national army and police forces (Santos 2010, 163). Nevertheless, this was symbolically 
significant in terms of the cessation of hostilities. In El Salvador, the reintegration and 
demobilization process were more challenging due to the higher number of paramilitaries and 
the lack of financial resources. A parallel can be drawn to Northern Ireland, where the main 
issue was also decommissioning which took approximately seven years. The financing of DDR 
in Northern Ireland was not an issue for mediators there, compared to El Salvador and 
Mindanao. The number of ex-combatants in El Salvador and Mindanao was higher than in 
Northern Ireland, which posed even greater challenges to the third parties there.  The problem 
of financing DDR is difficult to resolve but can be best resolved by the successful cooperation 
of multiple mediators.  
In Northern Ireland, the demobilization issue focused on the removal of the British security 
forces from Northern Ireland. The removal of the troops lasted until 2007. The delay of the 
removal was due to the IRA’s delayed decommissioning of arms. The implementation was 
largely successful in Northern Ireland despite numerous postponements of security questions. 
Demobilization was sluggish. Disarmament was a key issue before and after the signature of 
the Good Friday Agreement. It was stipulated in Art. 7.4 that the implementation procedures 
should be monitored by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning 
(IICD) (Good Friday Agreement 1998). The first meeting was chaired by former Prime Minister 
Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern TD on 19 December 1999 (IICD 1999-2011). Several problems 





However, implementation was successfully completed due to continuous, multilateral pressure 
from different independent commissions, political figures and parties. The consolidation of 
governmental power-sharing had also provided an impetus for the implementation process.  
In Lebanon, a military reform was intended in the agreement to ensure domestic security in 
cooperation with internal security agencies and to defend the homeland from external threats 
(e.g., Israel). The implementation was blocked by General Aoun. An armed conflict broke out 
between his forces and the Syrian army. Gen. Aoun was defeated in October 1990 (Picard and 
Ramsbotham 2012, 71). Syria, the power mediator, did not engage in communication, 
facilitation or dispute resolution. It was more interesting in a military counterattack against Gen. 
Aoun. A peace agreement fully including Gen. Aoun and his supporters might have avoided 
peace spoiling through an internal armed confrontation. In El Salvador, one of the most flagrant 
violations of the peace agreement occurred, when the FMLN’s hidden armoury was discovered 
in Nicaragua. Facing this emergency issue, Boutros-Ghali and ONUSAL took initiative. The 
secret armoury was destroyed by FMLN and the Nicaraguan Government. The sudden 
discovery of the FMLN’s secret arms cache proved to be the biggest obstacle for FMLN to be 
recognized as a political party by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The provision of 
demobilization was completed in 1995, disarmament was fully implemented in 2000 (Joshi et 
al. 2015). The paramilitary organizations (death squads) were found guilty of crimes against 
the civilian population (e.g., assassination, torture, kidnapping, genocide) (Call 2002, 574). 
Those crimes entailed violent fighting between guerrillas and government forces in different 
places of the country. The organization, structure and activity of private security were newly 
regulated following the principles of human rights. Implementation was difficult because the 
process of recovering military weapons from private individuals was deliberately slowed down 
by the Government. Although a great number of military weapons had been recovered, the 
process could not be adequately completed because of uncontrolled weapon proliferation in the 
past (ibid. 549). The failure of disarmament was, to some extent, due to an inadequate 
reintegration program, lack of funds and lack of career prospects for ex-warriors (Call 2002, 
563). The Government failed to fully implement the stipulation.  
 
El Salvador had three “security forces all of which were under the control of the Ministry of 





of obstacles to military reform (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 198). The implementation was fully 
completed in 1997 under the watchful eyes of multiple observers. In its reports, ONUSAL kept 
referring to the financial shortcomings of the Salvadorian police forces, which means that 
money played a pivotal role in implementing the rest of the peace agreement (Boutros-Ghali 
1995, 442). It was fraudulent that the government took every opportunity to employ former 
security officers in the newly established police forces to maintain its former power impact 
(ibid. 570-571). The Government’s selfish strategy considerably slowed down the 
implementation process. Strong pressure exerted by the US and ONUSAL on the Salvadorian 
government largely contributed to successful implementation.  
 
A general amnesty was proclaimed by the legislative assembly to positively influence further 
peace settlement efforts. After six-month research, the truth commission was able to identify 
who had been the perpetrator or victim (Call 2002, 575). The prisoner release process was 
assisted by the Salvadorian Church, local diplomats, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Amnesty International and Americas Watch (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 346). Obstacles did 
not occur in the implementation process of prisoner release. Lack of financial support, 
commitment problems and postponements of implementation decelerated the peace process. 
The close cooperation between the US, ONUSAL and other national actors facilitated the 
implementation of security reforms.  
 
The OIC’s involvement as a pure mediator in the implementation process in Mindanao was 
unsuccessful, as its members kept lamenting and complaining instead of acting responsibly.  If 
the parties had implemented specific provisions in a coordinated manner and a parallel time 
frame, there would not have been any complaint about failing commitment. The Dispute 
Resolution Committee was one of the major factors to guarantee implementation safety, 
security and peacebuilding. COPAZ was founded to monitor implementation processes. In the 
event of any uncertainties and disputes, COPAZ, which was supported by the UN, took charge 
of finding solutions, reporting on the peace process and consulting the conflicting parties. The 
mandated ad-hoc commission COPAZ did not have any executive power, its function was 
highly inefficient (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 160). The dispute resolution committee was stipulated 
in the Ta’if Accords in 1989. In 1993 (Law No. 250), the independent constitutional council 





(International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2009). The commission’s function did not 
include monitoring the implementation process of the Ta’if Agreement. Its duty was merely to 
control the constitutionality of the laws. In Northern Ireland, the governments of the UK and 
the Republic of Ireland cooperated intensely to solve disputes (disarmament of the IRA).  The 
OIC failed to solve any disputes.  
 
The Ta’if Peace Agreement (1989) did not contain a detailed timeline for specific provisions 
(as in the Chapultepec peace agreement). It stipulated that the Syrian armed forces should assist 
the Lebanese forces over two years after the ratification. However, the withdrawal of the Syrian 
armed forces occurred 15 years later, in 2005. In terms of disarmament, the militias were to 
deliver their weapons to the Lebanese government (UN Peacemaker 1989). The implementation 
failed, as the militias did not keep the timeframe as stipulated in the agreement. This clearly 
shows the negotiators’ inability to implement the agreement in a phased approach, as they did 
not have any comprehensive overview of the particular situation in Lebanon. The Lebanese 
armed forces were unable to operate as a single power for a longer time.  
 
Hezbollah forces are still acting independently to maintain national and regional security. The 
provision of troop withdrawal was regulated within section C “Third, Liberating Lebanon from 
the Israeli Occupation” (UN Peacemaker 1989). The provision was intended to maintain full 
sovereignty over Lebanon’s territory and its borders which had been internationally recognized. 
Two countries, Israel and Syria, retained a strong military presence in Lebanon. Israel had 
approximately 1,000 soldiers in Lebanon, whereas Syria had 30,000 to 35,000 in 1990 (CRHRP 
1990, 1522). As mentioned above, the withdrawal of the Syrian army was delayed until 2005. 
The Ta’if Peace Agreement referred to resolution 425 of the UN Security Council which had 
ordered a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon, which finally occurred in 
2000 (Picard and Ramsbotham 2012, 37). Due to the pressure exerted on Israel and Syria by 
the UN Security Council, the withdrawal of both armed forces from Lebanon finally took place. 
This demonstrates the UN’s powerful role in successful implementation processes. It thus 
would be highly desirable, if implementation processes in post-conflict countries were to be 






In Northern Ireland, the BBC (2009) documented that the IRA had finalized its 
decommissioning of arms on 28 July 2005. Different independent commissions were 
established to monitor paramilitary issues concerning the ceasefire, the decommissioning of 
arms, prisoner release, demobilization, and reintegration. Key measures were taken to make 
sure that the ceasefire and the peace agreements would not be violated by paramilitaries.  
 
An Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland was set up with experts and 
international representatives on policing (Patten 1999). Although the Unionists and Sein Fein 
initially opposed the implementation of recommendations in the first phase, the 
recommendations were fully implemented (2002-2007) (Joshi et al. 2015). The commission 
found fault with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which had been the police force in 
Northern Ireland from 1922 to 1998. It criticized the inordinate employment of personnel from 
unionist and nationalist communities. The police reform in Northern Ireland has similarities 
with the police reform in El Salvador regarding proportional recruitment among rival parties, 
new structure and policy, form, training, education, development in terms of human rights. The 
UN faced the same difficulties in El Salvador, trying to prevent the employment of former loyal 
security government personnel in the post-agreement process. Lebanon did not have any proper 
national army or police forces during the implementation process. This power vacuum was 
filled by different armed groups and the Syrian army. In Mindanao, the OIC didn’t deal with 
any such problems.  
 
Pure and power mediators in the four selected cases faced various challenges in implementing 
security power-sharing. In Northern Ireland, power mediators were given assistance and 
support by different independent organisations and famous representatives of the world of 
politics. Disarmament, demobilization, the establishment of new security forces and the 
withdrawal of foreign troops required specific regulations, monitoring and financial support by 
third parties. In Lebanon, Syria was unable to get Israeli troops out of Southern Lebanon and 
implement disarmament of the paramilitary forces. The UN provided assistance to Lebanon. 
Israel and Syria withdraw from Lebanon after a long time. The UN also had difficulties in El 
Salvador, where the Government tried to keep former security officers employed in order to 
maintain its power. The process of bringing about a security reform was regularly monitored 





same time, the guerrillas were pressured into accepting disarmament. The Nicaraguan 
Government provided help for disarmament procedures. In Mindanao, the OIC was too weak 
to put pressure on both sides. It could not persuade the parties to reach a compromise. It did not 
have sufficient financial funds to support or guarantee the process. It failed to establish 
communication between rebels and the Government in terms of security stipulations. There was 
not any help from the US, as the US had close relations with the Philippine Government. Their 
relations were even intensified after the 9/11 attacks against Muslim insurgents. In that sense, 
it can be said that the implementation of security power-sharing arrangements in internal post-
conflict countries is likely to be influenced by the international security agendas of great 
powers. 
 
5.3.4 Implementation of Human Rights and Reconciliation Arrangements 
 
Respect for human rights and human “dignity” is a solid basis for living together in post-conflict 
societies. It determines “quality peace” (Wallensteen 2015, 5). In the Chapultepec Accord, 
which concluded the peace process in El Salvador, human rights and the judicial system were 
dealt with together, as mentioned above. The human rights process had been slowed down due 
to a financial issue in 1992. This was a common problem that equally occurred in the 
implementation processes of other provisions (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 247). Although the 
implementation of core human rights issues had been solved, which was a positive 
development, many problems remained in El Salvador. The right to life and liberty was 
continuously violated for political motives. Moreover, physical and psychological abuse of 
detained persons, abductions, torture frequently occurred. All this was aggravated by an 
inefficient judicial system to protect the rights of individuals and a deplorable lack of criminal 
investigations. The lack of judges and court personnel at district courts posed an insoluble 
problem (ibid. 248, 254, 378). Similarly, Syrian presence in Lebanon could not prevent 
assassinations which likewise occurred in Mindanao and Northern Ireland. Those violations 
abated when peace spoilers lost their backup and peace was achieved. The signatory parties 
distanced themselves from violent acts. In the reports issued by ONUSAL violent crimes were 
considered as serious obstacles on the way to improve human rights practice according to 





difficult were financial issues, frequent impunity due to the lack of investigations or court 
judges, vengeance committed by death squads. The “accountability for past human rights 
violations” has been equally identified by Call (2002, 563) as a major obstacle in the 
implementation process. Over the years, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
has been continuously consolidated in El Salvador under the supervision of the UN and 
COPAZ.   
 
Truth and reconciliation mechanisms are indispensable in the process of investigating war 
crimes in post-conflict societies, as they enhance accountability and ensure human rights. 
22,000 complaints were filed in court after numerous crimes had been successfully investigated 
by a commission. Crimes had been committed mainly by security forces against civilians, 
especially against peasants (extrajudicial executions, death squad assassinations and torture). 
Judges had been killed by the FMLN between 1980 and 1991 (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 433). The 
commission identified most of the serious crimes. Recommendations were made as to 
reforming the constitution. Reconciliation was acknowledged as a core condition to prevent 
further crimes in the future (ibid. 434). The ad-hoc commission urgently requested President 
Christiani to remove former officers from office (Call 2002, 564). Defence Minister Rene 
Emilio Ponce and Vice-Minister General Juan Orlando Zepeda stepped down, high-ranking 
military officials were removed from their posts, as the most atrocious crimes had been 
committed in their terms of office (ibid. 564).  
 
Besides, local human right organizations in El Salvador lacked experience in cooperating with 
the commission by comparison with other international human rights organizations. Moreover, 
the government was reluctant to provide information about criminal acts in the past. Military 
officers lied or withheld the truth (Buergenthal 1994, 513-515). President Cristiani granted 
amnesty for persons who had been involved in human rights violations (ibid. 537). In Northern 
Ireland, amnesty for prisoners was one of the most notable features of the ceasefire and peace 
agreement. Paramilitaries were released as long as they remained fully committed to the 
ceasefire agreement (The Sentence Review Commissioners 2008). Sinn Fein and the British 
government did not agree on the timing of the prisoners’ release (time-varying between 1 and 
3 years).  Due to the personal intervention of US President Bill Clinton and Sinn Fein leader 





Commission was appointed by the British Parliament in July 1998 by the GFA (The Sentence 
Review Commissioners 2008). It was to regulate prisoner release (BBC 2015b). The agreement 
was fully implemented thanks to the Sentence Review Commissioners.  
 
The truth and reconciliation processes were also critically viewed by the UN Secretary-General, 
who was deeply concerned about the development in El Salvador in July 1997 (UN 1997b, 7). 
Further challenges occurred when the truth commission was pleading with civilian victims to 
report crimes that had been committed during the Civil War. Victims were frightened to tell 
their stories, as they did not want to be exposed personally and put their loved ones at risk. 
Although the provision was implemented successfully (Joshi et al. 2015), this did not fully meet 
the expectations harboured by the commission and the victims. Moreover, local human rights 
organizations were not experienced enough to cooperate with the commission. Furthermore, 
the government granted amnesty to all individuals charged with serious acts of violence. This 
act is to be interpreted as a typical example of peace spoilers trying to violate the peace 
agreement. As ONUSAL had not anticipated the unusual step made by the Government, it 
utterly failed to cope with it. Such unexpected, one-sided political decisions taken by the 
Philippine Government frequently occurred in the Philippines. The mediators could not prevent 
such a decision in advance.  
 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in the Philippines criticized that the 
educational reform lacked financial funds, that Muslims were not treated equally, as they had 
no access to higher education in the Southern Philippines. The OIC promised to provide 
financial aid (OIC 2006, 4-7). Human rights had been partly respected in the Philippines for 
many years. According to the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in the Philippines 
(1996-2006), both parties violated human rights. Those violations were investigated by various 
NGOs and neutral observers. It was good that the Government allowed activists to investigate 
complaints of human rights violations throughout the country (CRHRP 1996-2006). However, 
over the years, a great number of activists were killed (Kraft 2010, 187). The provision could 
not be properly implemented. The OIC did not carry out any activity in that context. It did not 
inform the UN about those human rights crimes. All in all, the provision could not be 






Jetschke (2011, 231-232) points out that the US global anti-terrorism policy after the 9/11 
events (2001) posed a great challenge to the GRP’s domestic security policy, as the Philippine 
Government had to find the right balance between fighting Muslim insurgents and respect for 
human rights in Mindanao. In that regard, ongoing peace agreement processes might be affected 
by the great powers’ international security policy (e.g., Libya, Syria). In order to address these 
questions more specifically, one should ask to what extent international security trends can 
affect ongoing domestic peace agreement processes. Human rights had never been adequately 
respected in the Philippines. The OIC activities were not identified in that regard. In Northern 
Ireland, as everywhere else in the UK, the right stipulations are mainly agreed on in terms of 
basic human rights, citizenship reform, minority rights. They include education reform, official 
languages and symbols, reparations, right of self-determination, women’s rights, independence 
referendum. In the wake of constitutional changes, the agreement provided the citizens of 
Northern Ireland with the freedom of choice between having Irish, British or both citizenships 
(Debraggio 2010, 46). The amendment concerning citizenship in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Ireland was changed on 24 June 2004 (Ward 2010, 46). In that regard, 
implementation resolved itself.  
 
In the agreement, the stipulation for education is closely related to the language issue. As the 
UK was a contracting party in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
(ECRML), changes were made in the educational system of Northern Ireland in 1998 
(Legislation.gov.uk 1998). The UK fulfilled its responsibilities in matters of education and 
language. The North/South Ministerial (Irish) Council was established on 13 December 1999 
to implement language procedures. Implementation was successful. There were not any 
obstacles. Although the language reform had proved successful in promoting cultural diversity, 
sectarianism between Protestants and Catholics could not be prevented as expected (Nolan 
2012, 10). The situation in Northern Ireland resembles the one in Lebanon, insofar as children 
go to denominational schools according to their religious faith.  
 
Multiple challenges had to be overcome, as there are still socially explosive areas in Northern 





thousands of people were internally displaced (Call 2002, 548). Their return posed a new 
challenge as to land ownership in conflict zones. It also affected their right to vote or to run for 
an office. The landowners’ right to stay on their land was guaranteed in the Agreement, peasants 
were evicted by armed forces. Significant diplomatic efforts were pursued by the Under-
Secretary-General, ONUSAL, COPAZ and equally by the government and FMLN. As they 
proved successful, occupation and eviction were suspended (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 242). The 
idea that landowners, peasants, former FMLN members and fighters should share farmlands, 
posed a new challenge. The land transfer programme (PTT) put the sharing of lands in disputed 
areas back on the right track. The implementation process continued for years, facing all kinds 
of bureaucratic, technical problems (UN 1997b, 1-3).  The problem was solved by the Under-
Secretary-General, who unflaggingly engaged in substantial talks with ONUSAL and COPAZ.  
The government and FMLN likewise held intensive talks. As those talks had proved successful, 
occupation and eviction were suspended. Farmland sharing was not an issue in other cases.  
In the Salvadorian post-conflict society, mass media widely promoted the political participation 
of FMLN and the importance of reconciliation. They were a strong pillar of the democratic 
spirit of the Peace Agreement, widely supporting peace restoration, trying to prevent further 
political conflicts. COPAZ took charge of monitoring the process and made new suggestions. 
At the same time, ONUSAL verified the implementation process (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 218). It 
was found out in 1994 that the ARENA and the Convergencia Democratica had violated Article 
18 which regulated the rules of electoral propaganda. ONUSAL cooperated with the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal to cope with complaints effectively (ibid. 529). In Lebanon, human right 
reforms against discrimination were also established. Development, reconstruction and 
reconciliation in the educational system were agreed upon for schools and universities (UN 
Peacemaker 1989). The spirit of the Ta’if Accords aimed at the abolishment of sectarianism 
and confessionalism. Nevertheless, it was noted in the Report on Human Rights Practices that 
private Lebanese schools propagated confessional discrimination (CRHRP 1989, 1773; 
CRHRP 1992, 1048). Social inequality was not diminished by the Government and third-party 
Syria. The UN was unable to help financially due to a lack of funds (CRHRP 1995). As a result, 
the provision could not be fully implemented (Joshi et al. 2015). Syria had never pressured the 
Lebanese Government into improving the human rights situation in Lebanon. Lebanon is facing 





numerous cruel intra-state conflicts. Moreover, it has had to come to grips with the Palestinian 
refugee question since the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 (Picard and 
Ramsbotham 2012, 100). Unfortunately, human rights could not be entirely implemented (Joshi 
et al. 2015). As Lebanon was a small country based on multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
principles, the complete naturalization of Palestinian refugees constituted a challenge to the 
confessional balance in Lebanon (CRHRP 1989, 1474-1975).  
As the Lebanese mass media emphatically voiced the specific political attitudes of the 
conflicting parties in Lebanon, access to printed media of rival parties was deliberately 
hampered in areas dominated by one major party (CRHRP 1989, 1473). Although some bills 
were submitted in Parliament, the human rights provision could not be implemented as required. 
Pressure from Syria was not identified in the implementation process. Syria neither documented 
the complaints in detail nor did it communicate with the parties to implement human right 
stipulations. As long as Syria’s military and political interests were not affected by the 
conflicting parties, Syria did not do anything to support any rights implementation.  In El 
Salvador, ONUSAL documented complaints in detail and communicated intensely with the 
parties to solve problems in terms of rights implementation.  
 
In the Philippines, essential human right issues were regulated such as crimes against humanity, 
discrimination, cultural protection, education reform, official language and symbols. Article 
103 of the Peace Agreement emphasized the following aspects in education:  protection of 
cultural diversity, languages, values and traditions, history of Muslims, Christians and 
indigenous societies. Those educational goals were similar to the ones in Lebanon and Northern 
Ireland. In Mindanao, the educational system could not promote the kind of unity and 
reconciliation between rival societies as desired. Although the educational reform proclaimed 
freedom of language at schools in the autonomous region, discrimination of minority languages 
in favour of national (official) languages has been an ongoing issue (May 2012; Karakus 
2015b). The urgently required reforms in the Philippines were carried out following the 
Republic Act 9195 and DepED Order No. 51. The implementation efforts made by multiple 
third parties in Northern Ireland outperformed the OIC in Mindanao and Syria in Lebanon. 
Anti-discrimination human rights arrangements were taken more seriously in Northern Ireland 






The Good Friday agreement dealt with the reparation issue. According to an investigation 
conducted in 2016, the number of troubles related deaths had risen to “3,649” (Potter and 
Campbell 2014, 16). The Peace III Program (2007-2013) allocated nearly 37 million pounds in 
support to organizations that offer care to survivors of domestic violence (ibid. 2). However, 
reparation does not only refer to financial or material recovery. In Northern Ireland, no truth 
commission would help traumatized victims, prevent future conflicts or facilitate reconciliation 
between post-conflict communities.  
 
In terms of human rights reforms, the four cases addressed some core issues in their respective 
peace agreements. Pure and power mediators performed differently to enhance implementation. 
Multiple pure and power mediators in El Salvador and Northern Ireland outperformed single 
mediators such as Syria in Lebanon and the OIC in Mindanao. Multiple third parties worked 
closely together with human right experts and different independent groups. They regularly 
noted missing implementations and exerted pressure on parties to complete implementations. 
The activities of the two single mediators were inefficient. Syria’s low level of implementation 
effort, the OIC’s inability to persuade the conflicting parties to seek a compromise.  
International Human Rights organizations made a tremendous effort to identify the lack of 
human rights. Unfortunately, numerous volunteers working for human rights organizations lost 
their lives in their fieldwork.  
 
5.3.5 Implementation of Economic Power-Sharing 
 
In El Salvador, implementations in terms of economic and social development continuously 
faced delays and postponements. A contractual commitment should be measured by the 
conflicting parties’ compliance with the set schedule of implementation. In the agreement, the 
schedule was very detailed, comprising specific steps to be done on specific days. However, 
details as to certain provisions had not been clearly worked out by third parties, e.g., the 
specification of conflict zones, land redistribution to peasants and reconstruction. Considerable 
delays occurred after the discovery of secret FMLN weapons in Nicaragua and after armed 





Problems of timetable and uncertainty were solved, with the help of ONUSAL’s 
communication and monitoring skills (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 598). Delays and commitment 
problems caused by both sides hampered the process. They were gradually removed in the 
course of the mediation process. This was largely achieved through advice, pressure, technical 
assistance and financial funds provided by the UN (ONUSAL) and COPAZ.  Studemeister 
(2001, 40) argues that “institution-building is a slow process”. Financial issues as to 
reconstruction and reconciliation are a common problem in post-conflict societies (Boutros-
Ghali 1995, 50). Donor countries, international and regional institutions (The World Bank, 
IMF, Inter-American Development Bank, the US) took great interest in financing the process 
with certain preferences (ibid. 44-45). Preference issues were resolved without too much delay, 
with the help of the UN and donor countries. Resolving those problems strongly facilitated 
further implementations.  
 
The need for technical help was also fully met. The agrarian issue, one of the main causes of 
the Salvadorian Civil War, was a serious problem in the post-war implementation process. It 
constituted a key factor for economic and social development in the post-conflict period. The 
government established a “National Reconstruction Plan” for sharing lands between former 
warriors (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 29). Moreover, a “Forum for economic and social” development 
was created in which the government and “labour and business sectors” worked together to find 
answers to land issues (ibid. 161). A problem occurred again as to the actual residents of lands 
in conflict zones. The security forces evicted the peasants from some areas, as they wished to 
occupy these lands themselves. COPAZ and ONUSAL mediated between peasants and the 
Government, trying to find a solution but eventually failed. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
personally intervened on October 13, 1992, urging President Christiani to fulfil his 
commitments regarding land transfers (ibid. 256). Completing further implementation in that 
regard, Kofi Annan cooperated with the UNDP and donor governments (UN 1998, 2). The 
provision was fully implemented thanks to intensive diplomatic efforts (1997-1998) (Joshi et 
al. 2015). In Lebanon, one provision was to be dealt with in terms of economic and social 
development (UN Peacemaker 1989). Although Lebanon urgently required proper 
reconciliation and reconstruction, the council that was to solve this problem had not been 





first 10 years of the implementation period, which could have facilitated the implementation 
process to a great extent, as in El Salvador and Northern Ireland.  
 
In the Philippines, the OIC and other parties were to review the implementation of Economic 
and Social Development. The OIC issued only a few reports which were considered inadequate 
by the Government. Its first general and comprehensive review occurred 10 years after the 
signature of the Agreement. Although the Government had passed Republic Acts in favour of 
Mindanao autonomy, SZOPAD and SPCDP, the OIC (2006, 11) heavily criticized the National 
Government’s strategy of ratification, as the government had been acting autocratically, 
ignoring critical opinions. The OIC as a single third party was too inactive, failing to provide 
an incentive to the government. The implementation process was repeatedly postponed. This 
was due to several reasons:  ceasefire violations, financial shortcomings, constitutional reviews, 
exclusion of conflicting parties, timing incompatibilities as to referendums and national 
elections. The OIC and other external actors failed to accelerate proceedings. As mentioned 
before, delays always constitute a risk, as the agreement might be violated by “spoilers”. In the 
Philippines, this risk was emphasized by Dr. Danda Juanday, a member of the board of the 
Bangsamoro Development Council and executive director of the Bangsamoro Development 
Agency (Ampatuan et al. 2010, 40). 
 
Article 12 of the Peace Agreement stated that OIC assistance was needed to finance the 
implementation process. In the framework of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, 
the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was created by 
Republic Act Order No. 371 in 1996.  The Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) 
was established in 2001, which received international financial support (The World Bank 
2002). The OIC reported that the Philippine National Government was providing a limited 
amount for the “infrastructure and other government programs” in Mindanao (OIC 2006, 8). 
The OIC blamed the National Government’s discrimination policy and unfair distribution of 
wealth, as, in its view, the government-controlled the “natural resources in the Muslim areas” 
and was responsible for the underdeveloped conditions in Mindanao (OIC 2006, 6). The 
Philippines Country Report on Human Rights Practices (1997) reported that Nur Misuari had 





(2006) estimated that there was a high level of poverty in Mindanao. The OIC strongly 
criticized the government’s one-sided decision on strategic mineral regulation, blaming the 
government for having violated the Peace Agreement (OIC 2006, 9) The regional recovery of 
the economy was not as effective as expected. The provision was not implemented as desired. 
Although the OIC complained about the failed implementation, it remained inactive for the 
most part.  
 
In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement took account of the economic and social 
development of the divided society. A special commission was established to implement 
necessary changes, especially as to discrimination and equal chances in employment (Obe and 
Obe 1998). The implementation of economic and social development was regularly reviewed, 
verified and monitored by officials from the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
They were assisted by several national, international and independent commissions and mixed 
councils. They issued reports to the parties, instructing them on how to reform and implement 
disarmament and policing, on how to combat discrimination and unemployment. The most 
important steps in the Peace Agreement Process were the ratifications in the Republic of 
Ireland, Northern Ireland and the British Parliament, which were mostly implemented on 
schedule. In contrast, the decommissioning process of arms was deliberately delayed by the 
IRA and other paramilitary groups. Although delays in the implementation of some provisions 
had occurred, all the provisions were implemented according to the set schedule (Joshi et al. 
2015).  
 
In sum, multiple pure mediators such as the UN and COPAZ in El Salvador faced several 
commitment problems in terms of economic power-sharing. Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali personally intervened to enhance implementation. As he needed money for the 
implementation process, he organized donor support from different countries, international and 
regional institutions for the implementation process. In contrast, the other single pure mediator, 
the OIC, was simply too inactive, failing to impact positively on the Government in a 
sustainable manner. It strongly rejected the Government’s discriminatory attitude and the 
unequal socio-economic power-sharing with Muslim areas. It also criticized the Government’s 





communicated with the Philippine Government in the way the UN did in El Salvador. Power 
mediators in Northern Ireland cooperated and communicated very closely with other 
independent councils and conflicting parties and thus achieved successful implementation. In 
Lebanon, however, substantial, external economic support was lacking during the first ten years 
of the implementation period. Syria proudly relied on its military power. It did not improve the 
socio-economic conditions there. International financial support was also lacking. Multiple 
mediators such as France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt or the EU could have financially supported the 

































Chapter VI Conclusions:  















In order to assess the impact of international mediators on the implementation of peace 
agreements, this dissertation has been guided by the following research question: Under what 
conditions can external (pure and power) mediators enhance the implementation of mediated 
intrastate peace agreements? Based on empirical analysis, some general and specific results 
are identified in terms of the present-day international mediation theory, implementation 
research and sustainable peace. I have reached the central conclusion that multiple power or 
pure type third-party mediation is crucial to enhance a proper implementation of peace 
agreements in the long-term. By contrast, single pure or single power mediators are less likely 
to ensure implementation as shown in the comparative analysis and single case analysis of El 
Salvador, Northern Ireland, Lebanon and Mindanao. This result also confirms my hypothesis: 
If multiple mediators (pure or power) support a peace implementation process, they are by far 
more successful than singly acting mediators. How does this relate to previous research in 
mediation strategy? As to previous research on conflict resolution, Svensson (2007) argues that 
an alliance of pure and power mediators is more successful in reaching power-sharing 
agreements than the action of a one type of mediator. His findings are aimed for short-term 
mediation in terms of conflict resolution. My findings, however, are not based on a pure+power 
combination, but rather on one type of pure+pure or power+power combination. This will 
enable future research to focus on the impact of pure+power combination on implementation. 
The common point of the two different arguments is that multiple mediators exert a positive 
influence on peacebuilding. Vuković (2015, 66) supports this theory, pointing out that multiple 
mediation efforts of neighbouring states were successful in Tajikistan. However, the role of 
multiple mediation as a success factor largely differs from single mediation supported by 
Beardsley (2011), who argues that long-term mediation might fail due to lack of coordination 
between multiple mediators. 
When the Good Friday Agreement was implemented in Northern Ireland, the most important 
associations providing multiple mediation were the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference, the North-South Ministerial Council, the Independent International Commission 
on Decommissioning supported by the Equality Commission and the Independent Commission 
on Policing in Northern Ireland. They were firmly established associations, supported by the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland, as those two countries were considered to be the guarantors of 





successful implementation was achieved. The most urgent core incompatibilities, such as 
disarmament paramilitary groups and reforming police forces were solved by the Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning and the Independent Commission on Policing 
in Northern Ireland. External, independent, international or regional organisations and NGOs 
were required to implement provisions such as transitional justice, reconciliation, DDR 
processes and elections. Such organisations were technically advanced in specific issues. 
Implementation conducted under the leadership of multiple mediators resulted in more success. 
Their success was largely due to their cooperation with the rival parties in Northern Ireland. 
They created independent, international and national commissions, aspired for lasting peace, 
committed themselves to the prevention of recurrence conflict, emphasized the inclusion of all 
social strata and claimed financial support for peace. 
 
One can conclude from the post-agreement conditions in Lebanon, El Salvador and Northern 
Ireland that two or more external parties give proper balance power and confidence to rival 
parties supporting the implementation process. Nathan (1999) also suggests enhancing 
confidence-building between rival parties and discourages the use of power/leverage for long-
term peacebuilding. Syria, the single guarantor or protection provider in Lebanon, provided 
only partial implementation, as it was mainly interested in its own national benefit in a one-
sided manner. Had France been involved as a third party in Lebanon together with Syria, the 
two powers could have reached a proper balance between the rival parties and could have more 
adequately satisfied the demands of the Maronite Christians. The participation of an 
international or regional party such as the UN could have put the process on the right track. 
 
The main objectives of external mediators are to ensure successful implementation of ceasefire 
arrangements, institutional-governmental power-sharing, security power-sharing, economic 
power-sharing, respect of human rights and reconciliation arrangements. However, there are 
also situational factors promoting or hampering the efforts of mediators to implement peace 
agreements: varying difficulty of implementing provisions, commitment problems of parties in 
the implementation process, peace spoilers, financial situation of post-conflict countries as to 
funding peace and security, design of peace agreements to avoid misinterpretations in the 
implementation period, the challenge of early-stage implementation and occasionally US 





on the skills and efforts of long-term mediators. Situational factors should also be taken into 
account in implementation processes. Coping with all those challenges is the ultimate task for 
multiple mediators. 
My second conclusion is that different aspects of provisions have been dealt with as steps 
towards implementation. Certain stipulations in the four cases were more difficult to implement 
than others. The most challenging provisions to implement were related to the core 
incompatibilities which led to intrastate conflicts in all four cases. The conflicting parties 
primarily insisted that their demands be implemented first. Claims were made as to new 
elections, constitution reforms for autonomy, equal opportunity for election campaigns, 
security issues such as a ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of former rebels 
and security forces, prevention of peace spoilers, justice issues such as law-making for 
democratic institutions, transitional justice, reconciliation, a merit-based system for 
appointment of the heads in the executive instead of ethnic, religion-oriented nepotism, 
economic issues such as equality and social justice, equal distribution of farmland. The 
implementation of certain provisions required proper technical and scientific assistance from 
third parties such as farmland redistribution or the disarmament of rebels. Skilful mediators 
having detailed knowledge of the root causes of the conflict and being fully aware of what was 
at stake, devoted their energy to achieve successful implementation. Without their expertise, 
provisions could not have been adequately implemented, as stipulations might have been 
incorrectly interpreted by rival parties for their own benefit, which was the case in El Salvador, 
Lebanon and Mindanao. Therefore, the formulation of stipulations should be as clear as possible 
to avoid misinterpretations. Mattes and Savun (2010, 511) also point out that the proper design 
of agreements is crucial to prevent civil war recurrence. 
As shown in the case analysis, Syria, the power mediator, was more successful in Lebanon than 
the OIC (pure mediator). It enhanced the implementation of ceasefire arrangements and internal 
security. The prevention of armed confrontation between rival parties was achieved by putting 
military enforcement, by providing security and recruiting personnel on the ground. That means 
a single power mediator can outperform a single pure mediator to implement ceasefires and 
military/security arrangements. This idea is closely linked to Svensson's concept of power 
mediators: “Power mediators are particularly suitable for reaching agreements where the 





and conflict resolution. However, it focuses on the presence of a security guarantee which may 
encourage the longevity of peace agreements (Svenson 2009; Walter 2002). A security 
guarantee was properly provided in the Lebanon case, but not in Mindanao. 
My third conclusion is that commitment problems frequently occurred in the implementation 
period. Whenever some implementation was postponed, there were mutual recriminations, with 
each party accusing the other of having started the trouble. This could have been avoided if 
both sides had been seriously committed to an implementation process supervised by multiple 
mediators appealing to both sides in parallel timeframes. The implementation of the following 
provisions proved a difficult task: demobilization-disarmament-reintegration, farmland 
sharing, organising elections and referendums, ceasefire, transitional justice, confidence 
building. Technical assistance and financial support were strongly needed. In search of a 
comprehensive solution, independent experts should be consulted by mediators. The 
comparative case analysis reveals that commitment problems can be solved by building up trust 
between mediators and rival parties. Single mediators might not be up to the task, as they might 
misuse their actions for their own profit. Multiple mediators are better at solving commitment 
problems, as a peaceful settlement of a dispute and the well-being of a country is their ultimate 
goal. A strong commitment was an indispensable prerequisite for the implementation of the 
peace agreement in Northern Ireland. It was impressively demonstrated by Unionists and 
Republicans in the Northern Ireland peace implementation process. Power-sharing and human 
rights which people had longed for, were finally guaranteed by referendum and ratified by 
Parliament. External technical and financial support was provided by the EU, the UN, the US 
and several other countries before and after the signature of the agreement. The fact that the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland were responsible members of the EU and European 
organizations such as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), provided a great deal of impetus to the 
implementation process in Northern Ireland. The decommissioning of IRA arms and other 
paramilitary arms was a serious challenge. The problem of the suspension of the executive was 
solved by the British-Irish Council and the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning. Decommissioning was guaranteed by Prime Minister Tony Blair. Other 
unresolved issues were addressed by Gerry Adams (leader of Sinn Fein) and US President Bill 





peace process. They were gradually removed in the course of the mediation process. This was 
largely achieved through advice, pressure, technical assistance and financial funds provided by 
the UN (ONUSAL) and COPAZ.   
The following peace-supporting activities performed by mediators greatly helped to reduce 
commitment problems: 1. technical assistance and advice, 2. financial/donor support for 
implementation, 3. confidence building, 4. personal guarantees given by credible leaders (Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, Gerry Adams, UN Secretaries). Peace-supporting activities 
should always be performed by multiple mediators jointly and not by single mediators to avoid 
undue benefit for single mediators in the country concerned. The above-mentioned peace-
supporting activities complement each other, building on the idea that a third-party security 
guarantee is crucial for long-term peace (Walter 2002, DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013). At the 
same time, mediators perform verification and monitoring tasks more adequately than single 
mediators in the field, as multiple mediators are supported by expert groups. Whenever these 
tasks are performed inadequately, one can tell right away which side does not fulfil its 
implementation promise properly.  Once commitment problems have been identified, mediators 
are asked to increase leverage. This finding is consistent with the concept of verification 
mechanisms to overcome commitment problems (Mattes and Savun 2010, 9). 
My fourth conclusion is that peace spoilers regularly tried to violate implementation processes. 
They were rigorously kept under control and eliminated by multiple mediators. They emerged 
as excluded parties or splinter groups opposing the peace agreement. They also affected the 
signatories of peace agreements (government and rebel sides) and singly acting third parties. 
The most striking examples of peace spoilers seriously impeding implementation processes 
were identified in El Salvador (rebels’ secret arms cache, governmental recruitment plan) and 
Northern Ireland (IRA’s withdrawal from the decommissioning process) and Syria (initiating a 
military struggle led by a former general). The Philippine Government reneged on its promise, 
refusing to fulfil the requirements related to the implementation. It had passed new laws 
(Republic Acts) which were incompatible with the spirit of the peace agreement and even had 
the chairman of the rival party (MNLF) arrested. As governments frequently changed in the 
Philippines (2001-2010), it so happened that the new government did not approve of the current 
peace agreement and simply suspended it. Peace spoilers should therefore be carefully 





intervened in war-torn Lebanon, it might have been able to keep the warring parties and the 
single mediators’ self-interest under control. Lack of leverage power and weak capacity 
displayed by third parties encouraged peace spoilers to violate implementation processes. In 
three cases of my comparative analysis, peace spoilers were the parties themselves and in one 
case (Lebanon) a former army general acted as peace spoiler, as he vehemently opposed peace 
agreements. My finding is that a strategic cooperation of multiple mediators can more easily 
prevent peace spoilers and facilitate implementation than a single mediator, as they have 
multiple communication channels with locals, monitoring and verification capacities on the 
spot. They are more able to identify peace spoiling strategies. In the Syrian case, where there 
was a single third-party, military power was successfully used to prevent peace spoilers. The 
Syrian military success confirms Call's theory (2012) that the presence of third-party military 
troops maintains stability and helps to build up sustainable peace. All in all, peace spoiler 
prevention largely contributes to implementation success.  The concept of sustainable peace as 
expressed in my analysis is consistent with the findings of Stedman (1997, 2002) and 
Bercovitch and Simpson (2010). 
My fifth conclusion is that external financial support for implementation is very important. My 
research reveals that post-agreement societies were exhausted after a long history of internal 
conflicts. They were economically weak. Their political and governmental conditions were 
shattered, security was poor. Rival parties tried to obtain financial support for the reconstruction 
of their country. I maintain that a cooperation of multiple mediators can cope more easily with 
the financial challenges of post-agreement societies. It has various financial capacities, 
networks and connections with other countries and donors, regional and international actors. 
External financial support was provided in a satisfactory manner in El Salvador and Northern 
Ireland and but not in Lebanon and Mindanao. State capacity and the strong economy of a post-
conflict country are significant requirements to support peace implementation and lasting 
peace. Similar conclusions have been reached by Sobek (2010), Stedman (2002) and DeRouen 
et al. (2010). 
My sixth conclusion is about UN involvement in the implementation process in El Salvador, 
where the ONUSAL acted as an external mediator, closely cooperating with COPAZ in a 
successful peace-building process. Power-sharing in terms of government, security and 





process was stepwise realized under the clear leadership of the ONUSAL. It largely contributed 
to the successful implementation of a peace agreement achieving 96% of implementation (Joshi 
et al. 2015). The ONUSAL cooperated closely with civil societies and other parties at national 
and local levels. National actors were likewise coordinated by the UN. The UN’s successful 
involvement in the Chapultepec Peace Agreement avoided possible misunderstanding and 
prevented conflict recurrence. Its brilliant negotiation skills were demonstrated in previous 
peace-talk attempts between the Salvadorian Government and the guerrillas. The peace 
negotiations in the four selected cases demonstrate that long-term mediators should have a solid 
knowledge of the core causes of the conflict before and after signing peace agreements. They 
should also possess excellent communication and cooperation skills. They should have strong 
leverage power and convincingly provide power-sharing mechanisms in implementation 
processes. Moreover, they should be technically trained and be provided with legal expertise 
and support. All those different aspects are reflected in the successful Northern Irish Peace 
Agreement and the Chapultepec Peace Agreement in El Salvador. The UN had strongly 
cooperated with COPAZ, FMLN and the Salvadorian Government. In that regard, the UN’s 
pure mediation efforts were highly beneficial to the long-term implementation process.  This 
result is in line with the views of Arnault (2006), Joshi and Darby (2013) and Stedman (2002). 
It shows that the UN is capable of facilitating implementation processes. Single external long-
term mediation would have definitely failed in El Salvador. 
In El Salvador, the UN continuously held bilateral meetings with the leaders of the two parties, 
various actors and commissions during the implementation process at national and local levels. 
The Secretary-General repeatedly pleaded with both parties to adhere to their commitment.  The 
UN consciously took care of every step in the implementation process, as it was regularly 
informed by UN bodies about possible obstacles. It applied leverage on both parties to facilitate 
implementation. The US equally put pressure on the Salvadorian government. As new technical 
issues emerged, expert commissions were created which provided help. A pivotal factor 
facilitating the implementation process in El Salvador was financial support for the promotion 
of democratic institutions and the reintegration of ex-combatants. Lack of financial support 
would have undoubtedly shattered Kofi Annan’s peace efforts. 
The UN acted jointly with the Salvadorian government, the Salvadorian church, local 





Watch to grant amnesty to former FMLN members. The Salvadorian government established a 
new legal basis for their equal political participation in future elections which guaranteed the 
political inclusion of former rebels. Political inclusion supported lasting peace. This confirms 
Call's theory (2012) that the integration of former enemies into political or security institutions 
closely corresponds to successful peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War era and peace 
consolidation. Governmental power-sharing is considered by peace researchers to be one of the 
main factors securing sustainable peace. As required by the Salvadorian government, the UN 
established a monitoring mechanism for the national elections. Unexpected challenges 
occurred, when the FMLN’s secret arms cache was detected and the government granted a 
general amnesty to criminals from both sides (assassins, death squads, illegal organisations). 
This meant that UN peace-making efforts in El Salvador had been completely ignored. It also 
meant that former death squads would be forgiven or that they would be even “awarded” for 
their atrocities. Assassinations of high-ranking persons are considered devastating peace 
spoilers, as they can even terminate peace processes. 
 
The Salvadorian government and FMLN had never jointly asked a single third party for 
mediation or negotiations, except for the UN. The UN enjoyed greater trust than any other 
national actors in the country, so almost all previous negotiations were conducted by the UN. 
The opposing parties had high hopes, as the UN was highly thought of internationally. It was 
considered an unbiased and influential third party. Besides, the UN had signalled interest in the 
peace settlement in El Salvador, which was not always the case in armed conflicts. The Roman 
Catholic Church in El Salvador also aspired for peace, trying to mediate between the opposing 
parties. When Archbishop Romero was assassinated by a rightist paramilitary (1980), the 
Church did not lose hope. It successfully organized a prisoners’ exchange between the 
Government and guerrillas. Although the Church’s strenuous peace efforts did not lead to any 
direct peace agreement, it certainly paved the way for further peace talks (Chavez 1984). 
 
Several problems remained unsolved for many years in El Salvador: abuse of detainees, 
abductions, torture, the inefficient judicial system and court personnel, lack of investigation, 
failing accountability for past human rights violations, especially in farmland. Those issues 
were gradually resolved by the UN in cooperation with COPAZ and Salvadorian key actors. 





in tough, short and long-term mediation efforts before and after the signature of the peace 
agreement. The UN's long-term mediation success in El Salvador might be considered as an 
excellent example of future peace agreement implementation cases in other post-agreement 
societies. The idea of the UN's positive effect on peace agreements is taken up by Stedman 
(2002, 110), who recommends involving UN authorities for implementation success. 
 
My seventh conclusion is that US international security policy has a twofold effect on peace-
building processes. The US international security agenda (struggle against Communism) after 
the end of the Cold War had a positive impact on the peace process in El Salvador. On the one 
hand, the US played a decisive role, as it softened its anti-communist guerrilla policy in El 
Salvador. The newly unbiased US foreign policy in El Salvador also caused the Salvadorian 
government to be trapped in a stalemate position, which forced the rival conflicting parties to 
launch peace talks. On the other hand, the US international security agenda after 9/11 affected 
the peace process in Mindanao, as it strongly targeted Islamists fighting against the government 
of the Philippines during the implementation process, which implies that the ongoing US 
international security policy could overlap with the implementation of other peace processes. 
Syria is classified as a power mediator type, responsible for Lebanon’s internal security and 
peace. It provided governmental power-sharing to the conflicting parties. It directly interfered 
in Lebanon’s internal affairs due to the bilateral „Agreement of Brotherhood” (1991). It 
officially justified its interference in Lebanon’s domestic policy by stating that its presence in 
Lebanon was to build up peace there. However, it mainly acted for its own political benefit. As 
the rival parties belonged to different religions (Muslims versus Christians), Syrian interference 
was given full support by the Muslim parties in parliament, whereas the Christian Maronites 
were strongly opposed to Syrian interference in Lebanon. This caused a recurrence of internal 
armed conflicts. The presence of an additional unbiased country would have probably increased 
the chances of implementation success. The presence of the UN as a non-denominational, 
international agent would have been highly beneficial there, as the UN is neutral and entirely 





In terms of strategic coordination, Syria didn’t cooperate with any other international 
organizations such as the UN, Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. It failed to build 
a national monitoring committee such as COPAZ in El Salvador or the Independent Monitoring 
Commissions (IICD) in Northern Ireland, involving all the members of the rival parties. This 
was mainly due to its weak communication and facilitation capacities, its inability to deal with 
the rival parties’ commitment problems and their postponement of implementations at local and 
national levels. Syria’s exclusionary attitude as a third party proved its one-sided political 
interest in Lebanon. Although most of the governmental power-sharing was guaranteed in the 
constitution in terms of seats, number and governmental representation, several provisions were 
neglected and not implemented. Any exclusion of Maronite Christians in governmental power-
sharing in parliament might have caused another internal conflict if their participation had not 
been guaranteed. In Lebanon, there is another open question:  the huge number of Syrian 
refugees, who are mainly Sunni. One day this demographic change might require a new 
constitutional constellation which should be dealt with soon, before another conflict reoccurs. 
Several situational factors in politics, economy and security were identified in the post-
agreement period in Lebanon. The most positive results of the Ta’if Peace Agreement were the 
prevention of a recurrent armed conflict and divided governmental power-sharing between the 
different religious groups, guaranteed in the Lebanese Constitution. “External factors are 
paramount in explaining the varying degrees to which power-sharing regimes have succeeded 
at maintaining domestic peace in Lebanon.” (Zahar 2005, 232). Syria’s strong military presence 
had difficulties in preventing the military revolt of Army Commander General Michel Awn, 
who had used his military power to block governmental power-sharing in the Lebanese 
Constitution to secure Maronite privileges. The ties between Syria and Lebanon are still very 
close, especially because of Hezbollah, the regional power struggle between Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Israel and the ongoing Syrian Civil War. 
 
My eighth conclusion is about reconciliation. The integration of different religious groups 
which aimed at preventing sectarianism, confessional segregation and the discrimination of 
non-Lebanese residents such as Palestinian refugees, proved unsuccessful. Frequent 
assassinations and human rights crimes are still serious problems in the post-conflict period. 





democracy seems to remain fragile. The lack of reconciliation is still a problem in Northern 
Ireland. Future research should comprise a comparative case analysis of post-agreement 
societies such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon. One could then find out to what extent the 
peaceful coexistence of rival communities (religions) has been facilitated after the signature of 
the peace agreements of each of the two countries. As there was no truth commission in 
Northern Ireland, traumatized victims found it difficult to come to terms with their past. 
Reconciliation between post-conflict communities has been constantly hampered. The 
transitional justice mechanism was not dealt with in Mindanao. 120,000 people lost their lives 
due to internal armed conflicts. Transitional justice committees did not exist in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and the Philippines. There was one in El Salvador, which operated 
inadequately. 
 
Arabic news coverage on the Lebanese peace implementation process should be enhanced by 
researching local news after 1989. Moreover, officials who were in charge of the 
implementation process should be interviewed to gain a closer knowledge of the 
implementation circumstances. It is difficult to research sources to assess Syria’s long-term role 
in the post-conflict period, as official reports of the Syrian and Lebanese governments were 
sporadic and academic research on the implementation process of the peace agreement has been 
limited. 
 
The European Union could provide long-term mediation in Northern Ireland. However, the 
peace talks might be likely to fail as long as the two guarantor bordering countries, the UK and 
the Republic of Ireland, did not agree on the content of the peace agreement for fear of 
jeopardizing their political interests in Northern Ireland. In that case, unbiased UN mediation 
is more likely to occur rather than EU mediation to achieve a long-term peace-agreement 
implementation. In the case of Northern Ireland, technical expertise was regularly provided to 
keep the implementation process going. As the British and the Republic of Ireland were 
contracting parties in the GFA, they also acted as mediators between Protestants and Catholics. 
Whenever the implementation process was impeded, Tony Blair (UK), US President Bill 
Clinton and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams launched painstaking initiatives. The delay of the 





strongly linked with one another. Parallel implementation of provisions between rival parties is 
highly recommended to avoid mutual accusations, condemnations and commitment problems. 
 
In the long run, the consequences of Brexit might affect Northern Ireland’s economic, social 
and foreign affairs with the EU. They might even jeopardize the social integration process of 
Unionists and Republicans. Although people in Northern Ireland voted in favour of remaining 
in the EU by “440,707” votes against “349,442”, this was a narrow majority (The Electoral 
Commission 2018). The relations between Unionists and the British Government are also a 
matter of concern. The future of Northern Ireland remains insecure. Article 3 of the Good Friday 
Agreement states a possible future unification of Ireland. So, the people of Northern Ireland 
will be allowed to decide about their future along with the people of the Republic of Ireland. 
This particular jurisdiction and the consequences of Brexit will be an important issue in the 
future. There may be another referendum ahead. People might then vote in favour of a United 
Ireland. Future analytical research into the Northern Ireland peace framework would be 
instructive, particularly in the framework of Brexit. It would be interesting to know what effect 
Brexit will have on the Good Friday Agreement. 
 
In the case of the Philippines, articles 12 and 13 of the Mindanao Final Agreement (MFA) gave 
authority to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as the third party assisting, to 
guarantee and monitor the implementation process. It can be concluded that the OIC was less 
likely to achieve successful peace-agreement implementation in Mindanao compared to 
Northern Ireland and El Salvador. The main obstacle to implementation was that the 
government acted in a one-sided manner by releasing the Republic Acts (commitment 
problems) and systematically disregarded the OIC in the implementation process. In contrast, 
the OIC was less interested in communication and facilitation work, too weak to put pressure 
on the government. However, it operated successfully as a short-term mediator in agreements 
as to negotiations, ceasefire and peace. Nur Misuari, the founder of the MNLF argued that “the 
talks and the agreement would have been impossible without the OIC because the MNLF was 
determined for sovereignty“ (Stankovitch 1999, 76). A strong monitoring and verification 
mechanism would give strength for implementation. Another conditional challenge was that 
the OIC did not have any peacekeeping military personnel and civil experts in the post-conflict 





process. Moreover, the agreement did not specifically provide a DDR program aiming at the 
complete disarmament of MNLF fighters, as the availability of arms would have caused 
violation (Özerdem 2012, 406). There was hardly any cooperation between the OIC and the 
government. The parties were not supposed to regularly inform the OIC about their 
implementation efforts. In contrast, they were supposed to inform COPAZ in El Salvador. The 
strong involvement of peacekeeping forces for peacebuilding implementation is an important 
component for sustainable peace. This argument is in the line with research findings of Arnault 
(2006), Joshi and Darby (2013) and DeRouen and Chowdhury (2018). 
 
Although the peace agreement did not fail, the implementation of Mindanao Final Agreement 
scored as low as 59% (Joshi et al. 2015). It would have been possible to involve countries such 
as the US, Malaysia or Australia as third parties, or the UN or ASEAN. They could have 
pressured the Philippine government into overcoming its commitment problems. The US as the 
strongest military power could have done a good job, the way it did in El Salvador, when the 
implementation process had reached an impasse. As US international security policy strongly 
targeted Muslim insurgents after the 9/11 events, the US was not suitable for the mediation task 
in Mindanao. Incidentally, the implementation of the agreement was almost brought to a 
standstill, when joint military operations against other rebel parties in Mindanao which had 
been excluded from the Mindanao Agreement, seriously impaired the ongoing peace process. 
In that regard, ASEAN would have been a good, powerful actor. Although it was not directly 
involved in the Mindanao peace process, the ASEAN Charter states that the main purpose of 
ASEAN is “to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-
oriented values in the region” (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1967, 3).  The UN 
did not engage as a third-party in the process. However, the UN provided financial support for 
integration programs through the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT). As the UN had 
been successful in El Salvador, it would have certainly been able to handle the peace 
implementation process in Mindanao adequately. Multi-party efforts in El Salvador and 
Northern Ireland proved to be successful. International or regional organizations and third 
countries are not always interested in being involved in peace-making. This may be due to a 







The OIC kept urging the Philippine government to overcome impediments but was incapable 
of acting autonomously. In Northern Ireland, the UK and the Republic of Ireland power 
mediators achieved good implementation results. Although Syria did not succeed in achieving 
full implementation in Lebanon, it successfully provided security and prevented the occurrence 
of peace spoilers. The Philippine government’s abusive practices violated the ceasefire, caused 
a breach of confidence and hampered the demarcation of territorial lines. All this could have 
been prevented, if an additional mediator had been involved in the peace process and would 
have provided a security guarantee. The UN peacekeeping forces would have been able to 
balance power between the rival groups and would have kept the peace process going. 
My ninth conclusion is about the impact of changeable internal politics on ongoing peace 
implementation processes. Successive governments in one country do not always have the same 
peace agenda. As the Philippine Government acted pragmatically and suddenly changed its 
internal policy in Mindanao because of national elections ahead, the peace process was 
jeopardized and might have resulted in conflict recurrence. Implementation efforts in terms of 
power-sharing varied over the years (2001-2010), as different presidents took different 
approaches to solve the implementation problem (Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo). Despite those difficulties, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) was established. The implementation process was repeatedly postponed due to 
national elections, numerous ceasefire violations, financial shortcomings, constitutional 
reviews and standstills, exclusion of conflicting parties, incompatibilities as to timing and 
regulations in referendums, lack of decommissioning weapons, challenging geographic 
conditions, the passing of the Republic Acts. The OIC criticized Republic Act No. 9054 for 
being contrary to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Mindanao Peace Agreement (OIC 
2006, 10). 
Foreign financial aid for Mindanao in the post-conflict period proved insufficient compared 
with the financial support granted to Northern Ireland and El Salvador after their respective 
peace agreements. Amnesty International and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
issued by the U.S Department of State repeatedly criticized that human rights were not 





established ten years after the agreement had been signed. All in all, the implementation process 
largely depended on the political interests of the Philippine government. 
 
What policy implications could be drawn from the academic findings? As I have reached the 
theoretical conclusion that multiple power or pure type third-party mediation is crucial to 
enhance implementation processes, I would like to suggest my triple-team mediation model for 
successful peace agreement implementation. If two power mediators (from developed countries 
or Big Five) were to act jointly with the UN (pure mediator), this strong alliance would have a 
beneficial impact on implementing peace agreements and putting the process on the right track. 
 
 






The triple team should be led by the UN, an unbiased pure mediator devoted to global peace 
and fully conversant with peacebuilding processes. According to the datasets of DeRouen et al. 
(2011) and Högbladh (2011), multiple third-party mediation with UN participation was 




















El Salvador, Guatemala, Somalia, Tajikistan, Comoros Islands, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Cambodia, Croatia, Georgia and Liberia. These examples support the idea of a triple-team 
performing long-term mediation under UN leadership. 
 
The triple team should closely control rival parties and sufficiently exert pressure on them in 
case implementation is about to fail. When challenging provisions of power-sharing are to be 
implemented, the mediators of the triple team should act simultaneously in proper coordination. 
Ideally, the triple team should take an active part in the negotiation process - in short-term 
mediation - until a peace agreement has been reached. In the negotiation and mediation 
processes, the triple team along with their experts should help to formulate every single 
provision of the peace agreement in details. It is important that third parties quickly acquire 
specific knowledge of the conflict in the pre-agreement period (history of core incompatibilities 
and conflict onsets, characteristics of rival parties, conflict types, culture and ideologies), so 
that they will be able to carefully develop a resolution plan which should not be misinterpreted 
in the implementation period.   
 
The triple-team might be able to reduce problems as to commitment, postponement and distrust 
between rival parties. It could constantly eliminate peace spoilers, report obstacles, give 
security to peacekeepers in the field, maintain the power balance and above all, provide 
financial support. Mediation and supervision can be mandated in peace agreements and occur 
in a scheduled time until the agreement has been fully implemented. As an implementation 
process might take more than ten years, third parties should be fully determined to respect a 
long-term peace policy. There are always specific national features in each country that might 
determine a special course of long-term third-party mediation. The powerful triple-team of 
mediators would be able to successfully tackle problems of political and economic nature. It 
could help to solve problems such as security, peace spoilers, inequality, inadequate justice 
procedures in the conflict country.   
 
It can therefore be concluded that successful conflict mediation is a long-term process that 
requires patience, endurance and dedication. As a peace process comprises conflict mediation, 
signing a peace agreement and the full implementation of the peace agreement, long-term 





somewhere, the triple team consisting of power mediators and the UN as a pure (neutral) 
mediator should convince the conflicting parties A and B of the need of mediation separately. 
If their mediation attempt is accepted, a ceasefire will be agreed on for further peace talks. The 
ceasefire agreement should be then replaced by a peace agreement brought about by the triple 
team. When the peace agreement has been signed, it should be fully implemented with the help 
of the same triple-team according to an agreed timetable. Ideally, the same triple-team should 
be there from the beginning till the end of the peace process. So, the work and commitment of 
experienced short-term mediators would provide the basis for successful implementation 
processes. Short-term meditators not being directly involved in the implementation process 
should impart their knowledge to long-term meditators. Good negotiation and persuasion skills 
enable positive cooperation with the rival parties, which will eventually engender reconciliation 
and lasting peace. Mediators should be flexible and show psychological sensitivity in long-term 
mediation. They should never give up and always keep the implementation process running. 
Responsibilities should be shared by the triple team for specific implementations. Lastly, 
cutting off foreign military support for civil war-torn countries might greatly facilitate 
sustainable peace. When the implementation process has been successfully completed in a post-
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Appendix A:  implementation scores of selected cases over a period of ten years. 
            El Salvador 
Years: 
            Lebanon United Kingdom 
 
The Philippines 
1.    56,94444 24,07407 58,33333 16,66667 
2.    68,05556 31,48148 72,61905 23,61111 
3.    76,38889 40,74074 80,95238 23,61111 
4.    77,77778 46,2963 83,33334 26,38889 
5.    88,88889 55,55556 84,52381 26,38889 
6.    93,05556 55,55556 80,95238 50 
7.    93,05556 55,55556 84,52381 50 
8.    95,83334 55,55556 86,90476 51,38889 
9.    95,83334 59,25926 88,09524 56,94444 
10.   95,83334 59,25926 95,2381 59,72222 
Source: Data based on the “Peace Accord Matrix” (Joshi et al. 2015). 
 










Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 177,963 21.96 24 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 172,225 21.25 28 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 145,917 18.01 20 
Sinn Féin (SF) 142,858 17.63 18 
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) 52,636 6.50 6 
United Kingdom Unionists (UKU) 36,541 4.51 5 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 20,634 2.55 2 
NI Women's Coalition (WC) 13,019 1.61 2 
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